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Most observers of the Arab world point out that Islam has and is
currently playing a significant role in the region's political life.
In particular, the more fanatical, religiously based political movements
have and are determining the internal stability of the Middle East and
consequently affect the United States' political and economic position
in the world.
The success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution has dramatically under-
scored the United States' ignorance of the political impact of Islam.
Not only has the revolution embarrassed the United States but it has also
threatened the stability of those regimes which America currently depends
upon economically and politically; specifically, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Given the political influence of Islam and the importance of Saudi
Arabia to the United States, the question must be asked concerning Saudi
Arabia's ability to withstand the current wave of Islamic revolutionary
activity.
Through an analysis of two previous politically influential Islamic
Fundamentalist Movements in the Middle East; the Moslem Brotherhood of
Egypt and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Movement, as well as an in
depth analysis of Saudi Arabian society and politics, this thesis will
prove that Saudi Arabia cannot withstand the strains presented by Islamic
fundamentalist activity. Specifically, it will confirm that certain,
identifable socio-political phenomena exist in Saudi Arabia today that
were common to both Egypt and Iran and ultimately will lead to a change
in relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, if not a dramatic
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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the political impact of Islam in the affairs of
Middle Eastern states, it is appropriate to reconsider the
ways in which Islam may affect the political values and policy
choices of the ruling elites in the Middle East. Further,
little effort has been made to account for the political
strengths and weaknesses of the fundamentalist movements in
the region and thus a research into their origins, beliefs and
directions are also appropriate.
The spectacular success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution
has most dramatically underscored the United State's ignorance
of the political impact of Islam. Not only has the revolution
embarrassed the United States but it also threatens America
as well as those regimes which the United States' currently
depends upon economically and politically; specifically, Saudi
Arabia and Egypt.
Fortunately, there are currently several well documented
cases of politically influential Islamic Fundamentalist move-
ments in the Middle East. Two movements in particular, the
Moslem Brotherhood of Egypt and the recent Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary movement provide the analyst with a clear picture
of the power, beliefs and politics of Islam in the twentieth
century. One movement, the Moslem Brotherhood, has been rela-
tively neutralized by the ruling elite in Egypt yet remains
influential even today despite decades of persecution. The

other movement found in Iran has decidedly destroyed the
ruling elite and placed another religiously inspired govern-
ment under its control in power. Both movements, then, dra-
matically represent the past and present success of militant
Islam and provide an indication of what Western analysts can
expect to see in the future politics of the Middle East.
Of particular importance to the United States will be the
effect that the recent Iranian Revolution will have on the
political and societal stability of Saudi Arabia. Representing
Islamic fundamentalism at its extreme and greatest power, the
Iranian Revolution has sent shock waves felt throughout the
Middle East and most assuredly will affect the future politi-
cal and societal direction of Saudi Arabia. The question must
be raised then, concerning the Saudi ruling elite's ability
to withstand the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism. It
is the thesis of this work that though there are some notable
differences between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Iran, there
are enough political and social similarities to warrant the
belief that Saudi Arabia faces a crisis which will undoubtedly
force a shift in its political and economic alignment with
the Western world, and produce a dramatic upheaval in its
internal politics and society. In any case, the United States
has much to lose politically and economically if it continues
to ignore Islam as a political force and faces as well a
crisis of its own in the near future if Saudi Arabia bends
to its pressures.

The following hypothesis is offered to support this
thesis;
1. That Moslem fundamentalism is a response to:
a. the political impact of the West either through
colonialism and/or the Israeli occupation of
Palestine,
b. the dramatic changes in the social structure of
selected countries brought about by the influence
of Western technology and culture,
c. the rising secularism of Arab governments and
societies
,
d. the alienation of Moslem intellectuals and class
groups who can be sociologically identified,
e. the discontent of poor, rural, highly traditional
populace,
2. That all fundamentalist movements have in common
a. a traditional Islamic education and upbringing,
b. an alienation brought on by the social-political
changes which appear to denigrate or destroy
Islamic values,
c. simplistic, religiously inspired solutions to
complex social and political problems,
3. That Saudi Arabian politics and society;
a. show social problems identical to Egypt and Iran
as a result of its modernization efforts,




c. is threatened by radical regimes outside of its
borders,
d. has unique internal problems of its own requiring
immediate solutions,
e. and finally, has a well established and unique
fundamentalist movement and tradition with its
own borders
.
In order to best appreciate the problems of Saudi Arabia
today and for the near future, this work will analyze first
the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and then the Iranian Islamic
Revolution in Iran. In both studies, an effort will be made
to not only reveal the social and political problems respon-
sible for ensuring the rise and success of the fundamentalist
movements but their ideological and organizational structures
as well. In so doing, certain socio-political phenomena will
be identified and will act as a measuring device so that an
in depth analysis and comparison can be made in regards to
Saudi Arabia.
It will be proven that the past and present cases of Islamic
fundamentalism are directly applicable to the future of Saudi
Arabia. As such, Saudi Arabia, long touted as a bastion of
stability, will face a crisis not unlike that faced by Egypt
and Iran and as a result American foreign policy in the Middle
East will be faced with yet another crisis in the near future.
Because of the severe repercussions of such an event, it is
hoped that this paper may prove valuable for whatever insight
it may reveal into the dynamics of Islam and the fundamentalist
movements; their past, present and future.
11

II. THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1928 a diminutive school teacher in Ismailia named
Hassan al-Banna founded an association called al-Ikwan al
Muslimum (The Society of Moslem Brotherhood) . Little did
the Egyptian government nor the world realize that this little
inauspicious club would soon rise to the most influential
political/religious movement in Egypt's modern history and a
power to be reckoned with throughout the Middle East region.
Its emergence as a religiously inspired political movement
is not without precedence in Egypt or the Arab World as
several similar militant Islamic fundamentalist movements had
risen to similar heights of power and influence, as the
Wahhabiyya, Mahdist and Sannusi movements amply demonstrate.
Its political organization and ideology are, however, unique
in the Islamic world as is its political impact on the
political/religious environment in the Middle East today.
Consequently, no study on the impact of Islamic Fundamentalist
movements upon Middle Eastern politics is complete without a
thorough understanding of the Moslem Brotherhood. Indeed, it
remains a premise of this work that the birth and success of
the movement clearly illustrate certain sociological phenomena
which can be identified, defined and utilized in the study of
other Islamic fundamentalist movements. Through an analysis
of the Moslem Brotherhood, those factors which contribured to
its strength and weakness may provide the historical and
12

sociological data necessary to completely understand present
similar movements and quite possibly, predict the emergence
or revival of future ones.
With this in mind, the political, religious, economic
background of Egypt prior and during the movement's growth
will be reviewed, as well as the political/religious organiza-
tion, ideology and activities of the movement from 1928 to
present.
B. BROTHERHOOD HISTORY
Upon reviewing the history of modern Egypt and for that
matter the Moslem World, the establishment of the Moslem
Brotherhood (or Brethren) was the natural result of socio-
logical and religious problems encountered by Islamic peoples
in the 19th and 20th centuries.
The Brotherhood was an Islamic nationalist
organization and movement that derived its
special strength from the acute tensions built
upon Egyptian society during the modern era.
In its Islamic manifestation, it was an out-
growth of ultraconservative Muslum reaction
against the Western Christian penetration of
Egypt from the middle of the 19th Century. In
its nationalism, it was a product of the ,
Egyptian nationalist movement from 1879 to 1936.
Consequently, the world Hassan al-Banna was born into and
which consequently molded the ideology of his movement was
not unlike that faced by most Third World countries thrust
into the 20th century. Egypt at the time of his birth
remained under the control and occupation of a Western foreign
power, Great Britain. As a result of this foreign domination
and British colonial policies, the nation gradually became
13

westernized and modernized. Because of this foreign occupation
and modernization, Egypt faced not only national humiliation
but a severe intellectual crisis brought on by the conflicting
forces of conservatism and modernism a crisis which challenged
ancient societal values and religious beliefs.
As a nation emerging from a medieval society, Egypt found
itself at a crossroads which seemingly placed before it the
choice of either accepting or totally rejecting the Western
way of life forced upon it. The Moslem Brotherhood under
Hassan al-Banna arose to challenge the Westernization, the
modernization, the occupation and the consequential seculari-
zation. It attempted, as the bastion of conservatism, to
create a uniquely Islamic alternative and solution for the
problems facing young Egyptians.
Raised in an ultraconservative village environment, taught
by religious schools and inspired by a Sufi brotherhood,
Hassan al-Banna reacted violently even at an early age to the
2
changes developing in his country. World War I had left
Egypt with a legacy of strikes, shortages and political/
nationalistic unrest. The occupation of British armed forces
exacerbated nationalistic feelings of the population. It was
during this period of civil strife that al-Banna 's views on
nationalism crystallized.
More importantly, events during this period were creating
a society not unlike that of Westernized states. Al-Banna
viewed these changes as a departure from the fundamentals of
Islam, from the perfect community (umma) of the believers.
14

As a youth, Hassan al-Banna was greatly influenced by both
his deeply religious father and by the one of the many Sufi's
Brotherhoods in Egypt, the Hasafiyya Brotherhood. Inspired
by the two and moved by the works of Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali,
al-Afghani, and by Rashid Rida, al-Banna became stricken with
what was perceived as the moral decay of the society.
No one but God knows how many nights we
spent reviewing the state of the nation . .
.
analysing the sickness, and thinking of the
possible remedies. So disturbed were we that
we reached the point of tears.
His proclivity for joining and organizing societies was
marked not only by religious and Sufi intentions but also by
nationalistic motives. Patriotic duty was considered unavoid-
able and obligatory. Consequently al-Banna took part in the
nationalist strikes and protests during the violent years
leading to Egypt's independence in 1919.
After assignment as a teacher in Ismailia in September
1927, he continued his religious activities by preaching in
the mosques and cafes. In March 1928, he founded the Society
of Moslem Brotherhood (fam. ' iyyat al-ikhwan al-muslimin) with
a meager following of six loyal followers. By judiciously
avoiding controversial subjects, he was able to gain the
approval of the ulema, shaikhs, clubs and important people as
well as expand his membership. Concerning this he said,
I tried to make this a broad, general move-
ment based on science, education and a spirit of




Evidently, his call for the return to the faith and of the
rewards of the simple religious life struck responsive chords
among the poor and illiterate working class who could only
compare their lives with those of the wealthy Europeans living
amidst them. Interestingly, though working among the British
occupation forces and foreigners, no political activity had
emerged as yet.
Al-Banna continued spreading his movement by means of
travel, speeches, pamphlets, letters & newspapers. Soon over
fifty chapters were organized and through the merger with the
Society of Islamic Culture in 1933 he was able to exploit not
only their administrative and organizational capability but also
their numbers. Accordingly, this early period of growth can
be characterized as a period of preparation, organization and
diversification of membership. Actual political activity was
confined to calls for the dissolution of political parties and
letters to King Farouk and princes urging them to follow the
path of Islam, its rules, laws and civilization. The Brother-
hood had not yet taken to violence, nor did it shrink from
cooperation with government institutions. By 1938, the move-
ment had solidified and assumed its final shape laying down as
its principles upon which it was to be based upon. Al-Banna
said:
It is a Salafite movement, an orthodox way,
a Sufi reality, a political body, an athletic
group, a scientific and cultural society, an
economic company and a social idea.
16

Almost contradictorily, he also said;
My brothers: you are not a benevolent
society, nor a political party, nor a local
organization having limited purposes. Rather
you are a new soul in the heart of this nation
to give it life by means of the Qur'an; you are a
new light which shines to destroy the darkness
of materialism through knowing God: and you
are the strong voice which rises to recall the
message of the Prophet. .
.
In the years 1939 to 1945, the movement entered a new
phase, a phase characterized by more growth, success in its
social programs and by recognition and persecution by govern-
mental forces.
It's broad program of social action continued to expand
and bear fruit through the large influx of members, good
organization and plentiful funds. Commensurate with its
religious activism, the Brethen had through its formative
years created charitable foundations, textile and rug factories,
built mosques, ran dispensaries and built schools. The
society had been so successful that it had become a jugger-
naut of such size and success that no political party much
less the Egyptian government could ignore it.
The government during the war years had gone through several
regimes under the leadership of Ali Makir, Hasan Sabai,
Husayn Sirri, al-Nakhas, Ahmad Makir, al-Nugrashi, Isma 'il
Sidqi, and then al-Nuqrashi again. During the first two
ministries, the Brotherhood maintained their social activism
and even cooperated with Ali Makir * s decision of neutrality
during World War II. However, due to British pressure the
government under Husayn Sirri began what was to become the
17

consistent fate of the Brethren, political persecution. Their
presses were shut down, meetings closed and later its leaders
arrested, including Hasan al-Banna himself. This oppression,
however, brought them ever more attention of the masses and
ggarnered them more support and followers. The al-Nakhas
regime which followed, moderated this policy, allowing the
Brotherhood to become active but only under certain restric-
tions. With Akmad Makir in power, the pendulum again moved
back to persecution. His reign was shortlived however, as he
was assassinated by his political opponents of another party.
When al-Nuqrashi took power, arrests of the Brethren were
made, followed by the heaviest restrictions of their activities
As the war ended, the movement had undergone a metamorphesis
,
i.e., from a purely religious, social oriented organization
9
with some ties to politics to a more militant, politically
active organization which had shed its peaceful approach for
those of violent action. This new era for violent change was
inauspiciously innaugurated at the general assembly held on
Sept. 8, 1949 with al-Banna in his introductory speech saying:
In the time when you will have - Oh ye Moslem
Brethren - three hundred phalanxes, each one
of them equipped spiritually with faith and
principle, mentally with science and culture,
and physically with training and exercise; at
that time ask me to plunge with you into the
depths of the seas, to send the skies with
you and to attack with you every stubborn
tyrant; then God willing, I will do it. 10
The inference to be made from his speech and was made by
his followers was that force would be used and when done so,
18

it would be "honorable and forthright, they would warn first,
and then they would come forth with dignity and resolution and
bear the consequences of their stand in all confidence and
satisfaction.
"
Several other important developments resulted from the
war years which had led to this militant stance. Foremost
among these was the establishment of a secret wing of the
brotherhood. Driven underground by the various leaders of
the government, the Brotherhood's organization naturally
developed into a more secretive society and created a secret
militant wing organized into families (usar) and a revitalized
rover system (jarwala). This secret apparatus was rationalized
as an instrument for the defense of Islam and the society and,
accordingly, began military training and storing weapons, much
to the surprise and delight of Anwar al-Sadat and the nascent
12
Free Officers Movement. This development led to another,
possibly a more important one, that is, the Moslem Brotherhood
association with the military, specifically, the revolutionary
minded officers. As one of the most powerful political forces
in the country as well as the acknowledged leader in religious/
social reform, the Brethren support was actively sought by
them. Thus many meetings and efforts to coordinate the two
independent groups were made through al-Banna, and Anwar al-
13Sadat. These early contacts were to prove fruitful at a
later date when the Free Officers' Movement seized power in
1952. Commensurate with these efforts were the relatively
successful efforts of the Brethren to recruit members from
19

the armed forces other than the revolutionary officers. This
recruitment was so successful that at a later date, the new
revolutionary government could not ignore the movement. In-
deed, it had to placate them seemingly at every turn due to
the fact that so many members of the armed forces and of the
revolutionary government itself were members of the Brethren
or had strong ties to it.
The next most significant development of this period came
from outside of the country; the British, American and
Zionist efforts in Palestine. Though active in the political
14ferment of the area since 193 6, the Brethren became increasingly
alarmed with developments of the post war partition plans.
Running diametrically opposed to the basic principle of Pan
Islamism (Pan-Arabian) and anti-imperialism , the establish-
ment of a zionist state, provided an opportunity to expand
its legitimacy and membership in other Arab states, an impetus
for massive rearmament and training and later on, actual combat
experience under the banner of a truly Islamic jihad.
The last development contributing to the growing strength
and militancy of the Brethren, arose from the impact of the
war upon Egyptian society. Inflation had gone rampant, the
gap between the wealthy upper class and the poor expanded,
unskilled rural and urban laborers were suffering severe pri-
vations and the middle class resilient before, now became
hard pressed. A significant feature of the transformed society
was the massive and catastrophic urbanization of the major
20

cities. The rapid growth in industry caused by the war
collapsed with its end, and the thousands of peasants attracted
to the urban areas became jobless and homeless. This position
of the population swelled the membership of the Brethren and
added fuel to the political fire engulfing post war Egyptian
society and government.
In essence then, as the country approached the eventual
showdown between the Brotherhood and government in 19 48, the
Brethren had become more entrenched and powerful in the society,
Through the succeeding war years, it had set up more economic
companies, strengthened their position among the working and
middle classes, established a daily newspaper, regenerated
their pamphlet propaganda, created phalanxes (para-military
units), a secret apparatus, organized more branches into
tightly knit groups not only in Egypt but in other Arab coun-
tries as well, maintained the only real effective social
welfare program, and solidified the leadership of the Director
General (al-Banna) . Their membership had reached a total of
well over 500,000 with over 1,700 branches throughout Egypt.
They had become truly a force to be reckoned with and feared.
Realizing their strengths, Hasan al-Banna embarked upon,
on what some have said was a blatant move for control of the
country. Abandoning previous efforts of conciliation with
the Sidqi and al-Nuqrashi regimes, al-Banna took the government
to task for their vascillation in the negotiations with the
British, incompetence for curing unemployment and showing
21

leniency and favoritism to foreign companies. Sidqi Pasha
retaliated with arrests and confiscations of Brethren presses.
When he resigned, al-Nuqrashi maintained the counterattack
that only the Palestine War of 1948 interrupted. The Brethren
participation in the war though initially welcome, became a
two-edged sword for the government as the combat experience
of the Brotherhood and rumors of their intent to overthrow
the government became well known. Consequently, a military
order, dated 8 December 1948 (No. 63) was promulgated dis-
banding the Brethren and its branches, closing all their
centers, seizing all papers and assets of the organization.
All funds and companies were taken and many arrests were again
made. Al-Banna attempted to negotiate with the government
but his efforts came to nought as al-Nuqrashi was assassinated
on 28 December 1948. Following this execution blamed on the
Brethren, al-Banna reversed his militant stand and publicly
denounced the violent activities of this society. The effort
again was to no avail and on 12 February 1949 al-Banna himself
was assassinated by members attributed to the Sa - dist party.
The government persecution prevailed with lengthy trials and
the Brethren's strength was diminished but not eradicated.
Despite their depleted resources and tarnished image, the
association prevailed and by 1950, a new leader emerged, a
former judge by the name of Hasan Ismail-al-Hudaybi. On 15
Dec. 19 51, the new government under the Wafd Party and al-
Nahhas released some of the Brethren properties and lifted the
22

ban on press activities. By 18 December 1951, their legality
became a fact with a court order. As a result of this and the
law of 23 April 1951, the Brethren were able to resume their
activities openly but with some restrictions. Character-
istically, they managed to avoid the prohibitions and continued
their secret activities and military preparations. Thus began
a new phase of the association, one of gathering in the rem-
nants, regrouping of ranks and filling of various posts in
17preparation for a new surge. During this phase the Brethren
regained their previous position when the Egyptian/British
negotiation efforts & crises renewed. Hudaybi cautiously
avoided the political arena and in some instances, cooperated
with the regime. Further, the new leader attempted to quietly
reorganize and strengthen the association foundations including
a major restructuring of the top leadership. Besides the
inauguration of this cautious approach to politics, the society
underwent a major intellectual effort to crystallize and sys-
tematize their ideology. This effort resulted in a plethora of
articles, books and speeches written on all subjects concerning
Islam and government, and attempted to fill the void of the
politically expedient generalizations of the al-Banna era.
Though the association had regained some of their power,
it did not recapture its previous power due not only to the
decimation caused by political persecution but by more devas-
tating in-house fighting after al-Banna' s death and the
tarnished image of political violence and terrorism. The
internal schism of the association proved the most debilitating
23

of all factors in the decline of power and influence. When
Hudaybi was officially appointed Director General in 17 Oct
1951, the election was looked upon by some members as tem-
18porary and transitory. Hudaybi, however, through a variety
of means, notably through secrecy and packing of key positions
in the organization, consolidated his hold and developed a
program designed to further increase his power and standing
within the society. These moves, especially his insistence
on secrecy and undisputed author itv, exacerbated existent
rivalries within the demoralized association. Consequently,
Hudaybi ' s personal background and style of leadership both
completely different from the awesome personality of al-Banna
only worsened the situation as did his close association and
19frequent visits to King Farouk.
Later, the Egyptian government was able to capitalize on
this disunity by playing its hand in the support of the
Hudaybi opposition and publicizing the schism.
Despite the divisions within the ranks, the Brotherhood
still maintained a powerful voice in the society. Hudaybi
continued his policy of limited cooperation with the government
and abhorrence to violence. When the great riot of 2 6 Jan
1952 broke out in Cairo, Hudaybi denied and denounced any part
of it. Nevertheless, he was arrested and later released. At
the same time, his tenuous hold on the secret apparatus became
apparent as they partook in terrorist activity against the
British in the Suez Canal Zone.
At this juncture in time, the Moslem Brotherhood entered
a third phase of political activity, that is, active support
24

of and later persecution by, the Free Officer's Movement. By
the time of the 23 July 1952 revolution, the Brethren were
firmly established not only within the ranks of the army but
within the revolutionary elite as well. As mentioned before,
a liaison had already been established between the Brethren
through the services of Anwar al-Sadat and later, Abdal-
20Munim Abd al-Rauf. Their participation in the 1948 war
had placed them in good standing with the army in particular
Jamal Abdal-Nasir who directly benefited from their support
21in the siege of the al-Juflaq pocket. Further, their activi-
ties against the British in the Canal Zone provided added
legitimacy to the new revolutionary leader's eyes.
In any event, the Brotherhood were called upon to support
the coup by providing protection to foreigners, sparking
support in the streets in case it faltered, assisting in
order and security and by assisting and protecting the revolu-
tion if the coup failed.
Once in power, however, the temporary alliance collapsed.
At the onset, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) opened
the doors for Brethren participation. Hudaybi without con-
22
suiting the General Assembly offered three men for Cabinet
posts of which only Hasan al-Baquri was acceptable to the
RCC. Hudaybi, evidently insulted and desiring greater voice
in the affairs of the government, publicly refused to cooper-
ate with the new government which in turn was seen by the RCC
as duplicity and hostility towards the new government. Hudaybi
25

pressed for a role as the spiritual leader of the new regime
nonetheless and campaigned for the establishment of an Islamic
Constitution, religious government, and land reform. On 16
Jan 1953, despite the differences, the RCC allowed the Brethren
to escape a new law prohibiting political parties. However,
on 23 Jan 1953, the RCC announced the creation of the Libera-
tion Party, built as the nucleus of a political organization
to replace the abolished parties. The feud renewed itself
again as the new organization was seen as a challenge to the
Brethren role as "civil protector" and popular voice of the
people.
Matters came again to a head when the government conpleted
negotiations on the evacuation of the Canal Zone. Hudaybi
rejected the treaty stating that a jihad or armed struggle
was the only way to oust the British. This created a rift
within the Brethren ranks and was astutely exploited by the
RCC. Backing Hudaybi rivals within the society, they were
able to demoralize and split the ranks further. On October
21, 1954 a coup was made within the Brotherhood which was
quickly quelled by Hudaybi but not before serious harm had
23
come to the association's unity. Finally, after several
violent clashes in the streets between RCC supporters (Libera-
tion Movement) and an attempted assassination of Nasir on 26
October 1954, arrests were made of the Brethren's secret
apparatus. Hudaybi himself was arrested and along with six
others, convicted of the attempt to overthrow the government.
All except Hudaybi who was given a stay of execution, died on
26

the gallows despite a wave of protests throughout the Arab
24
world. Along with the trial of the Brethren, the dissolu-
tion of the society was ordered again. This time, the dis-
25illution was to remain in effect till the 1970 's.
For a variety of reasons, then, the Brethren again seemingly
collapsed. In retrospect, Hudaybi had committed serious
errors in his administration, leading his organization to its
worst political defeat and dissolution. Analysts point out
that the Brethren, again like 1948, had prematurely intervened
into politics. The internal dissension and drive for reforms
within the society had left the community weak and demoralized.
Further, the Brethren had insisted on reestablishing principles,
and practices that were now perceived by many as being no
longer compatible with modern conditions. Finally, most of
the programs which had made the Brethren popular had been
coopted by the RCC who in turn were seen by the population as
the legitimate government who had ousted a corrupt regime and
deserved support.
It was practically completely ousted from
the political arena not so much by repressive
action taken against it as because of the
progressive social and economic reforms effected
in the country, the atmosphere of moral and
political uplift and the awakening of the
national and human dignity of millions of
ordinary Egyptians. The socio-psychological
ground was thus knocked from under the feet of
the Brotherhood. 2°
Despite the repression and executions, the Moslem Brother-
hood miraculously survived, a fact not lost on Abdal-Nasir
or Anwar al-Sadat. Driven underground, the society existed
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in secrecy composed mainly of members of the secret apparatus.
While thousands including Hudaybi remained in prison the
headquarters moved to Syria and the Brethren continued to
maintain their organizational structure and ties with Egypt.
Until 1965, the Brethren were thought to have been completely
27destroyed or neutralized. However, activity in Jordan and
in Syria indicated that it still remained a viable force, at
least outside of Egypt. Then on 29 Aug 1965 it was reported
that President Nasir had crushed a plot by the Brotherhood
28
to overthrow the government. '"' Evidently led by Said Ramadan,
an exiled Egyptian, the Brotherhood had survived the persecu-
tion. Having moved their headquarters to Geneva, and receiving
funding from other Arab sources they were again politically
29
active.
Though the plot was known well in advance and despite
wholesale arrests (4-6,000), the attempt to assassinate
Egypt's top leaders and unleash a wave of terrorism almost
30
succeeded. The significance of the effort, not lost to
Egyptian leaders was not the plot itself but that its perpe-
trators represented elements not only from the lower classes
but from the professional middle class as well. Not only was
this startling to the regime but the fact that they were
young and direct products of Nasir 's new society when one would
suspect as being its heatiest supporters was even more alarming.
After lengthy trials and over thousands of arrests, seven death
sentences were handed down. Notably Sayid Kotub the chief
32ideologist of the society was among the executed. The
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trials indicated again that many of the convicted were students,
33teachers, scientific workers and engineers. Despite Arab
34
world protests such as in Jordan, Sudan and Pakistan they were
hung and many others imprisoned.
It was not until 10 Nov 1967, after the disastrous 196-7
Arab-Israeli War that the government released 1,000 prisoners
arrested for the 1965 plot. Supposedly, it was a move made
35by Nasir to show he had no fear of the Brethren. This and
other releases was later followed ominously by Brethren
3 6inspired student rioting in November 1968. Once again the
Moslem Brotherhood were active in propaganda and demonstrations
and were threatening the stability of the regime. Among the
items protested by the society was the liaison and close
ties with the Soviet Union. The protests and propaganda
37found receptive ears among a disenchanted military who
chafed under the growing Soviet influence and sympathized
with the call for a jihad against their humiliators, Israel.
After Nasir's death (20 Sept 1975), and emergence of
Anwar al-Sadat as leader of Egypt (15 Oct 197 0) , the Moslem
Brotherhood again came to the forefront of Egyptian politics.
After releasing more prisoners including Hasan Hudaybi , Sadat
appeared to be on the road to reconciliation with the society.
His moves however could not be construed as a manifestation
of friendship or trust based on previous prerevolutionary
experience. Sadat, evidently feeling the growing pressures
of the leftist movement needed a counterbalance which the
Brethren could and did give Sadat the much needed support in
29

the ouster of the Soviets and against Sadat's rivals, Vice
38President Ali Sabri and his group.
The Brethren despite this show of cooperation were found
implicated in another coup attempt on 21 April 1974. An
armed attack on a military college with the aim of overthrowing
the government was led by a group calling themselves the
39
Islamic Liberation Organization. Though quickly crushed,
the plot showed that Moslem fanaticism was far from muted by
the government. Indeed, a Parliamentary commission investi-
gating clashes between Copts and Moslems ranging back to 1972
found "that there had been an upsurge of religious fervor
and that some of this fervor had taken on the form of fanata-
,,40
cism.
Possibly in view of this report and acknowledging the
growing strength of the Brethren, Sadat released more Brethren
41prisoners.
This period under Sadat then can be described as a rebirth
for the society long suffering over 20 years of political
repression. With the release of many of its members, the
publishing of its of ficial newspaper, Al Da'wa, emergence of
demonstrations and activities in the Cairo University, and
a gradually perceived revival of Islam throughout the Arab
world, the Moslem Brotherhood appeared again to be on its way
to a true political force not unlike that of its earlier years.
Conservative elements exist today fueling their drive to power
which the Sadat regime cannot ignore and indeed can be seen to
30

42have been acknowledged by him. The pressure of conserva-
tism has yielded results as can be seen by the acceptance
of the government of the principle that laws will not be
adopted which contradict Islamic Sharia laws. Further, laws
prohibiting alcohol were in the process of promulgation and a
43liberal bill concerning women's rights shelved.
This conservative trend was seen not only as a manifes-
tation of Sadat's conservatism but also as a result of encourage-
ment from Saudi Arabia.
When riots broke out in the spring of 1977, the government
hastened to condemn leftists and exempt the Brethren from
fault. These riots, symptomatic of the deteriorating Egyptian
economy and Sadat's actions were seen by analysts as cutting
Sadat's freedom of political maneuver. As a result of the
exemption, the society was now more than ever conscious of
their power and privileged position and thus made increasing
44demands on the President.
The Moslem Brotherhood have exploited the current events
and have gained considerable strength from the Arab world,
notably Saudi Arabia. However, it must be noted that though
they enjoy "considerable and important support inside the
regime and is working to establish itself as the defender of
order in Egypt" it lacks the political clout of its early
45years. It is less organized than its Nasserite and
Communist counterparts. It does not have a program capable
of providing solutions for the economic and social malaise
found in Egypt today. It currently lacks support among,
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ironically, the working class and poor peasantry and has
46inherited a historical distrust from many in the government.
The fairly recent terrorist activities of the al-Takfir
ol Higra (atonement and exodus) group has not alleviated the
suspicions and fears of the government.
In fact, the current regime does not enjoy any support
from the Brotherhood due to its peace efforts and treaty with
48Israel. Groups of Moslem Brethren have demonstrated greater
opposition to the negotiations and since political parties
today exhibit the same characteristics of previous ones, there
is the increased possibility that these activities will be
exploited and thus project the Brethren as the only viable
alternative to the Sadat government. The unofficial truce
with Sadat appears to have collapsed and a new wave of repres-
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sion seems likely. In any event, the society has declared
a jihad against the peace accords and they are willing to
use violence and terrorism to disrupt them and the regime.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE BROTHERHOOD
1. The Problem
In retrospect, what can account for the spectacular
rise, fall and resurrection of the Moslem Brotherhood? Clearly
certain historical and sociological events determined its rapid
growth and strength and just as clearly, certain organizational
elements contributed to its power as well. As far as histori-




1. European military, commercial and cultural imperialism.
2. Rapid modernization and Westernization of the society.
3. Rapid secularization of the society.
4. Religious/intellectual crises concerning role of
Islam.
5. Social disparities between classes both indigenous
population and Europeans.
6. Rise of Arab nationalism/Rise of Pan-Arabism.
7. Political and Economic ineffectiveness of the Western
party system and capitalism.
8. Creation of the state of Israel.
The basic problem confronting the 20th century Egyptians
lay in the British interference and later full military occu-
pation of the land. For more than a century, Egypt forced
by European incursions developed from a medieval society to
a modern state. This development produced strains which
threatened to rip the entire social fabric of the Islamic
community. These strains, bad as they were for any developing
nation were executed by European imperialism and exploitation
and consequently all evils and ills were blamed on the foreigners
presence and his institutions. Modernization and Westernization
become not something to be looked forward to by the devout
Moslem but something to abhor and prevent. As al-Banna said,
"It is the culture and civilization of Islam which deserve to
52be adopted and not the nationalistic philosophy of Europe."
The exploitation of Egypt's resources was considered rape
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and restructuring of the government along Western lines as
cultural imperialism.
The evacuation of the British troops from Egypt
in 1954 meant for the Brothers the end of the
'military-political-ethical-social invasion.
'
Here again, in the social order imperialism was
seen as the fountain head of corruption. When
the armies of Europe came to Egypt, they brought
with them their laws, schools, languages, and
sciences; but also their 'wine, women and sin.'
The introduction of the traditions and values of
the West has corrupted society, bred immorality,
and destroyed the inherited and traditional
values of Moslem society.
"
Consequently, with Washington as a scapegoat for the inevitable
social/economic dislocation occurring in Egypt, Islamic
fundamentalism coupled with nationalistic activity found a
receptive audience.
Besides the hateful presence of the Europeans, there
were varying social/economic problems confronting the emergent
Egypt. The image of Islam in the modern world created a
religious and intellectual crisis which had gripped the Arab
54
world. How could Islam, created by God, have fallen to
such low esteem and power to be dominated by the infidel West?
For some, Islam needed to be reformed and restructured to
meet the demands of modern society. For others, a return to
the true Islamic state was called for, emphasizing Islamic
law (Sharia) , the traditions of the prophet and the pure
state of the community of the believers (urnma) . The debate,
however, was always waged on the intellectual level and it
took Hasan al-Banna representing the conservative element to
apply intellectual debate to lasting political action. To
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al-Banna, the famed university of al-Azhar, its teachers, and
the ulema in general had failed to vitalize Islamic faith.
They had fallen under the direction of the government who
used them for what was perceived as political expediency.
As a matter of fact, the educational system of Egypt had been
reorganized along Western secular lines with religious leaders
no longer in control or teaching. Various Christian mission-
ary schools had been established and were enrolling ever
increasing numbers of Egyptians. Divisional strife was
rampant as the various religious sects vied for religious
legitimacy and power and hundreds of Sufi brotherhoods dotted
the country. In this atmosphere al-Banna urged a return to
the past, unity of ranks, and a revitalization of Quranic
precepts
.
The government, stylized after a Western parliamentary
structure proved ineffective in coping with the economic and
social malaise growing within the country. Political parties
were identified by the Brethren as the bastion of personal
greed and interests, lacking social programs and goals, governed
by men and not ideas, and ruling as kings not servants as
specified by the Quran. The corruption and inefficiencies of
both the parties and government provided him with the necessary
facts to prove the moral deficiencies of Western constitu-
tionalism and parliamentary systems.
The foreign economic exploitation in the form of the
capitalistic system not only created a wealthy European class
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in Egypt but also an ever widening gap between the rich and
poor native population. The maldistribution of land and wealth
started by Ismail and nurtured by the successive governments
provided an impetus for social change which al-Banna felt
could only be accomplished by his organization. Particularly
irksome was the establishment of Western laws and codes which
were created by man not God and worse, sometimes violated the
principles of the Sharia. Finally, the creation of a Palestine
mandate proved beyond a doubt that imperialism and Zionism
were establishing a permanent state insulting and humiliating
to all Islamic peoples.
These factors resulted in a spiritual crisis,
a struggle between the old and new, religion
and science, liberalism and tradition. 56
2. The Solution
Faced with these problems, Hasan al-Banna offered a
solution through his Society of Moslem Brotherhood. There was
a need to go back to the Quran and reinterpret it in a literal
sense while disregarding all the modern interpretations pre-
valent in intellectual circles. Accordingly, six principles
were outlined by the Moslem Brotherhood for the betterment
of the society. The tenets of the Brethren began with
the Quran and its interpretation. It would be scientific;
the Quran would be precisely explained and interpreted, reveal-
ing it in the spirit of the age and defending it from false-
hoods. It would and could be proven to be compatible with the
spirit of the age and in complete harmony with modern science
and knowledge. The second principle was the unity of the
nation and all Islamic peoples around the Quranic tenets. All
36

divisions and sects with the ununa could be reconciled and
the pristine state of the community of Mohammad's time
recreated.
The third principle was economic. The Brotherhood's goals
were the growth of national wealth, protection and liberation
of its resources, an increase in the standard of living, the
realization of social justice, social security for all and
the guarantee of equal opportunity for all. Fourthly, the
Brethren emphasized social service in the struggle against
ignorance, disease, poverty and vice by utilizing charitable
organizations. Fifth, the Brethren promised to liberate the
country, all Arab lands and Moslem communities from all
foreigners while at the same time promising rights for all
minorities. Lastly, the society would strive for universal
peace and humanitarian civilization based on the principles
of Islam.
In order to obtain fruition of these principles Ishak
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Musa Hussaini identified nine more principles and tactics.
They were : the avoidance of theological disputes and devotion
to the bare essence of Islam. In this way, the society appealed
to a broad base of the population. They attempted to avoid
all political parties and organizations as this would maintain
the purity of the movement. Commensurate with this the Brethren
would avoid domination by government leaders and prominent
men for the same reason. The Brotherhood stressed the idea of
gradual development with stages for growth being propaganda,
inculcation of ideas, application, action and production. They
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would seek such help of the power of doctrine, faith, unity,
solidarity and finally weapons, using force only when necessary
So if the people refuse to listen to this
call and resort to defiance, oppression and
revolt, then, as a last measure, recourse
should be had to the sword to disseminate the
call. 59
Because Islam makes government one of its cornerstones
and is itself the embodiment of rule, execution, legislation
and education, the Brethren sought the establishment of a
religious government. As another principle, they believed in
Arab unity and Islamic unity under the symbol of a Caliphate
who would represent this unity and bind all lands together.
Finally, the society believed all Western countries to be
aggressive and imperialistic and as such the Brethren would
work to throw off their yoke, "for death is better than a
life of slavery and humiliation."
The Brotherhood saw education as the focus for the imple-
mentation of these goals and principles. Accordingly, they
called on the government to provide a program of education
that would: inculcate national spirit, emphasize Islamic
history and civilization, establish religious instruction,
reconsider the educational programs for girls, remove those
who were corrupt in their faith from the teacing profession
and finally, encourage the practical sciences so that the
nation could be technologically strong.
Not content on waiting for implementation of these goals,
the Brethren set up their own schools for the poor in order
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to establish the system on such far-sighted
principles as will ingrain religious tenets
in the minds of students, preserve their health,
inform them of religious injunctions, develop
in them self respect and, along with it, broaden
their vision about contemporary affairs. "O
Further, they constructed mosques, established dispensaries
provided health and life insurance for members, set up pro-
grams for the dispensation of alms and built up their own
industries along Islamic socialist ideas.
To reach the ultimate goal of the establishment of a
religious state, its members were trained for the jihad
necessary for its accomplishment.
It is this very collective mission towards
which Allah has beckoned the whole Moslem
Millat so as to turn them into one solid phalanx,
one power and one force. So that they should
become an army of such selfless soldiers as
would glorify the entire humanity by leading
it to the path of truth. They should be
devoted to prayer in the night and be horsemen
during the day. 61
The members were prepared by encouraging athletic sports,
creating groups of rover scouts and phalanxes, stressing
absolute obedience and finally instruction of Islamic tenets.
They were able to accomplish many of their goals, then,
by their comprehensive programs which included all aspects
of life, be it spiritual, social, scientific, economic, indus-
trial, political or military. Their success can be attri-
buted not only on the exploitation of the events and conditions





The society has been compared to the workings of a
fine watch and its success was directly attributed to its
6 2
synchronization. The organization was described as:
a precise and exact organization; secondly, it
is a mixture of various other organizations;
thirdly, the method of organization is the
most outstanding of its characteristics, and
indicative of its strength and success; and
fourth, it bears a religious stamn which is
the mark of the entire movement. 62
Due to the talents of its founder and Director General, al-
Banna, the organization developed into a large well oiled
machine. At its top sat al-Banna and later Hudaybi as
Director General (or General Guide) . He was required to
devote all his time to the society, provide tis direction,
settle all disputes and remain above internal politics. He
was elected for a life term but could be required to resign
if he abused his powers. Below him presiding over the opera-
tion of the society, supervising its administration and exe-
cuting its policy lay the General Guidance Council (GCC) , led
by a Secretary General elected by the Consultative Assembly.
The Consultative Assembly whose membership varied between
100-150, worked alongside the GCC and supervised the progress
of the organization, the election of the GCC and supervised
the progress of the organization. All three components of
the central leadership met and performed their duties in the
general headquarters in Cairo. From this center the Techni-
cal Operation and Field Apparatus were organized and con-
trolled. The Technical Operation Branch maintained all the
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special activities enumerated above. It is in the Field
Apparatus that the heart and soul of the society can be
64formed, the brothers themselves.
Membership was divided into grades. There were
'assistant,' 'related' and 'active' grades. Any Moslem had to
declare his intention to join, agree to pay dues and sign
a membership card. He became a 'related' member after he had
understood the principles of the society, attended meetings
and committed himself to obedience. Upon fulfillment of his
physical training, achievment in Islamic study and total
dedication to the movement and its activities, he became an
'active' member. A fourth degree, 'struggler' was reserved
for a select few who made up what was later called the Secret
Apparatus. ' Women were encouraged to join the 'Moslem Sisters
but they were relegated inferior roles in the organization and
attracted few educated or upper class women.
Active members were subsequently divided into spiritual
units formed as families (aslah), usually consisting of five
members. Families were incorporated first experimentally
into battalions of 40 members but this was dropped in favor
of 'class' of 20 members. Five classes joined together to
form a 'group' and five groups formed a battalion (new system)
.
In such a system, unwieldy numbers were brought under direct
control and effective dissemination of orders and action
promulgated.
Coincident with this structure the Brethren organized




Ostensibly oriented toward scouting its young members even-
tually turned out to be the para-military arm of the society.
Perhaps the oldest of the institutions created by al-Banna,
the idea of the rovers was based on religious roots and
stressed inseparability of a healthy body and mind. it
had as its major activity, scouting, but its more important
function was to preserve order within the society and defend
it against enemies from outside. In 1948, just before its
dissolution, the society claimed over 4 0,000 members in the
6 7
group. By the end of 1953 government measures and the
society's lack of encouragement, had dissolved it.
The family and rover sections, then, were the two
major institutions for membership organization and indoctrina-
tion.
They alone reached the membership as a whole
and provided the cement in the fabric of the
the Society's power. ^°
Arising from both groups and garnering much support from them,
the secret apparatus evolved. Largely responsible for the
terror and violence blamed on the Brotherhood, their numbers
reached to a level between 1,000 and 3,000. Highly secretive,
little is known about them other than they were responsible
for the assassination attempts on leaders, notably President
Nasir, and terrorist activities (as brought out in trials)
.
It was said that they were directly controlled by al-Banna
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and Hudaybi. They had become a two-edged sword for the
Brethren as their activities brought more harm than good for
the society. Hudaybi evidently was unable to effectively
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control them or their activities, a fact not lost by Egyptian
government who in the course of the trials concerning
Nasir's attempted assassination, attacked the secret apparatus
and not the organization itself.
In any event, the organization despite internal schisms
and the independent secret apparatus, clearly withstood all
the efforts brought to bear on their succeeding governments.
After their dissolution in 1954, many felt that the society
70had been neutralized if not iradicated in Egypt. Events in
1964 (attempted coup) and their current resurrection, however,
prove that the Brethren are as viable as ever. Since 1954,
the society turned into a secret underground organization still
maintaining a semblance of its former structure.
Today, attesting to its enduring strength, the society
has emerged again with its own newspaper Al-Da'wa, university
pressure groups and an enlarged membership. There appears,
however, to be lacking a 'guide 1 on a par with al-Banna and
Hudaybi. At present, two leaders stand out, the managing
editor of Al-Da'wa, Umar al-Talmasani and former member of
the old Guidance Bureau and Shaikh Abd-al-Hamid Kishshik, who
attacks the regime every Friday in the mosques.
Though no central leadership has stood out, the
Brotherhood, nevertheless, have re-emerged, reorganized and
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are presently at odds with the government again.
D. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the Moslem Brotherhood was at its early
stages a purely religious movement employing Islamic socialist'
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73ideas. As it matured and grew in size, it swayed from
its spiritual roots and played an ever increasing role in
politics, resorting in the end to self destructive terrorism
and ending in bitter schism. Its uniqueness from other power-
ful religious movements, such as the Sanusai, Wahhab and
Mahdist revolts lay in its all inclusiveness of Islam upon
all the affairs of man not just in the spiritual realm.
Further, its tightly knit organizational structure, its popu-
lar orientation and appeal, and its successful interaction
with local events in Egypt, distinguish it from all previous
religious movements. Probably more distinctive is the fact
that the society was lay inspired and ulema led. The ulema
of Egypt had recognized the value of the religious fervor
and had acknowledged the importance of the movement but they
remained skeptical as it was thought to be lacking intellec-
tual discipline. This skepticism turned to jealousy over its
74popularity and fear over their lack of control over it.
Nevertheless, the Moslem Brotherhood had coopted the Ulema
and had become the authority for Egypt's Islamic revival.
The Brotherhood's rapid rise can be attributed to its
successful combination of religion, socialism and nationalism.
It reacted against imperialist rule with both a religious and
nationalist fervor, claiming that it was the duty for all
believers to throw off the shackles of imperialism not only
in Egypt but throughout the Moslem world. The society exploited
the sad state of domestic politics. Political parties,
according to the tenets of Islam were sinful as their disputes
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and divisiveness were not in conformity with brotherhood.
Further, they lacked social welfare programs and were con-
cerned only with ruling and not being servants of the people
according to the dictates of the Quran. Finally, the Brother-
hood offered what appeared to be a sound religious ideal and
activism in a period of political transition, intellectual
crisis and social upheaval. Facing the threat of the West,
they offered an Eastern counterattack.
All these factors, then, imperialism, domestic politics
and religious confusion, "resulted in a spiritual crisis, a
struggle between the old and the new, religion and science,
liberalism and traditionalism." In this environment, the
Brotherhood worked and promised to fill the void present in
all of Egypt. With over 500,000 members in the society, it
becomes obvious they found a receptive audience.
They offered simple remedies to a country in desperate
need of them. The society called for the return of the Quran
and Hadith, for the gathering of religious sects. They
successfully tied religion with world affairs. The religious/
intellectual crisis, a result of various materialistic ante-
cedents, could be solved through the reinstitution of an
Islamic life, religious government, a Caliphate and Pan-Islamic
ideals. It offered a comprehensive solution for societal
problems. Finally, it emphasized the new Islamic Man who




With such fertile ground to farm why did the Moslem
Brotherhood collapse? The very programs responsible for its
success also contributed to its fall. Its anti-westernism
was indiscriminate, labelling all Western institutions and
people as abhorrent and sinful. Thus the society became
labelled as reactionary. It called for unity of all religious
sects but failed to unite them. The society fell short of
its own ideal of peace, humanitarianism, and pursuit of its
aims by peaceful aims
.
As the movement grew, it became more irresponsible as
their preoccupation with politics and power led them farther
away from its goals and closer to the very corruptions it
originally set out to cure. Blinded by ambition and power it
refused to compromise its principles and reforms which by
the 1950 's were seen by many as impractical and archaic.
Increasingly, they paid only lip service to their extensive
reform programs and let some of their organization's programs
fall to the wayside (notably the Rovers) . Their theological
and intellectual arrogance alienated large segments of the
middle and upper classes and especially the ulema upon whose
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support the Brethren required. Finally, it exaggerated
the cultural and other differences between Moslems, Christians
and Jews, further alienating a large segment of the population.
For these reasons, the Brotherhood slowly eclipsed from
a popular religious socialist movement to just another violent,
divided political party. The death stroke which capped the
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fall of the Society and prevents it today from regaining the
power it used to enjoy, came through the revolution of 1953.
The revolutionary government not only removed from power the
inefficient government and party system but more importantly,
they coopted most of the social welfare programs of the
Brotherhood. Thus they and succeeding governments have under-
cut the popular appeal of the Brethren by incorporating their
more popular ideas and eradicating or at least appear to be
79
solving many of the social problems confronting the Egyptians.
They have provided free education stressing the new
Egyptian and today the Islamic Man. Government projects
continue in their attempts to provide housing, medicine and
welfare for its citizens. Though their efforts have not borne
sufficient results as yet, they are nonetheless existent and
8benefitting from government concern and efforts.
Only one problem still remains cancerous and quite possi-
bly may become an opening for Moslem Brotherhood exploitation.
The issue of Israel and the recent peace treaties have already
brought official condemnation and demonstrations by the
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Brethren. This plus some of the still unsolved social/
economic problems could provide the necessary fuel for a
Brotherhood resurgence. However, the traditional fear and
suspicion of the Brethren still remains not only within the
government but in all elements of the society. Such a resur-
gence is most likely to be met with severe repression and
thus drive the Society into prominence and ultimately under-
ground, but if their past history is any indication, it will
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never be destroyed. Instead it will remain a ghost continually
harassing the Sadat government and those that follow it.
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III. THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1976 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah held absolute power
over his nation. Because of huge profits derived from the
exploitation of oil, massive industrialization and military-
arms buildups, he felt his country was well on the road to
becoming a superpower. By 1979, however, the Shah and his
cohorts were fleeing Iran and seeking havens wherever they
could find them. An Islamic Revolution had put an end to
their dreams and boasts.
Apparently taking the world, especially the United States,
by surprise, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had done what was
felt to be the impossible. He had unified all Iranian opposi-
tion groups and overthrown the most pro-western and "stable"
regime in the Middle East. In light of all the promising
reports emanating from Iran, how was this possible? How could
an old religious leader in Paris destroy the powerful regime
in Teheran?
Many analysts answered these questions by pointing out the
"very bad economic situation," the "stifling political atmos-
phere," the "social injustices" and the "failure of the ruling
elite." All of the above certainly contributed to the
explosion but are found lacking in providing the overall
reason, the motivational and organizational impetus for the
revolt. They all overlook the driving force of Islam in
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politics. In particular, they write only the seeds for the
revolt and not the unifying factor which ensured its success.
Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the Iranian Islamic
Revolution from the perspective of the impact of Islam on
politics. As the Moslem Brotherhood of Egypt represents con-
clusively the past strengths of a conservative Islamic move-
ment, so does the Iranian Islamic Revolution depict its pre-
sent but still underestimated power.
To fully understand the reasons for its success, to
realize "why the Shah fell," this chapter will analyze first,
Shiite Islam, its origins, uniqueness and political impact.
Afterwards, the "rebirth" of the fundamentalist movement as a
political power will be reviewed along with the seeds of the
revolt. Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership, beliefs, and organi-
zational capability will be analyzed as well, thus providing
the reader with a complete picture of the Islamic Revolution
and the political impact of Islam today.
B. IRANIAN SHIITE ISLAM
The most distinctive feature of modern Iran lies in the
almost total acceptance by its population of the Shiite branch
2
of Islam. Iran, in fact, remains the only country in the
world that can claim to have always had a Shiite majority
within its national boundaries. Moreover, most Iranians belong
to the "Twelver" Shiite sect, thus imparting to Iranians a





The special characteristics of Twelver Shiism and their
role in Iranian history need to be fully explored in order
to fully understand the political impact of the faith, and
its leaders in modern Iran. Accordingly, the origins, the
uniqueness, and political impact of the faith will be delved
into in this section.
1. Origins
The Shiite branch of Islam was created from an early
dispute and division of Islam in the seventh century (AD)
.
The dispute, more political than doctrinal, arose over the
issue of leadership succession in the Moslem community. Upon
the death of the Prophet Mohammad, Ali, Mohammad's cousin and
son-in-law, was coopted of the leadership role of Caliph by
Abu Bakr, Umar and later, Uthman. This occurred despite Ali's
3pre-eminence long acknowledged by Mohammad himself. For the
sake of unity, Ali and his followers (the Shia) accepted these
men as Caliphs, but upon the death of Uthman insisted that
Ali be recognized as the leader of Islam. He thus became the
fourth Caliph and reigned for only five years (656-661 AD).
Politics intervened again and Mu'awiya, a governor in Damascus
had Ali assassinated thus throwing the community into a con-
fusion in regards to choosing the next Caliph. Believing that
the Caliph should be based upon appointment by Allah and his
prophet, and not man, Ali's sons, Hasan and Hossein were
designated by the Shiites as their Imam (leader) . Hasan
declined (later poisoned) and Hossein was slain by the forces
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of Mu'awiya, creating another martyr for the partisans of
Ali.
Though all power went to the Caliphate in Damascus and
later Baghdad, the Shiites refused to accept "the practical
compromise of the Caliphate" and created secret societies and
4
missionaries to convert the people. As followers of Ali, a
line of specially selected leaders followed Hassan and Hossein.
Eventually, the Shiites split into sects based on some of the
succeeding Imams, but not before the twelfth, and last Imam,
Mohammad al-Muntazai (d. 878 AD) was selected. The majority
of the Shiites, follow this twelfth Imam who reportedly dis-
appeared and will come again at a later date. Iranians are
considered to be "Twelvers" in that they believe in the entire
line of Imams. They follow, however, the teachings of Jafar,
the sixth Imam and are thus known as Ja'farite Shiites.
The Ja'fari Shiites differ from the other sects in their
acknowledgement of the true line of succession in that they
do not insist upon some " living examplar of the true faith.
"
Insteady they believe that the last of the twelve Imams is
now 'hidden' and will appear to bring justice to the earth at
some unannounced time. After Mohammad al-Muntazai died, four
'lieutenants' followed as leaders and interpreters of law.
After the failure of the fourth 'lieutenant' to designate a
successor, leadership fell not to a specific person but to
many of the ulema. These special men, as a group, known for
their piety and understanding of Islam, led the faithful through
the years of persecution at the hands of the Sunnis.
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Consequently, two major Shiite themes concerning the
proper government of Islam were developed due to the succession
problem. The first demands that the Imam must be a descendent
of Ali and exhibit all the qualities of pious men and kings.
He must rule through acceptance of all men and "unfailingly
institute the kingdom of God on earth." Secondly, due to the
absence of the hidden Imam, the faith created the need for
pious and talented ulema (mujtahids) to advise and guide the
ruler or Imam.
Despite succession problems, the Shiite faith sur-
vived the ruthless persecution of the Umayyad and Abbasid
caliphs by going underground and adopting the principle of
9dissimulation (Taqiyah)
.
A period of doctrinal or "ideological confusions"
however, remained. It was not until the Saffavid Empire
(1500-1722) was established in what is now present day Iran
did their political theory fully develop.
The highly politicized nature of the faith revealed
itself with this emergence of the Saffavids, for they arose
to power and influence through the clever usage of the faith.
Transforming "a Sufi order of purely local importance into a
religious movement" the Saffavids claimed a Shiite origin
"to differentiate themselves from the Ottoman's (a rival
Sunni power) and to enable them to enlist the sympathies of
all heterodox elements." They claimed descent from the
seventh Imam, Musa al-Kazim, and thus legitimized their rule
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and garnered many more followers, who were enthusiastic in
12following a man considered divine.
The new state capitalized on and sustained itself not
only through the uniqueness of this faith but upon also the
Persian nationalism which did not want to be absorbed by the
Turkish Ottomans. Thus Shiism became the religion of the
Persians and the state theocracy. The kings called themselves
Imams, appointed religious judges and regulated the religious
lands (awqaf ) . They appointed leading members of the ulema
to official positions and patronized those of any influence
and standing in the community. Finally, they accepted the
guidance and advice of the most learned ulema and thus set a
precedence to that which would undermine their power at later
a >. 13dates.
Having once attained this pre-eminence, the ulema
fought to maintain it in succeeding years. They shifted
through periods of strength and weakness depending upon who
was on the throne. Under Nadir Shah (1736-1747) the Shiite
clergy were cast aside and lost much of its material advan-
14
tages. Under the Qajars (1779-1925) the ulema "played an
important role in public life, maintaining established privi-
leges and paralyzing the progress of the country." They
obtained especially significant power in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, having successfully overturned the
Tobacco Concession (1891-1892) and forcing through a Con-
stitution in the revolt of 1905-1909. With the rise of
Reza Shah Pahlavi, the role of the ulema became considerably
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reduced and attempts were made to keep them out of political
affairs.
The Shiite faith in Iran, then, can be seen as having
deep political roots. First, with Ali and the problem of
succession and later with Ismail, the Saffavid king who adopted
and utilized the faith to create an empire distinguishable
from the Ottoman's through the succeeding years, the faith
melded with the Persian culture and created a religious society
with many unique features. The exalted and powerful position
of the ulema as well as the monarchial tradition had been
well established. But more importantly,
Not only during the 2 22 years of Safavid rule
but even up to our day, Shiism, with its over-
tones and its aroma of opposition, of martyrdom
and of revolt, is matched quite well with the
Persian character - a character formed in the
course of a long history which is very different
from the history of other people's nearby. 17
2. Uniqueness
In the course of time, the Shiite system of doctrine
and law had diverged considerably from that of Sunni's. In
many areas, they are similar in thought and attempts have been
made to legitimize the faith as the fifth orthodox 'school' of
] 8
religious jurisprudence but those attempts have so far failed.
For the purposes of this paper, however, a detailed
review of Shiite beliefs is unnecessary. There are, however,
certain unique features of the faith that bear review.
Foremost among these is the unique stature of the
ulema. The Shiites have a decided preference for a living
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leader and strong monocratic tendencies in questions of
legal interpretations. From these two drives, there emerged
the notions that the faithful follow the most learned indi-
viduals in the ulema and recognize his authority in reinterpre-
19
ting religious law. In essence, then, the Shiites unlike
the Sunni ' s , do not recognize the authority of the four schools
of law previously noted. Instead, each individual must decide
which living mujtahid to follow. Hence, a distinct feature
emerges which has great impact on politics. Unlike the Sunnis,
the Shiites have a closer knit religious hierarchy in direct
contact with the population. At the level of the masses,
there were the mullahs. Above them, the mujtahids (a restricted
group of canonists) who held power at government levels.
Finally, there are the Ayatollahs, the most learned and
respected religious figures who wielded great power over the
masses which followed them. The mujtahid' s after special
training gained power only through the following they attracted.
This power is manifested by the numbers of people who pray
behind him during the Friday prayer service and can at times
wax and wane since allegiances are fluid and easily swayed.
The Ayatollahs become the most respected and powerful through
their choice as one by the mujtahids and the people. Their
numbers vary but usually there are close to five at any one
time in Iran who wield the most influence.
The political significance of this hierarchy of ulema
lay in the fact that the voice of the Ayatollah could mobilize
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the masses and command large, previously unruly and divided
groups to do his bidding. Their voice as well as all the
ulema in Iran derive even greater legitimacy through their
historical role as protectors of the people especially against
conquering foreigners and sometimes against the indigenous
government. It was noted by one scholar;
. . . the religious classes enjoyed more respect
than any others; and since some of their
leaders at least acted as a shield for the
people from the exactions of the government,
it was to them the people looked for protec-
tion. 21
The next unique feature of the Shiite faith with great
political impact was the tendency of the religion to regard
their rulers as 'usurpers.' Legitimate rule, pending the
return of the twelfth Imam could only emanate from those
leaders of the ulema who were competent to interpret his
22
will. Ayatollah Khomeini took this principle one step
further by declaring that "monarchic rule is in conflict with
the Islamic rule and with the Islamic political system . . . only
23God is Sultan." Because temporal rulers were usurpers the
need for advice and guidance by mujtahids was paramount in
order to legitimize and maintain their rule. This principle
was firmly established in Saffavid times under Ismail and was
used as a rationale for revolt in later centuries, including
today
.
Another feature of the faith is the glorification of
martyrdom. The Shiites strongly identify with the martyrdom
of Ali and his sons. Due to the many years of religious
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persecution, the faith has incorporated martyrdom as the
highest ideal to be attained by its followers. When combined
with Persian culture, it produces a fanatacism unequalled
throughout the Middle East. As one noted in reviewing the
Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 and Persian culture, the
Persians were capable of extreme stoicism and courage.
But it is not in the conscript soldiers of
a despotic shah that we must look for the
highest manifestations of Persian courage.
It is when the Persian is inspired by that
enthusiasm for a person, a doctrine or a
cause of which he is so susceptible that his
heroism becomes transcendental . . . Persians when
exalted by enthusiasm, can meet death and the
most horrible tortures imaginable, not merely
with stoicism but with ecstasy.
^
4
When one notes this particular trait amongst the
Shiite Persians, one can fully understand the power of an
Ayatollah who can enthuse a crowd so much so that death and
hence martyrdom is actively sought after. This power coupled
with Persian fanatacism was evident not only in the Persian
Revolution of 1905-1909 but in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
The streets of Teheran and Qom were full of religious fanatics
who bared their chests and begged the shah's troops to kill
4-v, 25them.
This martyrdom complex remains powerful through another
distinct feature of Shiism, that is, the religious holidays
and passion plays (SHABI, TAZIYEH) . The Iranian calendar is
dotted with religious holidays commemorating the deaths of
Ali, Hossein and others. The most important one being the
month of Moharram in which towns and cities recreate the
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events of Imam Hossein's martyrdom at Karbala (known as
Ashura) the passion plays of which is the highlight of Moharram
often become extremely frenetic, sometimes leading to riots
against Sunnis or rival neighborhoods. The emotionalism,
aggression and grief displayed at such times can and has been
utilized as demonstrations of opposition to the central govern-
ment. It's highly political character has made it a time of
concern for whomever is in power and demonstrates most aptly
27
the true mobilizxng and political power of the ulema.
Finally, there is the distinct unification of Shiism
and nationalism. As noted earlier, Shiism was accepted in the
early periods of Iranian history due in large part for its
distinctiveness from the Sunni and hence Ottoman empire. It
was a major rallying point for the Persians to throw off the
yoke of foreigners and their occupation forces. This acceptance
of Shiism is also due to the fact that Hossein had married
the daughter of Yazdgerd III, the last Sassanian (Persian)
monarch and that subsequent Imams were descendents of that
marriage. In this way, the line of Imams was Aryanized and
hence, distinctly Persian.
This symbolic unity of Shiism with Persian particu-
larism and nationalism was and continues to be reinforced by
the ulema. It was they who most often led the revolts against
colonialists as well as with the status quo. It was the
mujtahids who fired the people's emotions with religious and
nationalist fervor in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
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It is they who the people look for in definitions and leader-
28
ship of nationalist causes.
When one combines all these distinct and unique
features of Persian Shiism, the political impact of the ulema
can be most clearly seen. From its earliest period , Shiism
has been and continues to be highly political, passionate and
revolutionary. No ruler can completely stamp out these traits
but must instead learn to avoid their dire consequences.
Some have learned to accept them and rule effectively (i.e.,
Ismail) , others have misjudged their strengths and revolutionary




Having noted the origins and uniqueness of Persian
Shiism, it can be seen that its political impact has been
great, yet most times misunderstood by Shah's and Westerners
alike. Through the Saffavids, a theocratic state was created.
During the Qajar reign the ulema went through periods of
strong and weak political influence. During the Paklavi dynasty,
they have once again re-asserted their power and influence,
once with Prime Minister Mossadeq and later with Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi. Throughout all these periods, the ulema have
shown remarkable resilience to governmental control and have
at various times shown remarkable political astuteness and
compromise to achieve their goals.
The present situation in Iran reflects this past
astuteness indicating that the presently successful revolution
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is not unprecedented nor unique. In fact several features
of the past role of the ulema are present today and help
explain how Ayatollah Khomeini was able to unite so many
diversified groups and lead the revolt.
Two revolts dramatically point out the political
expertise and characteristics of the ulema; the Tobacco
Protest and the Constitutional Revolt inferred earlier.
These two revolts will be examined for specific actions under-
taken by the ulema that help explain the present Iranian
situation.
The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 shows the capability
of the mujtahids to mobilize the masses against the Shah as
well as the capability to form alliances with various power
groups to ensure success of their goals. When the government
gave the Tobacco Concession to the British extrepreneurs
,
29the mollahs led the revolt against xt. Significantly it
was led on primarily nationalist and economic grounds. The
ulema and their production of tobacco grown on their waqf
lands were obviously endangered by the monopoly. Particularly
irksome and relevant today was the large numbers of foreigners
which had to come to Iran and organize the concession. To the
ulema, this represented a wedge for un-Islamic practices and
beliefs to be introduced to Iranians.
More significant than the opposition, however, was the
method or practice of the opposition which bears direct rele-
vance today. A leading mollah, Sayyid Ali Akbar, started the
61

violent revolt in Shiraz. The Shah ordered his arrest but
due to Akbar's following and influence, the shah was forced
31
to acquiesce as it would create a 'martyr' for the cause.
Martyr's, however, were created and used extensively to stir
up more revolutionary activity.
Continuous telegraphic communication was another fea-
ture of the protest besides the use of religious leaders and
martyrs. The leaders of the ulema maintained continuous
contact throughout the protest making the movement "perhaps
32the first coordinated national movement of Iranians." The
use of mass communications and media then were played to their
fullest potential with remarkable results.
Because the leaders of the ulema in each city could
be the most effective spokesman, discontented merchants and
growers turned to them for support. Leadership subsequently
fell to the most respected religious leader in Teheran, Hajji
Mirza Hasan Shirazi. A fatwa (religious decree/order) was
issued by him forbidding the use of tobacco by all Shiites
and resulted in the complete breakdown of the concession and
33
the central government's authority. The alliance between
mollahs, merchants, and growers ensured success as it provided
legitimate leadership in the mollahs and money and mob raising
capabilities in the bazaaris and growers.
Another feature which finds an echo today was the
firm intransigence of the leading muj tabids. They refused
to cooperate with the Shah at all times and demanded successfully
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the termination of the concession without bargains. There
was no equivocation on their part and due to their rising
power, the Shah himself had to deal individually with Hajji
34Shirazi to bring the country back to order.
The Constitutional Revolt revealed much the same
features except with a few new twists. Most who watched the
revolution were struck by the rare phenomena of a popular move-
ment in which the clergy played so prominent a part; a move-
ment if successful would deprive them of a large part of their
influence and power. Again the reasons for their participa-
tion has relevance today for the ulema, showing remarkable
ease in compromising with democrats and intellectuals, sought
to attain a higher goal, the delimitation of the power of the
shah and an end what was perceived to be a corrupt and foreigner
dominated government. Neither group could dispense with the
power of the other and close cooperation was needed to ensure
35
the success of their sometimes divergent priorities. That
cooperation was given, but not wholeheartedly by the ulema.
Some mujtahids supported the shah in maintaining that repre-
sentative government was incompatible with the spirit of
Islam.
The use of the media again became an important attri-
bute of the modern mollahs. Letters, telegrams, and mani-
festos were used extensively as were the pulpit, newspapers
and radio.
The ulema again proved adroit, even more so in the
Constitutional Revolt, in controlling and leading mobs. This
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became evident due to the fact that the majority of opposi-
tion occurred in Teheran streets and not the whole country
3 8
as in the Tobacco Protest. The use of mobs, often paid or
'drafted' by the bazaar merchants, proved highly successful
39in bringing Teheran to the brink of chaos. Led by the
mollahs and organized by professionals, their role in the
revolt and later during the Mossadeq Coup of 1951-53, foretold
of their usage and impact in the fall of the shah in 1979.
In sum, the Iranian mu j tahids have historically and
successfully led revolts against the central government. In
the process, they revealed several practices or characteristics
of a well organized, revolutionary movement. They were capable
of coalitions with merchants, growers, landowners and even
intellectuals and democrats when it suited their purposes.
The role of the mujtahid as leader and voice of the revolt
became paramount if success of the revolts was to be ensured.
The ulema's usage of modern communications supplemented and
at times surpassed their powerful voice found at the pulpit.
The use of mobs, of martyrs, of intransigence on issues, and
compromise with diverse opposition groups, all made up the
political personality and practices of the Iranian ulema.
This personality or capability survived through many
years of repression. Even after the years of Reza Shah's
repression and belittlement of the ulema ' s power and prestige,
the ulema were again capable of resurrection and insurrection.
Ayatollah Kashani proved this by leading the revolt alongside
Mossadeq in 1951-53. It should come as no surprise then that
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after 25 years of Mohammad Reza Shah's attempts to control the
mollahs, that they would again lead a revolt and do almost
exactly as they had done so many times before. The Iranian
Islamic Revolution of 1979 then was not unique. What was
unique was the failure of the Shah and political analysts to
perceive and acknowledge these capabilities and inherent
characteristics of Persian Shiism.
C. THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
1. Introduction
When Mohammad Reza Pahlavi succeeded his father Reza
in September 1941, Iran had undergone an almost complete
transformation under the modernizing and stern rule of Reza
Shah. Initially weak, Mohammad Reza soon overcame most opposi-
tion within his country and pursued with vigor his dream of
rapidly bringing his country to the level of superpower status.
As with his father, this effort entailed growing Westerniza-
tion, secularization and modernization of the society's culture,
people and socio-political systems.
This effort did not go unopposed. Under the banner
of nationalism, Mohammad Mossadeq was able to seize power for
a few short years. More importantly, the ulema though weakened
by the social reforms of the two modern shahs, were able to
mobilize many people to revolt in 1963 and later 197 8 and 197 9.
Despite the efforts of the two Pahlavi 's the ulema were always
to be a force to be reckoned with. This force showed its true
strength in 1963 and presaged the events of 1978-7 9.
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Accordingly, the re-birth of the fundamentalist move-
ment and the re-emergence of mujtahid power must begin with
the 1963 revolt. It was here that Ayatollah Khomeini came
into the limelight and ensured his pre-eminence in any future
battle with the shah. The stalemate which lasted almost fif-
teen years will also be covered as well as seeds for revolt
which were planted in this time frame. Finally Ayatollah
Khomeini's views on government and his plan for the future of
Iran will be analyzed.
Inevitably, one will recognize many similarities with
past Iranian revolts. History indeed repeated itself in many
aspects, except for one point. A shah would no longer rule
Iran, instead a religious man, an Ayatollah would. Thus the
inconceivable had become fact. The Islamic fundamentalist
revival, often referred to in the past but most often ignored
by the West, had succeeded in producing the first real theo-
cratic state in the Middle East in the twentieth century.
This fact cannot be overestimated. Iran today represents
truly the present power and influence of Islamic fundamentalism.
It is a power that cannot be overlooked again as its ramifica-
tions for the future security and stability of the Middle East
remain high.
2 . Rebirth of the Movement
By the early 1960's, the ulema's hold over the people
of Iran had been greatly weakened. Reza Shah since 1925 had
systematically closed many of the doors for the clerics rule.
Reza Shah had taken the throne as a reformer which meant the
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destruction of tradition, that is, the traditional monarchy,
the privileges of the aristocracy and the perogatives of the
40
ulema. Both he and his son were committed to a separation
of religion from politics and to undermine the influence of
the religious classes. Reza Shah, then, systematically secu-
larized education thus depriving the ulema of one of their
closest ties and influence with the people. Besides the edu-
cational system, Reza Shah had secularized and Westernized the
legal system. "Attacking them here (the sphere of law) deprived
them of their chief social function and principal source of
41legitimate revenue." Their function as interpreters of the
law meant that they had to validate the most vital acts of the
society; marriage, divorce, testimonies, transfer of property,
and commercial contracts. This changed with the introduction
42
of a New Civil Code in 1928. The state with Western laws
ruled the courts and not the ulema and the Sharia.
Control over religious endowments followed as well as
pressures to reduce the number of seminarians studying to
43become mollahs. He also attempted to outlaw a number of
popular practices associated with the faith, most notably with
44
restrictions on the passion plays during Moharram. The
traditional dress and veiling of women also were changed, with
European headgear being made mandatory in 1935 and the veil
outlawed. These reforms did not go unanswered by the ulema as
a rebellion erupted in the shrine city of Meshed in which only
45troops and machine guns could quell. However by 19 3 6 Iran
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was legally and socially "emancipated" from religion to a
, ^
46great degree.
Mohammad Reza Shah did not abandon his fathers
dreams of a modern state when he assumed power. The present
shah, however, dealt less harshly with the ulema. In fact, he
attempted to legitimize his rule on religious grounds. As
one analyst points out, his sensitivity to the Shiite faith
resulted in several unprecedented moves.
The Shah and his court never failed to pay
homage to Shiism, the state religion. He took
every opportunity to stress his belief in God,
always maintained that his reforms were in
conformity with the prescriptions of Islam,
and went on pilgrimages to Meshed and other
holy cities. 4 '
Despite these acts, the mullahs still regarded the
Shah as a secularizing modernizer and hence a threat to their
power
.
Nevertheless, the crises which would occur in the early
1960's had its roots not just on religious grounds but more
so on political-sociological areas. After the 1951-53 scare
due to Prime Minister Mossadeq's seizure of power, the shah
returned to Iran determined to rule and not reign. Ever sensi-
tive to his political survival, he rapidly rebuilt the army
and created a new secret police, SAVAK. He effectively diminished
the power of the Majli's (part of the Iranian Parliament)
and attempted to control every aspect of government. Politi-
cal freedoms were in effect curtailed and all facets of society
put under close scrutiny. Added to this were chronic social
68

problems which included overcentralization of government in
Teheran, concentration of land into the hands of the few, an
enormous and inefficient bureaucracy and unequal tax laws and
.48
administration.
Of great import prior to the revolt of the early 1960 's
49
was the "reign of terror" created by SAVAK in the fifties.
Starting first with the supporters of Mossadeq and the National
Front, the military and SAVAK undertook mass arrests and exe-
cutions. The Communist movement in the form of the Tudeh
Party was next. After finding that the army was heavily infil-
trated with Tudeh members, a purge followed which affected
all levels of society. Strict censorship closed newspapers
and print shops and the shah's troops attacked university
students and professors as well as anyone else who expressed
dissident views.
While all this repressive activity continued, it did
not escape the notion of many Iranians that the United States
was intimately involved with it. Whether Americans were actively
involved in the repression still lies open to dispute. The
fact remains, however, that the United States was quick to
supply foreign aid to the shah's regime, massively rearm his
army, and build the hated SAVAK organization.
The SAVAK organization (coined from the Iranian,
Sazelman-e Ehala-at Va Amnujate Khasvari) established in 1957
through American aid and expertise was particularly disturbing
54
to the Iranians. Its activities would be forever linked,
55
appropriately or not, with the United States.
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The 'reign of terror, ' then, ultimately led to the
widespread revolt in the 1960's. It created enough antagonism
in the society to allow the ulema to once again be the spokes-
men for reform and justice. Outside international pressures
were nonexistent but acknowledgement of the repression was
there and proved disturbing to many outside observers . As
Peter Avery recounted,
Perhaps foreigners were unaware of the reign
of terror going on in Iran at that time, but
for those who wished to see the Shah become a
beloved and effective sovereign, whatever
allowance had to be made for the rumors being
exaggerated or inspired by foreign communists,
they were extremely disturbing rumors nevertheless.
They were disturbing on the grounds of humanity
alone; but also on political grounds their
effect in implanting a gulf of bitterness between
the Shah and the nation seemed ominous. "56
During the years immediately under review the ulema
were not a serious problem. By 1958 they had assumed a passive
attitude, due in large part to the mujtahid highest in dignity
and respect, Ayatollah Burujirdi. When the discontented looked
to him at Qom, they found him and many others more concerned
with scholarship than politics. ' Two events would change this
compliant attitude; the 1960 elections and the Shah's White
Revolution.
The 1960 elections were "among the most flagrantly
corrupt ever experienced," and the Shah was forced to order
58
new elections. The 1961 elections were even more 'pathetic'
and considered to be ^mockery by many people. The Shah dis-
solved the Majlis and the Senate and unrest resulted over the
59failure to announce new elections. The Shah had in effect
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suspended the 1906 Constitution and ruled not through the
authority of Parliament, but by royal decree (Farman)
.
Political ferment continued and the economic situation
deteriorated. The decade of the sixties opened with student
demonstrations and teacher's strikes which in turn was accom-
panied by disorder and repression. The government attacks
on the students on January 21, 1962 were particularly brutal
as were the attacks on the teacher's strike in May 1961.
Into this maelstorm the Shah through his Cabinet formed
legislation for the execution of a program of land reform and
fi 3
distribution of large royal estates. Limiting the size of
land one could own, the effort was made to alleviate the gross
hardships of the peasants and secure their support for the
Shah. Originally weak in design, the law underwent several
modifications and finally in January 1963, the Shah presented
the new version with five other reforms. The six point pro-
gram, known as the "White Revolution," included land reform,
nationalization of forests, sale of state owned factories,
profit sharing plan for industrial workers, electoral law
reforms and the creation of the Literacy Corps. Six more
points were subsequently added and all had a profound effect
on social development in Iran. In promoting the program the
Shah had bypassed the frustratingly inept Parliament and
appealed directly to the people for support. In a referendum
held in January 1963, the Shah purportedly received an over-






Previously, it was noted that the ulema had been
evasive and uncharacteristically neutral to the problems
around them. The events outlined above, however, ended this
acquiescence. The first voice heard came in August 1960 as
Ayatollah Behbehani demanded that the elections of the time
be cancelled and run again. Due to mounting criticism, the
Shah was forced to do just that. Increasingly the clergy
took part with the resurrected National Front in demonstra-
tions demanding a return to the Constitution. The repressive
crackdown by the Shah's troops stifled the National Front but
not the ulema who could and did use the Friday prayer to voice
their dissent.
The ulema, however, were far more concerned with the
Shah's land reform laws and especially his six point program,
the "White Revolution." As early as 1960 the ulema through
Mujtahid Burujirdi, had declared it contrary to the Sharia,
the religious law and the Constitution. But as one analyst
points out,
... it is probably correct to attribute the
religious classes' opposition to Land Reform
to an instinctive fear of the extension of
the Central Government ' s power in a manner
resulting in government interference in the
people's lives at all levels, and in conflict
with traditional patterns of behavior. "67
Of particular concern to the ulema was the disposition
of their vaqf lands. Ayatollah Behbehani announced that the
vaqf lands must be exempt from the Reform laws. Prime Minister
Asadollam Alam, however, noted their notorious corruption and
72

exploitation of the peasants and refused the exemption.
Alam's reply, made public, was quickly regarded as an affront
by the religious community. ' Reaction was quick as was the
emergence of a new leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.
Khomeini had long been a member of Ayatollah Burijirdi's
circle and had constantly strove to impel Burij irdi to a more
activist stance in political affairs. After the death of
Burij irdi in 1961, Khomeini gradually came to lead the politi-
cal revolt for the ulema. After only two years he had revita-
lized the role of mujtahids in politics, remade the mosque
as the center of social and political command and activity,
"and embarked on the campaign for the abolition of the hated
monarchy .
"
On 22 January 1963, the ulema organized large and
violent demonstration in the bazaar area of Teheran in an
attempt to obstruct the Shah's forthcoming referendum. Besides
the land reform, the ulema hoped to block and arouse public
sentiment against the electoral emancipation of women.
Khomeini helped lead the revolt for he
saw that the agrarian reform would further
weaken the position of the clergy in the
country; and as for the reforms concerning
the status of women and the role of religious
courts, these were r abominations ' whose
acceptance would entail giving up positions
which Islam had held for more than a thousand
years. 72
The Shah responded to these demonstrations by going
to Qom and distributing former vaqf lands to the peasants
before the most revered shrine in the city. Further insulting
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the clerics, he said, "we are done with social and political




Ayatollah Khomeini responded with a series of sermons
delivered in Qom, denouncing the Shah, the close ties with the
United States, the economic malaise in the country, and the
extension of the repressive apparatus of the state into the
countryside as well as so-called crimes of violating Islam
74
and the Iranian Constitution. Immediately afterward, the
shah's troops attacked Qom's theological school on May 22,
1963 and arrested Khomeini.
Released shortly thereafter, Khomeini resumed undaunted
in attacking the regime. In the summer, Khomeini , cleverly
utilizing the commemorative day of the martyrdom of Hossein,
led the riots in Teheran. Again the careful and very capable
utilization of mobs was apparent as they looted, burned and
destroyed whatever they could. Further, "the rioters made
a particular effort to frighten women and to demonstrate their
new rights exposed them to serious violence." The violence,
principally in Teheran and Shiraz lasted four days and was
well supported by the common populace, as well as the wealthy
7 6landowners and bazaaris. The government's severe and immedi-
ate punitive measures and Marshall Law ended the riots but
only after many deaths and the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini
77
and Ayatollah Qomi.
After being placed in house arrest, SAVAK issued a
public statement that an "understanding" had been reached
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according to which Khomeini and two other leading "eminences"
7 8
would "cease to interfere in political matters."
The government, through its demonstrated willingness
to use harsh force, had momentarily neutralized the religious
opposition. Recounting later, the Shah had this to say of
Ayatollah Khomeini and the riots of 1963;
The latter were inspired by reactionary
forces led by an individual who claimed to
be religious, even though his origin was
obscure. It was certain, however, that he
had secret dealings with foreign agents.
Later the radio stations run by emigre members
of the Tudeh Party, who were atheists by
principle, accorded him the high religious
title of Ayatollah ("the sign of God") and
praised him to the skies, although he was
anything but divinely inspired. 7 9
Fearful of the ulema's power, then, the shah set out
to intimidate them and their allies. Prior to 1963 the
government security forces had concentrated on the National
Front, Tudeh Party and radical intellectuals. After the 1963
riots they broadened their activities to include the clergy
8
and bazaaris. Accordingly religious and bazaar i leaders
were among the many arrested in a mass roundup of the opposi-
tion. Included among the arrested was Ayatollah Taleqhani
who was later ordered to be executed by the Shah. Though
this execution order was stayed, Taleqhani was imprisoned for
81ten years.
In less than a year, Khomeini again rose from his
banishment in Qom to denounce the regime and the Majli's who
had passed a bill granting diplomatic immunity to American




United States for the purchase of military equipment. In
a particularly biting sermon, Khomeini attacked the bill as
a capitulation to a foreign power, a power which no less
8 3
supports Israel as well as the Shah's modernizing policies.
In extremely nationalistic terms, he said;
Do they (the Iranian people) know that the
assembly on the suggestion of the state, has
signed the bond of their enslavement, has
approved the colonization of Iran and has
given America a bill to treat the Moslem Iranian
nation brutally?84
Further, his resentment toward America and Israel was equally
evident in his attack.
It is America that defends Israel and the
supporters of Israel (the Shah) . It is America
that is strengthening Israel to strike the
Moslem Arabs. It is America that imposes deputies
on the Iranian people. It is America that views
Islam and the venerable Koran as a danger
threatening it. It is America that sees in the
clergymen and the ulema a thorn in the path of
colonialism and sees that they must be jailed,
insulted and tortured. 8 5
For this speech, Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested by
SAVAK and flown to Turkey where he lived under house arrest.
After several months there he was able to proceed to Najaf
in Iraq, a major center of Shia learning and pilgrimage.
While teaching there, he resumed his attacks and proclamations
against the Shah and government. His influence had waned
but was not completely broken as the shah would see in the
next decade.
In effect then, by 1965, political opposition activity
had dwindled and become disorganized. In the following years,
the government extended surveillance over the bazaar is and
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clergy, periodically ordered "vicious police attacks" on
seminary students and undermined the traditional independence
of the trade and craft guilds. Sporadic opposition con-
tinued for the next few years but the initiative had clearly
gone to the government. The years to follow can then be
considered a stalemate in the struggle between Conservative
Islam and Khomeini and Modernization and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
If anything is to be deduced from the riots of 1963
and reemergence of militant mollahs, it is that despite years
of repression, the ulema could and would lead a revolt against
the regime. Again they proved the power of the mollahs was
unbroken; the mosque was the only place where open criticism
of the Shah could be voiced, the clergy could still get the
mobs into the streets and that only the ulema through their
Ayatollahs could effectively lead the opposition. For them
to be a power however, the regime had to provide the right
environment so that the masses would find reason to oppose
the government, for this revolt was obviously more than a
religious one. The economic and political malaise certainly
aroused many to go into the streets but the regime also had to
directly threaten the powers of the ulema and other conserva-
tive elements, notably the Bazaaris, in order to impel them to
lead the opposition. The government as could be seen from
above had created just such an environment and threat. The
religious riots of 1963 opposed not only the land reform.
They attacked the modernizing tendencies of the Shahs in
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general, such as the introduction of civil laws and courts,
secularized schools, and the enfranchisement of women. The
build up of the military and SAVAK, close relations with the
United States and the recognition of Israel; all were subject
to condemnation.
By 1965, the Shah again appeared to be in control as
he would for the next decade. Yet through the period of
stalemate, he again created the conditions which would lead
to another Islamic revolt.
4. Stalemate
A disaffected calm prevailed over Iran for the next
decade partly due to a rising and hopeful economic change.
A pattern for the coming years also relegated opposition to
a neutral role, that is: a docile, rubber stamp Parliament,
the appointment of technocrat ministers and the increased use
8 7
of SAVAK for political repression. The only remaining pro-
test was desultory opposition from within the universities
and the mollahs. Despite SAVAK, both the students and mollahs
persisted in sporadic protests but they were in reality low
key and easily quelled by arrests.
Subsequently only two major opposition events may
be recorded for the time frame; Ayatollah Khomeini f s con-
tinued protest from Iraq and the development of an underground
guerrilla movement.
From his base in Najaf , Iraq, Khomeini continued to
comment on Iranian affairs. Through the use of smuggled
papers and tape cassettes of his sermons, he was capable of
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keeping his opposition image intact as well as voicing
dissent to the Iranian populace. For the most part, his
calls fell on deaf ears due to the economic boom Iran was to
8 8
undergo in the late sixties and early seventies.
The most significant exposure for him came in April
1967 through an open letter to Prime Minister Hoveyda . In
it, he denounced the continued violation of the Iranian con-
stitution and Islamic principles by the Shah's regime as well
as its subordination to foreign powers, particularly the United
8 9
States and Israel. Other messages to the people continued
expressing concern over the arrest of Muhandis Bazargan and
Ayatollah Taleqhani as well as other members of the so-called
Freedom Movement, the commemoration of martyrs, especially
religious ones such as Ayatollah Sa'idi, denunciation of the
"celebration of the Iranian monarchy" and condemnation of the
Shah's one-party system. In the later years of the 1970 's,
his speeches evidently were placing pressure on the regime
for the mere possession of a copy of one of his works meant
imprisonment and torture.
While in exile, Khomeini devoted much of his efforts
to develop his theories on Islamic rule. Perhaps the most
important of his writings are "The Rule of the Sharia" and
91
"islamic Government." In both Khomeini says that rule in
Islam is not absolute but constitutional but not constitutional
in the Western sense. The rulers are bound by the Koran and




More was heard from Khomeini when the Shah adopted
in the late 1960's the course of "Persianization. " Trying
to dilute religious feelings by reviving nationalist feelings,
the Shah reminded Iranians of past glories of the ancient
Persian state. This call confirmed to the religious estab-
lishment as well as Khomeini, the suspicion they held con-
92
cerning the Shah and the throne. In the latter years,
Ayatollah Khomeini was to consistently attack this attempt
to legitimize monarchial rule as un-Islamic.
The efforts of Khomeini during this period were more
along the lines of scholarship and propaganda. From his
post in Iraq, his protests were heard but lacked the impact
of former years. The thrust of active opposition was left
to underground guerrilla movements which emerged into the
limelight in the sixties.
The underground guerrilla movements had their genesis
in the 1950 's but were not as prominent as they were in the
93late sixties and seventies. By early 1970 however, a total
of over eight major groups had been identified with either
94
religious or leftist orientations or a mixture of the two.
The religiously motivated groups began in 1965 and were con-
sidered to be the Fedayeen Islam and the Islamic Nations Party.
The leftist groups were the Tudeh Party, the Revolutionary
Tudeh Organization, Tufan, the Saka, and the Siah Kal guerrillas
while the third group, a synchretism of the previous two
groups was the Iran Freedom Movement (or National Liberation
Movement) . Finally, there was the Confederation of Iranian
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Students which was not active inside Iran but caused consider-
able international impact and has acted as a spawning ground
95
for other guerrilla movements .
Of primary concern for this paper however is the
religious groups as they represent militant Islam in its
extreme. The first group to surface in the 1960's was one
known as Fedayeen Islam. The Fedayeen espoused the overthrow
of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic republic and
employed assassinations as its primary tool. They were respon-
sible for the deaths of several high ranking ogvernment offi-
cials in the late fifties and sixties. They achieved national
notoriety in their assassination of Prime Minister Mansur
97in 1965. When he was shot, the government accused a religious
study class (Maktab) of the deed, however, subsequent tes-
timonies revealed the hand of the Fedayeen Islam. The swift
arrests and executions after this event ended this groups'
activity and little was heard of it again.
The Islamic Nation's Party arose as another religiously
oriented opposition group in 1965. This group attained promin-
ence when they were rounded up in the fall of 1965. Though
little is known of the party, their stated goal appeared the
same as the Fedayeen' s, the overthrow of the Shah in order to
restore religious principles to the government and work for
98Islamic unity. " Of significance however was that the leader
of the group Mohammad Kazim Musave was the son of a mujtahid
. . 99in Najaf, Iraq and was a follower of Ayatollah Khomeini.
The foreign connection claimed by SAVAK undoubtedly referred
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to Khomeini. In any event, the group, noted for its modern
yet conventional terrorist attacks, disappeared as quietly
as the Fedayeen after the arrests and executions of its
main members.
Another group, synchretic in ideology was the Iran
Freedom Movement (IFM) founded in 1961 by Mohandis Mahdi
Bazargan. Joining him for leadership was Ayatollah Sayyeed
Mahmud Taliqhani whose religious and political views earned
him the title "the Red Mollah." 100
The IFM advocated a highly activist role in politics
and subsequently took on a more radical stance than the old
National Front, from which most of its members came. The
IFM attempted to
reconcile what appears to be genuine religious
convictions with a modern socio-economic theory,
Marxist Socialism, in hopes of producing a
doctrine capable of social and economic
modernization on one hand, while remaining
uniquely Moslem on the other. 101
By the mid sixties, the IMF was described as having a large
following but lacking in organization and executive cadre
102
strength. In the late sixties the group moved to far
safer countries and concentrated on recruitment of students
.
They came into the limelight again in 197 when
Ayatollah Saedi, the most prominent mujtahid in Iran led
riots against an American Investors Conference. Ayatollah
Saedi was arrested for his part in the demonstrations and
reportedly died under torture, causing even more unrest in
Teheran and Qom. Though banning all demonstrations, the
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leaders of the IFM, Ayatollah Taleqhani and Dr. Abbas Shaybani,
104
led another protest march and were promptly arrested.
The group garnered greater public recognition in
January 197 2 when SAVAK announced that it was the best and
largest armed group of three supposedly broken up in 1971.
At the same press conference, they were said to be responsible
for bank robberies, skyjackings and the attempted abduction
of the Shah's nephew. During this time frame the name of the
group changed to the Iran Liberation Movement (or National
Liberation Movement) and under this new name were responsible
for gun battles with the police, bombings and assassination of
an Iranian General and an American colonel. Their activi-
ties continued along this same vein up to the Iranian Islamic
Revolution where its more militant members became known as the
Mujahedin-e Khalq. They played a significant part in the
revolution with an estimated 30,000 membership claimed and
are presently Khomeini's de-facto police force.
The stalemate period then can be characterized by
more violent underground political and terrorist activity of
guerrillas with religious and sometimes Marxist views. The
Marxist organizations, though not covered here, became highly
organized and potent during this period as did, to a smaller
extent a few religious based groups. The ulema maintained its
traditional role as spokesmen for the people through Ayatollah
Khomeini, Taleqhani and Saedi. They as a group paid dearly
as Khomeini remained in exile, Taleqhani imprisoned and Saedi
killed. Nonetheless, as years went by their role gained in
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prominence and activity. Massive social problems, economic
dislocation, intensification of government repression and the
increasing involvement of the United States in the daily lives
of Iranians - all these factors aided in the maturing of
discontent into revolution, in which the ulema would take
a leading role.
5. Seeds of Revolt
The seeds for revolution ironically were planted by
the regime itself. Revolving around the production of oil,
Iran undertook the calculated risk of rapidly transforming the
Third World country into an industrial power comparable to
Western states. In the process, a "centralized command
structure" and not a democratic institution was deemed the
107
only way to sexze and utilize the oil revenue properly.
The prevailing notion in the early seventies was that such an
opportunity would not avail itself agin and that firm measures
for modernization and oil exploitation were needed immediately.
One measure of the scale of this 'gamble' was that while
imports were running at over $15 billion annually, non oil
10 8
exports were under $600 million. The early years of the
1970 's then previewed the most dramatic social economic upheaval
any country, other than Saudi Arabia today, would or could
experience. The transformation entailed in the gamble however,
was to go uncontrolled and poorly led and ultimately contributed
to the downfall of the Shah.
The seeds for revolt in Iran were many and some
evolved over a great many years. They include a multitude
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of political, social and economic problems that most modernizing
underdeveloped countries experience. Iran was no exception
to these problems. In most cases, when a state finds itself
in a quagmire of such problems, revolution or a similar social
upheaval erupts in an attempt to change the situation. For
revolutions to be successful, however, it is not enough that
a majority of the people suffer various deprivations. To be
successful a revolution requires leadership, organization, and
the participation of elite groups who are generally either
leisured, better educated and better off people than the
109
masses. In Iran's case, leadership can also come from a
privileged class; a group noted by tradition as protectors
and leaders of the people, in essence, the ulema. Only when
both the ulema and the privileged classes were pushed to
revolt, was the final ingredient for a successful revolution
introduced.
Thus while many Iranians suffered through the years
of social transformation during the reign of the Shah, a great
many others, in particular government workers, entrepreneurs,
the military and a growing middle class benefitted from it.
Only when these groups became effected by a variety of depri-
vations at one time did a revolution have any hope of being
instigated much less accomplished. Meanwhile, the seeds for
revolt lay dormant. They steadily built up however through
the succeeding years of the 1970' s. Their explosive growth
and flowering then should serve all analysts as a classic
case for the study of, and perhaps, prevention of, revolution.
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Indeed, the implications of the Iranian Islamic Revolution
should be noted not only by analysts but by leaders of nations
undergoing similar programs and problems as did Iran, especially,
in this case, Saudi Arabia.
What exactly constituted the reasons or seeds for
the Iranian Islamic Revolt? As mentioned earlier, they may
be summarized as: a bad economic situation, perceived social
injustices, a stifling political atmosphere, and even a
failure of the ruling elite to govern popularly and effec-
tively. Included in this categorization, one must add
other unique features prevalent in Iranian society, that is,
an unusual demographic change in the population's age and
location and a perceived spiritual-cultural exploitation of
the society by foreigners. Each problem will be dealt with
below.
The "very bad economic situation" referred to by
Walter Laqueur in Why the Shah Fell had its roots in the
economic boom of the early seventies. In January 1974, the
Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) began examining the effect
of the new price of oil which had quadrupled revenues in the
course of the year. The Shah instructed them to prepare a
blueprint of what to do with the windfall and in July 1974, and
the PBO revised the five year plan started in 1973. The
Shah and Prime Minister Hoveyda, ignoring the cautious views
of economists embarked upon a program to accelerate their
already ambitious programs. As one writer stated,
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the new Plan unveiled after Ramsar was a
breathless example of what was going to become
of the new Iran ... It was an impatient attempt
to concertina the time scale to economic
takeoff. The real change was not one of sub-
stance but form; more money to be spent on
bigger projects in a shorter time; better
imported technology; more foreign experts
and a host of marginal items that seemed a
luxury in the old Plan - especially in the
military field. H2
This gamble then could be seen as an attempt by Iran
to bypass the centuries required by the West to industrialize
yet achieve the same sophistication in a matter of a few
years. No country had ever attempted it before but its false
hopeful start spurred the government to accelerate the pace
even more.
Every sector of the economy, with the exception of
agriculture showed dynamic growth with its implementation.
The "hyper-boom" however proved to be shortlived. By mid-
1976 expenditures overtook revenues and accumulated bottlenecks
114
curbed the hectxc pace of development. Worldwide inflation
cut deeply into programs as the average cost of imports rose
by 28% in 1974/1975. By 1976 inflation in Iran ran ram-
pant as food prices rose 3 0% per year and rents in Teheran
rose by as much as 200% in 1976.
The boom had other ill effects as well. An increasing
proportion of the oil income had been spent on other expendi-
tures which did not contribute to Iran's productive capabili-
ties. Arms expenditures had taken up increasingly large
percentages of available funds. The service sector of the
economy had expanded even more and by its nature of its product

118
catered only to the well off. Import substitution became
the main form of industrial expansion with the result that
119badly needed capital intensive industries suffered. Dis-
parities arose in income distribution, between the rural
areas and urban ones, between the North and South of the coun-
120try and finally, amongst the working class and upper class.
Finally, the shortage of trained manpower greatly increased
121
and stalled the ill-fated programs.
The net effect of these problems placed great strains
on the Iranian economy, in particular, the lower classes,
both urban and rural. The skyrocketing costs in housing
benefitted only the privileged classes. Added to the high
rents was the shortage of housing units available and being
122
constructed. In response to these pressures, the workers
went on strikes throughout the decade in most of the indus-
tries. The heavy handed government response to them more
often than not resulted in deaths, imprisonment or the drafting
123
of the men into the army. Prior to and concurrent with the
boom, was the invasion of large numbers of rural people in
search of better opportunities. Between 1960 and 1970 Teheran's
population increased at roughly 6% a year to reach 3.2 million,
124
over double the national average. By 197 6, shanty towns
dotted Teheran while the population increased at the rate of
12% a year and if left unchecked would have made Teheran a
city of 16 million in twelve years. The cities obviously were
totally unprepared for such an assault and became vast slums
teeming with discontented people. ^ Add to these figures the
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fact that demographically , the median age of the population
was between sixteen and seventeen years of age and one can
foresee the future problems. The extreme youth of the popu-
lation had great socio-political implications in terms of the
burden placed on workers of children too young to be economically
12 6
active and the need for the creation of new jobs. Further,
this large group of young people were easily susceptible to
revolutionary causes and leaders.
Perceived and real social injustices exacerbated this
dismal picture. The backwardness of the countryside was not
alleviated by government programs which reflected a cynical
127
attitude toward those rural areas and the poor. The most
telling sign of this backwardness was the literacy rate among
the rural people. Despite the efforts of the Literacy Corps,
enrollment in primary level schools in 197 3 was only 3 9% for
the rural areas whereas in urban areas it was 90%. Since 1973
the situation altered little with only 4 0% completing primary
128
education. When these rural people moved to the city, the
differences between the two became apparent and divided the
population there. Relegated to lower paying job opportuni-
ties and discrimination, they added to the tension in the
129
cities. ' The culture shock alone meant confusion and their
only solace could be found not in bureaucratic welfare machin-
ery of the government but through the mollahs.
Indeed the culture shock experienced by the rural
130
migrants was felt by other groups. One of the mam com-
plaints against the government was the gross importation of
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anything Western. The alienation experienced by the Iranian
in his own society was great and reflected to some the cultural-
spiritual exploitation by the West. As one Iranian pointed
out,
The image presented to Iranians for self-
identification reflected, in importunate,
superficial and selective colors, imported
European-American features rather than their
own. Not only does this phsiognomy appear
behind bluish glass panes on the back seats
of big American sedans, not only does it
smirk from toothpaste billboard ads, not only
does it flick across the screen as sheriff
or fashion model, or appear as a striptease
star through the early morning hours in dim,
feudal enclaves of the plutocracy; it lies
over this land like a poisonous mist and
enters like a deadly tumor into the conscious-
ness of the astounded Iranian, who has lost
track of his lineage in an abruptly changing
reality and now seeks salvation in a precipi-
tate flight forward, in identification with
what is hopelessly heterogeneous . 131
The effect on the traditional many then, as well as the
true Persian was enormous. "These substitutes literally tear
132him out of the soil in which he is rooted."
The Bazaar is suffered this alienation and more. The
restructuring of the economy had put the bazaar and its ideals
under severe pressure, to the point that they did not wish
133their sons to be bazaaris. The government since 1956 had
undertaken several attempts to eliminate them as a power by
splitting the guild system, establishing banks (thereby taking
away their traditional source of revenue, money and lending)
,
creating strict commercial laws, and creating import licensing,
134building price controls and waging corruption campaigns.
The traditional market system then, lost much of its prestige,
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value and power. Thus those within it, always closely allied
with the ulema, were more than willing to strike at the regime
135
at the most opportune moment.
Finally, the judiciary system developed to be a can-
cerous sore in the society. According to one author, the
judiciary had been absorbed almost completely by the executive
branch of government and reflected only the will of the ruling
elite. Increasingly, military tribunals acquired greater
importance as all cases affecting national security were
within its realm of justice. In this case, "national security"
was loosely interpreted. Where the judiciary had not lost
out to the military, its authority was further usurped by
137
special courts serving the whim of the regime.
Probably more distrubing to the traditional man was
the imposition of a Western civil code of law and not the
Sharia or traditional Bazaari methods of justice. Faced with
secret trials, military and executive courts, Western laws,
corrupt and inefficient judges, many Iranians felt deprived
of the most basic rights and efficient justice while the ulema
and bazaaris felt deprived of an essential power and function.
The political environment of Iran at the same time
had gone from bad to worse. The Parliament continued in its
role as a rubber stamp of the ruling elite. SAVAK accelerated
its activities of repression in all spheres of Iranian life.
In effect, all legitimate avenues to formulate governmental
decisions or voice dissent had been successfully closed to
the majority of Iranians.
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In theory the Shah observed the 1906 Constitution;
which envisioned a constitutional monarchy with an independent
legislature. However,
In practice, the Constitution had only served
as a point of reference when convenient. The
distinction between the executive authority of
the Shah and the independence of the legisla-
ture . . . has been blurred and all were merely
part of the monarchs ' executive arm. 138
Throughout the period all important decisions were
by a select few men and by royal decree (Farman) without any
real intercourse between the Shah and Parliament. The only
real exchange of ideas appeared between the Shah and those
closely surrounding him. As one analyst pointed out, this
personal rule by the Shah and a select few individuals was not
unique, "the government of Iran historically has been and
continues to be 'of, by and for the elite*. "139
Recognizing the artificiality of the Parliament and
Party system, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi finally dispensed with
all pretenses of democratic rule. In 197 5 he created a single
140
party, the Rastakhiz-e Iran. It was to serve as a mobi-
lizing agency in the modernization process, a screening device
for more political talent, and a channel to educate the masses
141in the principles and priorities of the White Revolution.
The Shah himself declared its true purpose as a vehicle for
legitimizing his tenuous hold over the poeple and isolating
dissenters by saying,
Every Iranian who has clarified his position,
that is who believes in the Constitution, the
Monarchy, and the Sixth Bakman Revolution (the White




The party to many Iranians finally dismissed the
masquerade of a Western-style political system in Iran. From
1975 onward even the prospect of voicing legitimate opposi-
tion was denied to them. Further, the Party represented a
hated extension of the Shah's ruling elite. It was used,
for example, in policing the anti-profiteering and price
control campaigns in 1975; a campaign that brought the ire
of the main targets, the bazaaris.
Denied even the rudiments of party politics, the
Iranians had little else to turn to for voicing ideas much
less dissent. The SAVAK organization intervened in all organi-
zations capable of providing such a voice. In the field of
labor, SAVAK ensured that labor groups did not become politi-
cized. Interference in the arts was more noteworthy, for
the banning of plays, films or the refusal of permission to
143publish works were an integral part of SAVAK* s duty. What
remained of the press in Iran was controlled by two families
144
closely linked to the Shah.
SAVAK could even have a hand in granting industrial
licenses, the right to import certain equipment and in the
clearance of goods through customs. By far the most damaging
influence of SAVAK was its methods in dealing with the opposi-
tion in exile, and at home. Student surveillance was all
144
embracing, corrupting the educational system. Dissidents
everywhere, even abroad, faced the prospect of intimidation,
14 5interrogation, torture, and imprisonment without trials.
Professor Richard Cottam wrote to one Iranian of special
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SAVAK hit squads' overseas, saying, "these men will appear
146
as ordinary muggers and kill the Iranians one by one."
Contrary to what Walter Laqueur has said, thousands
of men and women were summarily executed during the reign of
Mohammad Reza Shah. "More than 300,000 people are estimated
to have been in and out of prison during the last nineteen
years of the existence of SAVAK, an average of 1,500 people
147
are arrested every month." As Martin Ennals of Amnesty
International stated:
the Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image
despite the highest rate of death penalties in
the world, no valid system of civilian courts,
and a history of torture which is beyond belief. 148
In conclusion, the SAVAK organization had become
synomous with terror in Iran and abroad. Necessary to stifle
dissent, it created more opposition and laid the final seeds
for revolt against the Shah.
Thus economically, socially, and politically, the
Shah had created a bedrock for revolutionary activity. A
list for the causes of the revolution may be summarized as
follows:
the too rapid modernization of the economy resulting
in inflation, housing, manpower and bottleneck
problems,
- the costly militarization of the country at the
expense of the economy,
the collapse of agriculture due to government
inefficiency and neglect, 14 9
- Western cultural-spiritual exploitation,




overcontrol of a highly centralized government,
the failure of the ruling elite - and of Consti-
tutional government,
SAVAK repression,
the "Persianization" of Iran,
the massive foreign presence in the country,
the secularization of the society.
D. KHOMEINI'S SOLUTION: REVOLUTION
1. Unity and Leadership
As could be seen from above, the seeds for revolt were
well sown by the late 1970' s. With the necessary ingredients
there, the revolution needed only a leader and a spark, an
"X-factor" for revolution.
The leadership in the form of Khomeini was ideal.
Being a mujtahid and in exile for opposing the Shah gave great
legitimacy to his role as leader. Being in Iraq and later
Paris, allowed him relative freedom of movement as well as
access to the media and publicity. Khomeini's views had the
advantage of great simplicity as he concentrated on only a
few essentials: the overthrow of the Shah and the creation of
a still nebulous Islamic Republic. As he stated to one
journalist,
Once Iran is independent it will also have
freedom and social justice. Once the country
is liberated from political and economic depen-
dence on foreign powers, all the other causes
of repression and exploitation will disappear
1
,_..
and all citizens will be able to freely develop.
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This simplicity garnered for him diverse opposition
groups which might not ordinarily follow a religious leader.
As Walter Laqueur pointed out,
this prince of the church became the darling
of the extreme left. For however reactionary
his views in every other respect, on two main
counts they were "progressive", he was against
the Shah and he attacked the Americans. 151
The disaffected middle class and intellectuals flocked
to him because of his advocacy of the return to a Constitution.
The Bazaaris knew of his previous support to them and were
guaranteed "business as usual" if he returned as their leader.
Khomeini also took advantage of the resurgence of
Islamic faith in Iran, especially among the young and uni-
versity students thus capturing a highly emotional and vola-
152
tile group. Khomeini was guaranteed the support of the
traditional and religious oriented men in Iran for obvious
reasons. He built up this support even more by coloring his
speeches with religious and nationalist imagery. "Thus the
Shah became 'Yazid 1 - the Khalif detested more than any other
by the Shiites," as well as a satanic figure while Khomeini
pictured himself almost as a prophet.
Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini had the distinct advan-
tage of a lack of competition. Largely due to the Shah and
SAVAK , all potential leaders were dead, imprisoned or totally
intimidated. The only other source of leadership, the under-




Ayatollah Khomeini did not take these advantages for
granted. Showing astute political skill, he backed down
from previous stands concerning land reform, women and leftists,
On land reform, he stated that he opposed it only because it
created new markets for foreign countries and now advocated
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it along Islamic lines. His attitude toward women toned
down from his previous 1963 position where Khomeini now said,
All women and men are at liberty to attend
universities, to vote and be elected, however,
"As Moslems, we will not accept the Western
view of women as toys.' "155
With secularists and leftists the Ayatollah was less
intransigent as cooperation with them was disavowed. He
said however, "they are free to advocate their own views and
convictions." Further, though not accepting leftists,
those that made up his semi-provisional government in Paris
"were men whose loyalty is certainly not to Allah."
Unexpectedly, the Shah provided the ideal environment
in which all the societal discontent and the leadership of
Khomeini could emerge. Because of student demonstrations
overseas, Amnesty International investigations and President
Carter's "Human Rights" criticism, the Shah eased his grip
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on Iranian society.
In March 1977 the Shah granted amnesty to 256 politi-
cal prisoners. In April, he permitted foreign lawyers to
attend trials. In May, he met with Amnesty International
officials and in June, he announced through the Rastakhiz




criticism." Encouraged by these acts, the opposition
groups emerged from hiding and various, previously illegal
organizations were created. Both groups promptly campaigned
for more freedoms and an end to repression and corruption.
Among the most prominent were the "Writer's Association,"
"Group for Free Books and Thought," "Society of Merchants,
Traders and Craftsmen," and the "Association of Iranian Jurists
It was in this atmosphere of new felt freedoms and
demands that the government provided the "X-Factor" for revolt.
By allowing in January 1978 the publication of an article in
a Teheran newspaper criticizing and questioning the piety of
Khomeini, the government created the spark to light off the
14-- 161revolution.
The religious leaders in Qom reacted violently to the
affront to Khomeini. They quickly organized a protest meeting
in Qom where they announced twelve demands on the government.
They were: the implementation of the Constitution, separation
of powers, abolition of the bureau of censorship, freedom of
speech, freedom for political prisoners, freedom to form
religious associations, dissolution of the Rastakhiz-e Iran
Party, the reopening of Teheran University (closed as a result
of poetry meetings), an end of police violence against students,
state assistance to farmers, the reopening of "Fuzieh," a
seminary closed by the police in Qom and finally, the return
16 3
of Ayatollah Khomeini.
The formulation of the twelve points again reflected




aims of the masses and particular opposition groups, they
avoided as well issues that could alienate other groups, such
as the veil and land reform.
Immediately after the demands were posted, the
leading religious figures led a demonstration of over 4,000
people and attempted to march throughout Qom. The govern-
ments response created a serious clash and provided "martyrs"
which thus began the cycle of forty-day riots which were to
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plaque Iran throughout the year.
2. Revolution
After the customary forty day period of mourning for
the Qom demonstrators, the city of Shiraz erupted with riots
centered around the university there. In Tabiz, the mosques
and other religious places became centers for demonstrations
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and bloody riots. These rxots were reported by the govern-
16 5
ment as premeditated and carefully executed. By March the
government reported unrest throughout the country but that
the agents of black reaction will not be
able to undermine the atmosphere of national
understanding in our country; on the con-
trary, it will unit and consolidate the
ranks of the Iranian people.-^ 6
Significantly "foreign agents" were blamed for the
disturbances implying Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters
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as well as Soviet activists.
It was not until late April that the government admitted
that it was going through a critical phase as more funerals
16 8fed the fire of revolt. Typical of the banners carried
throughout the country, one carried;
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Glory and everlasting life for our martyr's
blood in Qom, Yazd, Tabriz and Palestine.
Victory to the Koran and death and shame on
our enemies . . . our Islamic scholars will go
on existing and become immortal . . . God will
bestow victory on us. Down with Zionism and
victory to Palestine . 1*>9
By August, Marshall Law was declared in Esfahan in
wake of riots there but violence continued unabated.
Increasingly theatres, restaurants and banks became targets
of the religious and nationalist rioters. Anything American
or perceived to be a part of the Shah's modernization program
were subject to attack. In Abadan, 4 00 people died when a
cinema was burned to the ground by sabateurs. A cinema in
Shiraz burned down as well a few hours later.
Ayatollah Khomeini and the religious leaders very
cleverly utilized many of the age-old tactics for revolt
described previously. Ties with the Bazaar is provided them
172
money, organization and mob control. The mosque played a
significant role as the only place where criticism could be
voiced and demonstrations planned. The highly volatile stu-
dents, many being new adherents to a resurrected Islam, eagerly
obeyed the mollahs commands. Finally, in a new twist, Ayatollah
Khomeini couched his rhetoric in vivid religious and revolu-
tionary terms stirring the martyrdom complex among the faith-
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ful and leftists, thus creating fearless mobs in the streets.
Competition for leadership still remained nihil as
Ayatollah Khomeini became the symbol of the revolution. How-
ever, over fifteen opposition parties emerged during the revolt
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which would place serious strains on the revolutionary
government when its revolt succeeded. Among them representing
the extreme right were the Pan Iranist Party, Iran Nationalist
Party, Society of Iranian Socialists. In the middle were
the Iran Liberation Movement and on the left were the Mujahedin
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Khalk, Strugglers for Freedom, and the Fedayeen Khalk.
Besides these groups many religious leaders represented dif-
fering views from that of Khomeini but they will be discussed
later. In any event, Ayatollah Khomeini was still able to
present himself as the leader of the revolt and all activity
in Iran came as a response to his orders
.
Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the Shah
responded to it with a mixture of the 'carrot 1 and 'stick.'
The 'stick' has already been mentioned as it included exten-
sive use of SAVAK and the military to break up demonstrations,
create counter demonstrations and establishing Marshall Law.
The 'carrot' entailed a series of moves meant to placate the
various opposition groups.
Previous to the more serious rioting, he had ordered
the release of hundreds of political prisoners. Instead of
stifling dissent, more demands for more releases were created
and during 1978 many more were released. Along the same
lines, Premier Janshid Amuzegar made an effort to restore the
country's economy by cutting inflation from 31% to 8%, cracking
down on tax dodgers, reshuffling his Cabinet, and purging
corrupt civil servants. His reforms however came too late and




for his piety. Court Minister Hoveyda also was forced to
resign in September 1978 in an apparent attempt to mollify
177
the opposition groups.
To placate the ulema, Sharif-Emami ordered the imperial
calendar scrapped and replaced by the old Islamic one, as
well as the closing of the country's eight big gambling casinos,
including four owned by the Paklavi Foundation, the abolish-
ment of the Minister of State for Women's Affairs post, the
lifting of press censorship and the release of a half dozen
... . , 178
religious leaders.
The Shah's concessions, though many, were not enough
to stem the tide of revolt, and only made the opposition demand
for more. In early September, the Shah was forced to declare
Marshall Law throughout the country thereby causing more riots
in what is now called "Black Friday" in Teheran. At least
179122 demonstrators were killed in Teheran's Jaleh Square alone.
In November when strikes in the oil fields threatened to
paralyze the economy, the Shah played his last major card -
the formation of a military government under General Gholam
* u 180Reza Azhari.
The strikes in the oil fields represented the turning
point for the Shah. Previously, the regime had tried to pre-
vent dissent from spreading into the working class, in particu-
lar, the oil workers. As the regime knew well, the middle
class already in revolt could not carry through a successful
revolution by itself, but with the two million industrial
workers it could. By answering the call of Khomeini, all the
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Shah's efforts were unravelled and as much as $60 million
a day of revenues and four-fifths of the annual output of
oil was lost.
In December with the oil strike crippling the country,
the ulema increased their attempt to depose the Shah. The
month of Moharram and the day of mourning known as Ashura
were again used more as political demonstrations than religious
commemoration. The true power of Khomeini was revealed as
millions of demonstrators shouting "Death to the Shah" and
"Long Live Khomeini" engulfed Teheran, Qom and Isfahan.
Again, though mostly peaceful, the Shah's forces provided
for more martyrs in the cause.
Finally realizing the hopelessness of the situation,
the Shah formed a new government in January 1979 with a National
18 2
Front leader at its head, Shahpur Bakhtiar. In an attempt
to win over the masses Bakhtiar promised more concessions;
the halt of oil flow to Israel and South Africa, to support
Palestinian "legitimate rights," strip SAVAK of power, phase
18 3
out martial law and hold elections.
Bakhtiar 's promises of reform like the Shah's failed
to sway the opposition. In a matter of days, Khomeini refused
to recognize the new government, reiterated that the Shah
must pay for his crimes and formed a rival government in
Paris.
More demonstrations continued till at the end of
January, the Shah was forced to flee his country. Three days
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later, in a response to a call from Khomeini Iranians took to
the streets again, "this time in numbers that dwarfed even
18 5
the most massive rallies during Iran's year of protests."
At least a quarter of Teheran's four million people marched
through the streets demonstrating for support of Khomeini and
celebrating the' fall of the Shah. The giant rally had been
meticulously orchestrated by the Ayatollah's political machine
and demonstrated once again who held real power; Khomeini and
not Bakhtiar.
Bakhtiar's efforts to negotiate with Khomeini revealed
the same intransigence met by the Shah. Bakhtiar had to
resign. His futile pleas for national unity and refusal to
allow the Ayatollah to return, finally collapsed.
After his triumphant return to Iran in February 1979,
Khomeini prepared for the final assault. He immediately
attacked the United States and the Bakhtiar government. De-
claring he would create an Islamic Republic by peaceful means,
18 6
he also threatened a holy war if Bakhtiar put up resistance.
On February 5, 1979 Bazargan, a Moslem human rights activist
was appointed to form a transitional government to turn Iran
into an Islamic republic and on 8 February, the first signs of
the army's disintegration appeared. By 10 February, the
battle for Teheran erupted with Moslem forces loyal to Khomeini
187
gaining victory and arresting Bakhtiar. Finally, the
crushing blow to the Shah and Bakhtiar came with the United
States officially recognizing Khomeini's new government on 16
18 8
February 1979. The bloody revolution had finally ended.
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E. KHOMEINI AND ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT
1. Introduction
The Iranian revolution could not have been successful
without the personality and character of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Nor could it have the impact without his views on Islamic
government and the role of ulema in politics. Therefore this
section will review Khomeini's life, his theory concerning Islamic
government and the role of the mujtahids in the revolution and
government.
2. Khomeini and Politics
What pushed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to the fore-
front of politics? As could be seen in Iranian history, the
ulema always had a central role in Iranian politics. Based
on their mass following and tradition, they wielded consider-
able power. Khomeini gathered his following at a remarkably
early age while still a student in Qom, where he advanced so
189
swiftly that he was allowed to teach other seminarians.
Khomeini also became celebrated at this early point in life,
I
I for the eloquence and effectiveness of his speech, a quality
190
which was deemed indispensable during the years of opposition.
His entrance into politics followed the deposition
of Reza Shah with the publication of a book entitled The
Unveiling of Secrets . This book, a detailed criticism of Reza
Shah and his modernizing policies, brought him more acknowledge-
ment from the people and more importantly, the government





The uniqueness of Khomeini, however, was that his
political activism was virtually singular among the ulema
of his time. Prefering to be concerned only with religious
scholarship and neutralism vis-a-vis the government, the ulema
followed the quiet Ayatollah Burujirdi. Only with his death
in 1961, did Khomeini rise from Burujirdi' s circle of friends
and become an Ayatollah. It was Khomeini, then, after years
of persecution, who transformed the quiescent ulema into
political activists and the mosque a headquarters for socio-
192political command and activity.
Khomeini's role in the 1963 revolt launched him into
greater pre-eminence among the ulema and people. With Iranians
left with little leadership due to the Shah's purges, he moti-
vated other ulema into carrying the revolution onward: a
group readily accepted by the disenchanted populace.
One of the more popular figures among the ulema and
the masses for his opposition to the Shah, his prestige could
only gain with more persecution from the Shah's forces. His
exile, the mysterious death of his eldest son, Mustafa, and
the continued modernization policies of the Shah only strengthened
193his noted intransigence with the Shah. It was this intransi-
gence and his repeated call for the overthrow of the Shah that
made him distinctive from other opposition leaders and
garnered him more supporters. Increasingly, as the economy
turned sour and socio-political problems became more pronounced,
the people saw only the uncompromising Shah as the source of
the problems. It was important then, that Khomeini was the
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earliest and most visible leader who would not compromise
194
with the Shah.
His leadership then cannot be solely attributed to
his political theories but rather because of his symbolic
role of opposition and intransigence with the Shah.
As was noted earlier, this intransigence did not carry
through his sense of diplomacy concerning other opposition
groups. Realizing that his strict conservatism would not be
well received by many in the population, Khomeini reversed
many of his demands concerning women, land reform and minori-
ties. By far the most important reason for his acceptance
by the masses, however, was the simplicity of his call - the
overthrow of the Shah. By avoiding major issues, by being
deliberately obscure on many issues, and by repeating this
call, Ayatollah Khomeini insured his popularity and leadership
role.
In sum, Ayatollah Khomeini was a marked leader for the
opposition movement at an early age. Utilizing the role of
Mujtahid to its fullest, having been renowned as a religious
scholar and ardent foe of the Shah for decades, exercising
restraint and intransigence at the appropriate times and most
of all, keeping his goals simple and policies obscure, Ayatollah
Khomeini ensured his role as leader and the successful com-
pletion of the revolution.
3. Khomeini and the Ulema
Though Ayatollah Khomeini at present enjoys undis-
puted leadership of the Islamic revolution, there are indications
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that his leadership may be tenuous due to differences and
jealousies on the part of other Ayatollahs, in particular
Ayatollah's Taleqhani and Shariatmaderi.
As noted previously, Ayatollah Khomeini was found at
odds with other members of the ulema as far back as 196 0.
Only after the death of Ayatollah Burijurdi and great efforts
on his part was Khomeini able to motivate the ulema to enter
into political activism. Before Khomeini had achieved this
however, many had opposed him, prefering "an adroitly non-
195
committal attitude, adopted with considerable urbanity."
During the years of opposition, Khomeini was not the
only religious leader, for Ayatollah Taleqhani had distin-
guished himself as a forceful opponent to the Shah during the
late sixties and early seventies. Leadership of the rebellion
however fell to Khomeini due in large part because he was
not jailed for ten years like Taleqhani and hence silenced.
Taleqhani also made the mistake of being identified with a
leftist ideology thereby alienating a large segment of the
mujtahids traditional source of power, the bazaaris.
Yet both Taleqhani and Shariatmaderi played significant
roles in the revolution. They were the immediate contact
point for Khomeini and due to their presence in Iran, the
revolutions most visible coordinators. Further, both were
highly instrumental in creating alliances with the diverse
groups of opposition in Iran. Taleqhani through his secu-
larist and leftist emphathies was able to attract the many
leftist intellectual and middle class groups to his cause.
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Ayatollah Mohammad Kazim Shariatmaderi primarily added legiti-
macy to the revolution and garnered the religious segment to
197
the cause because of his piety and scholarship. Both men
due to their activities and risks were greatly responsible
for the revolutions success. One would assume that both
would have a say in the direction of the Islamic republic
afterwards as well but this is not the case. Recent events
in Iran have proven that it is Khomeini alone and not anyone
198
else who will provide the direction for the Islamic republic.
Yet differences exist among the Ayatollahs nonetheless.
Whereas all are committed to building the still nebulous
Islamic Republic, Taleqhani and Shariatmaderi have voiced con-
cern as to what kind it should be and who should lead it.
While Khomeini seeks a strict, seventh century type of govern-
ment, Taleqhani requested for a return to the 1906 Constitu-
tion with a veto power given to religious leaders over any
199laws passed. Shariatmaderi on the other hand opposes the
establishment of the secret revolutionary council as it
interferes with the operations of the Bazargan government. On
the question of leadership both Taleqhani and Shariatmaderi
oppose the seemingly autocratic rule of Khomeini. Taleqhani,
in an obvious reference to the high handed and absolute behavior
of Khomeini said, "an Islamic government is not the monopoly
,.200
of one person.
It is significant to note also that both Ayatollahs,
months before Khomeini's return to Iran were expressing ideas
different from Khomeini. For example, Shariatmaderi has said,
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"We don't want to turn Iran into another Saudi Arabia or
another Libya. But we shall demand strict adherence to the
Islamic precepts of our country's constitution." Perhaps
even more significant, however, is the fact that Shariatmaderi
has formed his own party based in Qom.
Despite the jealousies and differences, Khomeini rules
the Islamic Revolution and dictates who will run the govern-
ment, as well as how it will be run. Through his revolution-
ary council, created while in exile, Khomeini has been effec-
tive in limiting the role of other muj tabids, and establishing
the new Bazargan government.
In sum, Ayatollah Khomeini holds almost dictatorial
powers in Iran, and as such, remains the most dominant per-
sonality in Iran. It is a testimony to his leadership and
political skill that he remains so today and as such his views
on Islamic government should be reviewed.
4. Islamic Government
Khomeini's exact views concerning the Islamic Republic
remain open to interpretation. Most of his ideas and general
principles can be discerned through his work written in 1969
202titled Islamic Government . In it Khomexni says that rule
in Islam is not constitutional in the conventional Western
sense. It is,
not similar to the well known systems of
government. It is not a despotic government
... it is constitutional in the sense that
those in charge of affairs observe a number
of conditions and rules outlined in the Koran
and in the Sunna and represented in the necessity of
observing the system and applying the dictates
and laws of Islam. 203
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Thus, the Islamic state relies on holy laws and its
legislator is God, whereas the role of legilature in the
Western sense is performed by the people's elected represen-
tatives. Since "Islam has thus dealt with every aspect of
life and has given its judgement on it," the need for man's
204
laws and legislation is not apparent. The legislature
then can be replaced by a "planning council" that works to
run the affairs and work of the ministries so that they may
offer their services in all sphere.
Since legislative and judiciary branches of govern-
ment are already covered by the holy laws and the ulema that
interpret and implement them, there is need only for an execu-
tive branch. A monarchy is out of the question for as he has
said, "Islam abolished monarchy and succession to the throne
2 n fi
... only God is sultan." Yet an executive authority must
exist but not as "the conveyor of laws and not a legislator"
207
but only for implementation of laws.
The presence of a person in charge of the
Islamic laws and rules is essential because
such a presence prevents injustice, violation
and corruption. 208
This executive must meet certain qualifications. He
must have knowledge of the Islamic law and have a sense of
209justice. In essence, he must be a religious and pious ruler.
The role of the ulema in this government is supreme
and Khomeini devoted much of his work concerning it.
They are the nation's reference and leaders.
God's authority is the man appointed by God
in charge of the affairs of the Moslems. 210
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Since the ulema are the heirs to the Prophet and have a
knowledge of Allah and His laws that no other men have,
they should and must rule side by side with the executive.
Hence
,
We must lead the people by virtue of our
mission and position in ordering good deeds
and proscribing evil deeds . . . for fighting
injustice and resisting the unjust. 211
Further,
If the ulema are faithful to the permissable
and the knowledge , then they can take charge
of affairs, establish the strictures and set up
the religious system, without misery, injustice
or obstruction of the laws... 212
Finally,
Since Islamic government is a government of
law, the religious expert and no one else
who should occupy himself with affairs of
government. It is he who should function
in all those areas in which the Prophet
functioned - neither adding nor diminishing
these in the slightest degree. 2 13
Khomeini's view of religious and national minorities
shows less tolerance and more xenophobic ideas. As he said,
Christian, Jewish and Bahai missionary
centers are spread in Teheran to deceive
people and to lead them away from the teachings
and principles of religion. Isn't it a
duty to destroy these centers? 2 ^ 4
As for women, Khomeini does not oppose their freedoms
but only wants to "restore her dignity." The veil has less
importance then but their dress and social behavior should
conform to Islamic laws. The same laws apply to all nation-
alities as well. They are welcome if they accept the laws but





Only in the area of foreign policy is Khomeini
specific. He wants to restrict foreign influence in Iran
217
and promote Islamic causes outside of it. Of particular
concern to him are Israel and the United States. On Israel,
he stated;
Israel has usurped a Moslem people's land
and committed immeasurable crimes ... I have
always strongly urged Moslems throughout the
world to unite and fight their enemies,
including Israel. 218
Islamic countries must unite and must exert
all their efforts and employ all their resources
to uproot the usurping aggressor. They must
stop aiding Israel, those who proceed in its
bandwagon and those who support it. 219
Further, Khomeini holds the United States largely
responsible for what has afflicted Iran and the Israeli
state. As he stated,
Let the world know that all our problems
emanate from America. All our problems
emanate from Israel. Israel is also a part
of America. 220
Plainly, the United States does not stand in good
favor, nor would it in the future, given its commitment to
Israel and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.
Today, after victory in the revolution, Khomeini has
put into practice what had been advocated during the struggle.
He severed relations with Israel, expelled Israeli and American
military experts, declared a halt to oil shipments to Israel
and South Africa. To reassure the Arab states, he declared an
end to Iran's role as policeman of the Persian Gulf.
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In the field of government operations, however, his
general principles have failed to materialize into practical
applications. In his words, all that remained for the new
government to do was for it "to organize the ministries, their
. . 221jurisdictions, their activities and their tasks." Yet
under Khomeini the new Iranian government's efforts to do
just that have been undermined. Evidently, the only proper
machinations of government can be found in Khomeini himself
222
and his government within a government in Qom.
For the present, the world has to wait and see if a
truly Islamic government can be formed, much less run along
the general principles proposed by Khomeini. Indeed, his
ideas concerning the legislative and judiciary branches of
government have to be modified. The Constitution of 1906 may
well serve as the better model for government operations than
Khomeini's idealistic notions as it has established a tradi-
tion thatthe vast majority of Iranians accept. Given Khomeini's
ability to recognize the political wind shifts, then, one
should expect the new Constitution about to be presented to
the people, to reflect more the 1906 model than his
ideas noted previously. In any event, until Ayatollah Khomeini
can provide more specific guidelines concerning the Islamic
REpublic and give it his whole hearted support, such a state
may never materialize.
F. CONCLUSIONS
With the successful overthrow of the Shah, the world
witnessed what had only been discussed, argued and mostly
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forgotten: the revival of Islam and the power it wields in
politics. As could be seen in the historical survey of Iran,
the event had many precedents, some of which nearly duplicated
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's fall. Equally evident in this fall
was the power and tactics encompassed in the mujtahid's
struggle which were remarkably similar to those of Iran's
early history. The power of the mollahs was shown to be
unbroken, the mosque remained the center of criticism and
opposition, its leaders (the ulema) unquestioned in their
roles, the clergy could still move the masses in the streets,
and ultimately, could overthrow the most powerful and "stable"
regime in the Middle East
.
The uniqueness of the revolution, then, lay not in the
successful overthrow by religious forces; this had been estab-
lished many times before in Iran's history as well as in
Saudi Arabia (to be discussed later) and to a limited extent
in Egypt (the Moslem Brotherhood) . The uniqueness of the
revolt lay in the failure of the Shah, political analysts and
the intelligence communities to acknowledge the resurgence
of Islam, the political impact of Islam and the uniqueness
of Iranian Shiite Islam. Even today, this negligience on
the part of the Western world still remains as one journalist
stated:
An astounding spectable is happening right
before the eyes of the West which still believes
in progress and the Third World which is eager
to advance. At the threshold of the 21st century,
the 35 million strong Persian people, just
liberated from the despotism of a reckless upstart,
seem by way of a religious time machine to be
115

vaulting back 1,300 years to the original
Moslem society, and religious doctrinaires
clamor for the conquest of temporal power. 2 ^3
This bewilderment of such a spectacle has dire consequences
for the United States for as one Arab writer stated, "For
the millionth time, the American computer confirmed its
224failure to observe the behavior of peoples." Already
shuddering from the effects of the Iranian oil cutbacks, can
the United States afford to miscalculate again the political
impact of Islam in other Moslem oil producing countries?
The answer of course is no yet the United States can be found
doing precisely the same things in Saudi Arabia and the Middle
East as it had done in Iran.
As will be seen in the next chapter, Saudi Arabia like
Iran, is in the process of vaulting from the medieval ages
to the 21st century in as quick a time as possible with the
United States intimately involved with this effort. Further,
the United States continues its policy of support of the
Moslem nemesis, Israel. Both policies it was seen helped
create the Iranian Islamic Revolution, so the question remains
whether the United States intelligence community, political
analysts and leaders can learn from its mistakes and prevent
such a catastrophic event from happening in Saudi Arabia or
other Moslem oil producing countries. Judging from the response
225
of American newspapers, magazines, analysts and leaders,
it would appear that those mistakes have not been learned and
that the United States will face yet another powerful Islamic
inspired upheaval if not revolution.
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IV. SAUDI ARABIA AND ISLAM
A. INTRODUCTION
Given that Saudi Arabia remains a linchpin for the United
State's security and foreign policy efforts in the Middle
East, as well as of great importance to America's economic
well being, it would behoove American policy makers to under-
take a critical study of the Saudi Arabia's rulling elite's
political future. If that future appears to be unstable and
revolutionary, then efforts should be made to either 1) pre-
vent the fall of the monarchy or 2) prepare the United States
for its consequences.
It is the thesis of this paper that due to certain and
unique developments within the Saudi society, a revolutionary
or radical change in that country's government is forthcoming.
Consequently, the religious and political background of Saudi
Arabia will be reviewed and analyzed. The major ruling elements
that can be found in the society will also be discussed as
well as their political and religious impact on the society.
Finally, the positive influences that give stability to the
present regime and the negative aspects and influences found
in the society that threaten to destroy it, will be identi-
fied and analyzed.
It will be found that due to a variety of social, economic
and political factors, Saudi Arabia's present ruling elite
lives on borrowed time. A radical social and political trans-




B. THE WAHHABI MOVEMENT
1. Introduction
The present religious state of Saudi Arabia came as
a result of an eighteenth century reformist reaction to the
conditions of Islam in the country. Since the time of
Mohammad the Prophet in 632 to the fall of classical Islam
to Mongol and Turkish invaders by 125 0, the religion and its
believers dominated most of the civilized world. As a result,
they achieved brilliant secular and religious triumphs. With
the invasions of non-Arabs, a new period began (1250-1800);
a period witnessing many and varied interpretations of Islam,
most often non-Arab and mystical (i.e., sufism)
.
Opposition to the introduction and infusion of these
new ideas, deemed distortions to the pure concept of Islam,
appeared in peninsular Arabia. Under Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wakhab,
a new militant sect arose to combat and cleanse the world of
the Satanic inroads in Islam. Intolerant of all ideas other
than the pristine world which Mohammad had originally created
and animated with the driving force of the jihad (hold war),
the new reformists called the muwahhidin (Unitarians) struck
out from the Nejd in central Arabia. Their success, fall
and resurrection had a profound impact on modern day Saudi
Arabia, an impact which created it and some say may destroy
it.
Accordingly, this section of the paper devotes itself
to the movement's early history, its dormant period and its
rise to power under King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in the twentieth
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century. It will outline the precepts of the Wakhabi faith
and describe its impact on the society that today remains
uniquely religious and powerful.
2. Birth of the Movement
In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Turks nominally
held the peninsula of Arabia. In-land, however, in the Nejd
the Bedouin tribal chiefs remained largely independent and the
2
land, largely untouched by foreign invaders.
The lack of political unity, the absorption
of the tribes in raiding, counter-raiding,
personal disputes, the absence of leadership,
all contributed toward keeping Arabia as a
remote rimeland of the empire, easily visited,
as forgotten as it was before Mohammad's
time .
3
Life in the territory, however, was far different from what
the Prophet had created. Islam had lost its vitality and was
corrupted with the superstitions, customs and rites not unlike
4
that of pre-Islamic Arabia. As Philby was to point out:
Laxity in the observance of the prescribed
rites, in sexual relations, and in other ways
was ignored rather than approved by folks of
decent standing. Superstitious belief in the
efficacy of chains, offerings, and sacrifices
and in the powers of trees, rocks, and certain
tombs to effect or hasten the gratification
of normal human desires was but the measure of
Samaritan ignorance in the masses.
^
The country, in the eyes of the deeply religious,
desperately needed reform. In the early eighteenth century,
Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wakhab arose to do just that.
Born in 'Ayaina in 1703, al-Wakhab lived much like
his namesake Mohammad the Prophet. Taught at an early age
the puritannical precepts of Islam by both his father and
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grandfather (a noted ecclesiastic) al-Wahhab distinguished
himself at an early age with his knowledge and zeal. Indeed,
his father
often had to curb the zeal of the young man,
whose enthusiasm, to be up and doing in the
cause of God was apt to outrun his discretion
in a society which was not yet ripe for
fi
conversion from the easy-going ways of the time.
Al-Wakhab continued his religious instruction under
his grandfather, Sheikh Sulaiman and quickly accepted his
Unitarian philosophy inspired by the works of ibn Taymiyya
(1263-1328). Once he completed this training, he travelled,
much like the Prophet, and observed the deviations practiced
in the land. In the cities of Mecca and Basra, he continued
his studies under the renowned Sheikhs garnering for himself
fame and honors for his zeal and learning. By 1740, "he had
thrown caution to the winds and come out openly as an apostle
g
of moral and spiritual regeneration." Convinced that the
people had abandoned Allah and his message, he preached a
doctrine following the strict and purist teachings of the
9Hanbalx school of Islamic law. Again like the Prophet, he
was forced to flee his first ministry and move back to 'Ayaina
where the Sheikh, Uthman ibn Hamad ibn Mu'ammar proved to
be "an apt and ready pupil for his teaching." Striking a
bargain with him, Uthman supported al-Wahhab in extolling
virtue and fighting vice.
Al-Wahhab' s reputation for courage and sincerity grew
as he smashed sacred trees and tombs without harm from the
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people or Allah. Catching the scornful eye of Uthman's
sheikh and threatened with his life, al-Wahhab was again
forced to leave. This time, in 174 5, Mohammad ibn Saud of
Dar'iya accepted him and joined with him in an alliance that
would shake the foundations of Arabia. Promising to wage
war in God's cause ibn Saud opened his city to the teachings
of the reformer.
The Sheikhs classes were open to prince, peasant
and pauper without distinction: all of them
equally in need of spiritual comfort in the
slough of despond, into which the Arabs had
sunk through years of ignorance and neglect.
The greater and the lesser sins were rampant
in high quarters and low alike: prayers were
neglected or perfunctorily performed, and the
giving of alms had long ceased to be an operative
obligation.
H
Spurred by persuasion, zeal and spoils of war, the
new converts set out on their jihad. Striking typically at
local rivals first, their efforts at first faltered then
succeeded as village after village fell to the two leaders.
While ibn Saud provided th military prowess, al-Wakhab sup-
plied the religious experience and legitimacy.
When ibn Saud died in 1765, his exploits not only
earned him a sizable kingdom but also recognition of his
piety, humanity and military skill. His efforts were so
great that Philby remarked, "It may be said with complete
truth that but for him Wahhabism would never have had its




Succeeded by his son Abdul Aziz (not the great one
of the 1900's), the conquered territory was expanded and
consolidated. In 1788, al-Wahhab ensured his legitimacy by
proclaiming Abdul Aziz as the Imam, the ultimate spiritual
authority. Making all take an oath of allegiance and loyalty
to Abdul Aziz, al-Wahhab died in 1792 knowing his work would
be carried on after him. Again Philby remarked,
And it is amply attested that he not only
presided with distinction over the ecclesias-
tical administration of the realm, but also
took an active and vigorous part in the direction
of its military and political activities in
the cause of God.^-3
Under Abdul Aziz, the movement swept into Iraq in 18 2
and in an orgy of slaughter and pillage, the venerated tomb
of Hussain was demolished as the incarnation of Shiite in-
fidelity. The Wahhabi movement had thus earned a reputation
for violence and fanatacism. The general wave of revulsion
for this and other acts landed as far as Constantinople. On
the other hand, despite this reputation, their fervor was
also acknowledged as having "a salutory and revitalizing effect,
14
which spread little by little over the whole Moslem world."
In 1801, the Wahhabi forces now under Saud ibn Saud
captured Mecca and secured the Hijaj . The Wahhabi movement
had reached its zenith. Saud demonstrated beyond a doubt that
the Hijaj and the pilgrimage were his responsibility by stopping
a pilgrimage originating from Syria. The "Commanders of
Virtue and Forbiders of Vice," a kind of religious police-
men, went on their rounds to see that the people did not
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The Ottoman Turks responded to this and the massacre
at Karbala by sending an Egyptian expenditionary force under
1
6
Mohammad Ali, the viceroy of Egypt. Mohammad Ali's son,
Ahmad Tusun led this first invasion but was defeated. After
Mohammad Ali personally took command, Medina fell to him in
1812, followed closely by Mecca in 1813. The introduction of
the cannon on the battlefield and the superior equipment and
forces of the Egyptians quickly defeated the Wahhabi warriors
and in 1818 Da'iya the Wahhab capital fell. Mohammad Ali
razed the city to the ground and sent Abdullah, the new ruler
of the Wahhabs to Constantinople, for execution.
Wahhab power and influence had shattered due to the
success of the viceroy of the Ottomans. The ecclesiastical
hierarchy were executed and tortured with a reign of terror
lasting nine months. More importantly, however, the foreign
occupation fostered a spirit of discontent due to the ruthless
and incompetent rule of the Egyptians. As a result of their
administration and their incomplete persecution of the Wahhabi
ulema, Wahhabism stayed alive in the desert through the works
of the mutawwas (missionaries) "who continued to spread reading
and writing among the tribes so that they could study the
18
Koran and the hadith of Mohammad." The defeat had crushed
the Wahhabi army, but it did not destroy the spirit of the
movement which in its dormant state, kept alive the fervor
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until resurrected by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in the twentieth
century.
The importance of the early Wahhabi movement in
regards to the future of Saudi Arabia cannot be underesti-
mated. The movement though not nationalist, created the first
successful effort by the Arabians to throw out foreigners and
ideas in the Nejd and Hejaj. As a strictly religious phenomena,
it spread the doctrine of a unique reformist faith and brought
back true Islam to the countryside. The religious doctrine
of Wahhab further acted as a unifying force among the tribes
and brought relative peace, long non-existent, to the land.
It revitalized the idea of the jihad and the use of military
force to spread the faith. Further, it established the
Saudi family as the legitimate religious and political leader
of Arabia, not only then but for generations to follow.
Finally, it proved that using a religious creed, a strong
leader could arise to unify the previously divisive society.
Unfortunately, after the fall of Dariya , the movement lacked
such a leader. Still, according to H.A.P. Gible
,
the results of this first Wakhabi movement
were, and still are, far reaching. In its
original phase it shocked the conscience of
the Moslem community by the violence and
intolerance which it displayed not only toward
saint-worship but also toward the accepted
orthodox rites and schools. 19
3. The Dormant Period
After the destruction of Dariya, the Wahhab movement
entered a period of dormancy. One might ask, how could such
a movement invigored with religious fervor and legitimacy fall
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so quickly? Philby offers the view supported by the Saudi '
s
who taught him that the rise and fall came about through the
"relaxation of the disciplines which had rescued the Arabs
20from the barbarism of pre-Wahhabi times." Old tribal and
parochial jealousies and rivalries resumed their destructive
influence over the society. The movement had lost its inter-
est in the people's welfare and economy. Their own ruthless-
ness and fanaticism ran unabated and consequently alienated
a great portion of the population especially in the Hijaj
.
In any event, Arabia returned to the conditions that
had prevailed before the movements birth. Travel became
dangerous, raiding common, and the country leader less under
21
the harsh Ottoman rule. A member of the Saud family, Turki,
reestablished a deformed version of the Wahhabi state around
Riyadh in 1820. Slowly retreating from the Nejd, the Otto-
mans played the tribes against each other providing subsidies
22
and arms. Through the succeeding years, the Saudi ' s fought
among themselves over the succession of rule. It was not
until Sheikh Abdul Rakman ibn Hassain, the grandson of al-
Wahhab, that religion was restored as an effective element
in the life of the Arabs. Yet under his rule, the Wahhabis
23
never reached the height of their previous rule. Yet both
Turki 's and Abdul Rahman's reign were of "utmost importance
in restoring something of the shattered fortunes of the
24
Wahhabi state and the prestige of the House of Saud."
Prior to and during their reigns, however, inter-
family feuds weakened their power. Their* s and other family
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members' initial successes alarmed the Ottomans and once again
Mohammad Ali reentered Arabia in 1836 to reassert control.
Using Khalid ibn Saud as a puppet, his success was followed
by a resurgence of Saudi power under Faisal ibn Saud in 1843.
The Saudi family, weakened by feuds, however, came into con-
flict with ibn Rashid, the powerful ruler of the Shammar
tribes and were forced into exile into Kuwait. Although
humiliated and an outcast Abd al-Rahman set out to restore
Saudi power and extend the Wahhabi cause throughout Arabia.
Thus, in exile, he instilled in one of his sons, Abd al Aziz
ibn Abd al-Rakman al-Faisal al Saud (ibn Saud henceforth)
25
the fervor and lessons needed to accomplish the goal. The
period of Wahhab weakness, of dormancy, had come to an end.
4 . Resurrection
Armed with religious conviction and determined to
restore family honor, Ibn Saud with forty followers returned
to Arabia. In a campaign much like a Greek epic tale, he
succeeded in recapturing Riyadh and restored Saudi Wahhabi
2 6power in the peninsula. Through a series of successful cam-
paigns, all of the Nejd fell to him by 1906. By 1913 he had
captured part of the Hijaz and defeated the Rashidis and their
27Turkish allies. More importantly, he had conquered Al-Hasa
thereby reaching the Persian Gulf and making contact with the
British.
Ibn Saud soon found out, however, that conquering the
infidel came quite easily in comparison to ruling his domain.
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After the Ottoman Sultan had agreed to recognize ibn Saud as
the lawful ruler of the Nejd, he turned his attention to the
administration of the state. He had much working for him in
securing his hold over the society. His political legitimacy
was assured through his military exploits, his family pedigree
and his sincere Wahhabi faith. He had the nucleus of a theo-
cratic state in the ulema , many of whom directly descended
from al-Wahhab, and through his father, Abdul Rahman who still
held the title of Iman. The mutawwas strengthened his position
through their missionary work among the tribes. Despite all
his accomplishments and all these supportive forces, he still
could not effectively contain, much less rule, over the nomadic
and unreliable bedouin.
The astute ibn Saud saw the basic weakness of the
society which had brought about the Wahhabi movements' decline
and prevented him from ruling effectively. It was the con-
stitution of a desert society:
capable as it was of heroic effort under the
impulse of a great cause or a great personality,
but tempermentally unable to maintain indefinitely
the discipline necessary to develop the fruits
of victory for the common good. 28
Local and parochial loyalties overrode all attempts to sustain
the state and when harnessed, under the unifying banner of
Unitarianism, lasted only briefly. Ibn Saud, using religion
as his tool, struck upon the solution known today as the
Ikhwan (Brotherhood) . But before describing this unique
solution, one must first become more familiar with the forces
of instability which ibn Saud hoped to overcome.
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5. The Forces of Instability
With defeat of the Rashidis, ibn Saud had gained a
kingdom as large as France. His people, however, had no con-
ception of an ordered society, where laws didn't change with
each tribe or town passed. Totally illiterate, isolated from
the world by the desert, a lack of resources and their unruly
ways (referred to as al-Djakiliya ) , their lifestyle remained
unchanged for centuries. Raiding and robbery, feuds between
tribes and the Bedouin concept of honor and his elevated status
among all men; all created an anarchial society defying unity
and order.
Essentially six elements could be found in the society
that encouraged this anarchy. Foremost among them, Bedouin
were not accustomed to serving one master for an extended
period of time. Many rulers before ibn Saud had created
kingdoms; "but most of the kingdoms had broken up as soon
as the rulers died, whether they died by violence or were
29
cunning or lucky enough to die in their beds." The Bedouin
could be hired to the fight for the thrill, glory and booty
it would bring. For after all, it merely extended the act of
raiding beyond familiar borders. But when the struggle proved
to be an extended one, the forces owing allegiance to only
their sheikh and not the grand strategist, proved unreliable
and tended to drift away, sometimes even joining the enemy's
side.
The second element revolved around the basic conflict
inherent to the society of the peninsula between the townsmen
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and the nomadic Bedouin. The nomadic Bedouin as a class were
those men whose main economic support derived directly from
the sheep or camels which were constantly driven in search of
water and pasture. The townsmen, on the other hand, earned
their living and the disdain of the nomads directly from their
agricultural and urban activities. Especially after the
introduction of the Wahhabi Movement, the noble Bedouin con-
sidered the towndweller "with his waterpipe and clean shaven
face the very essence of sin and the towndweller considered
31
the Bedouin convert as little more than a fanatical animal."
This level of animosity, first based on their relationship to
the land, the treatment of women, and then later on religious
grounds, showed itself in a variety of ways. Besides the
normal violence and discrimination, towndwellers would not
32
even allow intermarriage with the Bedouin or vice versa.
Ibn Saud like his predecessors, utilized the armies
of townsmen more often and more successfully as they were far
more reliable on the battlefield and in times of peace. With
the capture of the Hijaj, this conflict between the two
classes became more evident with slaughter and conflict the
33
usual end result of their meetings.
The third element came from the townsmen themselves.
Each ruling family pandered to its own petty amibtions and
rivalries. The absence of a strong leader often led to fac-
tionalism and dissension not only among themselves but later
against ibn Saud. In 1908, ibn Saud had to forcefully retake




adventurist. Not only had they caused mayhem in their
territory, they had even challenged ibn Saud, refusing him
entrance to their town to mediate their own quarrelling and
warring.
A fourth element could be easily identified with the
first and third elements of independence and petty township
rivalries. The two problems are related to a more pervasive
phenomena in the peninsular society, that is, kinship or
tribal ties. Kinship is easily identified in the nomadic
Bedouins who wander in semi-autonomous bands of kinsmen. These
bands in turn relate to members of a larger grouping or tribe
on the basis of descent. Each group owes its allegiance to
its skeikh who in turn submits to one of a larger or more
powerful kin group who enjoys his status like those below him
via his election from all skeikhs or elders and in particular
family lineage. Villages in the same way are united to a
particular tribe with the elders and a skeikh enjoying the
position of leadership. Not all towns relate to kinship or
tribal ties as totally as others though. In some cases such
ties are important but the members remain united through their
common residence and shared experience. Nevertheless, such
villages exhibit the same loyalties as those characterized
above
.
In any event, the phenomena produced a political affinity
of all its members toward a particular group or leader. Re-
aligning and keeping their allegiance to another leader, in
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particular, of another tribe did not come easy. Further, as
there were distinct rivalries and differing social status
among tribes, divergence of opinion on who should hold the
leadership was common and divisive.
A fifth corrosive element could be found in the many-
racial and religious minorities found in the kingdom. A large
group, the Shiites were never treated with any tolerance by
the Ikhwan or more fanatical Sunni's. In fact, a fatwa issued
by the ulema under ibn Saud called for their forced conversion
denial of the right to worship and demolition of their
mosques. Ibn Saud overturned the order as he did not wish
to risk more war. Indirectly then, the existence of a large
religious minority in the Eastern Province contributed sub-
stantially to the problem of social and political consolidation
The sixth problem related to the difficulties of
establishing law and order in the realm. Ibn Saud faced the
problem of developing trust among tribesmen in the established
legal and regulatory forms of government. Familiar with
their own customs and law, they were hard put to accept the
Sharia and the central authority of Riyadh which sought to
37
standardize them. Similarly, the townsmen remained aloof
of other laws other than their own. In his attempts for law
and order, ibn Saud constantly had to deal with both groups
as they attempted to use that law which suited their needs at
38
the time. No one group readily accepted the new laws or




Thus ibn Saud faced many challenges against his
attempts to unify the society, to build a solid citizenship
and to preserve his kingdom beyond his death. Knowing that
the fate of his kingdom's independence and growth into a
modern state hinged on his ability to overcome these ancient
conflicts he utilized the cohesive elements of Wahhabism
and embarked upon a unique solution, the Ikhwan.
6. The Ikhwan
Starting in about 1912, ibn Saud encouraged the unruly
Bedouins to build close to two hundred hijras, "new towns
which were a combination of military cantonment, agricultural
colony, and missionary center for the propagation of Wahhabism."
Drawn basically from the Harb and Mutair tribesmen, they
40
came to be called the Ikhwan. The first experimental colony
established itself at Artawiya and were given arms, money,
seed and agricultural equipment. Supplemented by the mutawwas ,
the Ikhwan rendered valuable service to ibn Saud as devotees
of the jihad against unbelievers. This settlement Artawiya,
expanded to house over 10,000 Ikhwan and was much feared by
Moslems and foreigners alike. Philby reported in passing by
it, that it was "dreaded throughout the legnth and breadth of
Arabia" having become "a veritable metropolis of narrow
fanatacism.
"
Ibn Saud had thus canalized the warlike propensities
of the Arabs in the service of God and his representative on




and the luxuries of life were now taboo. All men regardless
of tribe and social status became Ikhwan and helped build the
mosques, schools and dwellings of the hijra.
Daily existence in these cantonments resembled a mili-
tary camp. Conditions were austere with religious duties the
most demanding. If one missed the call of the minaret and
lacked an adequate excuse, he faced execution. All members
worked for the development and expansion of the town and par-
ticipated continuously in all religious activities and training.
The equality of the membership, though in theory
unanimous, actually broke down into the development of three
classes. Bedouins now farmers made up the warrior class and
the majority. The leadership of this group, the skiekhs were
sent to special ulema schools in Riyadh to ensure their faith
and loyalty to the Wahhabi cause. They and specially trained
ulema made up the second class and religious leadership in the
community. This group, the mutawwas performed a dual func-
tion. They collected the zakat and spread the gospel in the
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economy and construction of the settlements. Finally,
merchants and craftsmen aided in the economy and construction
of the settlements and thus comprised the third class in the
hijra .
The hijra at its height had become the major feature
of the resurrected Wahhabi movement. It remained a ready source
of manpower and fanatacism for ibn Saud. At one time, they





They were an elite force, the only true Moslems.
It was a force of men who were always fresh and
always changing, with a lust for battle and
plunder, or reward in Paradise, which was
always new and sharp. These were men far more
ruthless and far more terrible than the men
of the tribal levies of his earlier days - men
who spread fear and respect for the justice of
ibn Saud. 44
The man ultimately responsible for their creation and
success, for their organization and vitality was Sheikh Abd
Allah ibn Mohammad ibn Abd al-Latif . A major actor in the
resurrection of the movement, Abd Allah had originally under-
took the task of re-educating the Nejd in 1902. He organized
the armies of mutawwas , directed their activities and inspired
their religious thought. His rules and regulations permeated
the country and the religion and his treatises served as the
basis for the philosophical and practical application of the
45faith. He had inspired ibn Saud to combine religion and
agricultural responsibilities with the obligation of jihad.
Through him, the true significance of the Ikhwan as compared
to other religious movements came into being. Nowhere else
had such a force and organization been created for such an
ideal. For the first time the Bedouin were involved in the
social and economic mainstream of the towns. "A formerly
unreliable social element was forged into a reliable and loyal
fighting force; all this was accomplished through the medi-
cines of religion as implemented and understood by the people
46
of the towns." A new class of citizen, a class between the
merchants of the towns and the unruly Bedouin had been born.
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This new class, by its very existence, tipped
the balance from barbarity towards a kind of civi-
lization. For the first time in the deserts'
history, the proportion of men who were settled
and more or less amenable to law was enough to
form the foundation of a stable state: it was
on that foundation that the state of Saudi Arabia
began to grow. 4'
In such a way, ibn Saud overcame, at least temporarily,
the divisive forces mentioned earlier. For close to twenty
years, they ensured his rule, conquered more territory and
spread the unifying faith of al-Wahhab.
7 . The Wahhabi Precepts
To understand fully this unifying element of the
Wahhabi faith, one must first understand its precepts. For
based on this faith, ibn Saud could boost to the British,
"should I have but to give the word and a great host
would flock to my banner . . . and not one of them but lives
48
to die for the great reward."
At the onset it must be pointed out that ibn Saud
could make such a boast first because he was a religious leader
Blessed by al-Wahhab, ibn Saud's forefathers had established
themselves not only as the political leaders of the tribes
but as the religious tutors of the faithful. Secondly, his
great personality of epic proportions ensured the loyalty of
the religious as well as the indifferent.
Besides this, puritanical Islam embodied in the
Wahhabi movement struck responsive chords among the popula-
tion long accustomed to austere living conditions and depri-
vations of desert life. Not only did the accretions of wealth
135

(Western lifestyle and inventions, gold, silk, liquor and
tobacco) come under attack, but also their location, namely,
the towns. As mentioned before, the animosity toward towns-
men was great and what better way to vent this hatred than to
war against them in the name of Allah and righteousness.
Using these primordial factors, Mohammad ibn Abdul
al-Wahhab thrust his beliefs on the people of the Nejd.
Though inspired by ibn Taynxiyya, in some major aspects he
49departed from hxs teachings. Thus unlike ibn Taymiyya, he
rejected all forms of Sufism. There could be no mystical
relationship with God by man. Therefore, walis
, saints, and
so-called 'friends of God 1 , were deemed heretics. Mohammad
the Prophet could only make such a claim and he was the last.
No one, according to the Wahhabi's theory has influence or
a special relationship with Allah. One can't reach Him nor
comprehend Him. Thus the tradition of grave visitation and the
cult surrounding special tombs became sinful. Wahhabi's
strictly forbid the adornment of graves and destroyed those
that were, as in the case of Hussain's tomb in Karbala.
Wahhabi's also rejected, with much more vitrulence,
ibn Taymiyya, the intellectualism of Islam. Taglid , the
various schools of Islamic thought, fettered men to false
rules and ideas. Written by men, they carried with them
foreign influences and errors. The only path to true Islam
was fresh thinking formed "through a personal study" deriving
52
"an understanding of his responsibilities to God." Significantly,





Through study one would soon discover the 'unity of
God. ' According to al-Wahhab, Allah was all pervasive, the
only worthy object of adoration, with no other object worthy
54
of devotion. Hence, Mohammad's warning against polytheism
was taken strictly. The pagan beliefs of the Bedouins con-
cerning jinns, sacred trees and venerated rocks violated this
tenet and had to be eradicated. Not even the celebration of
the Prophet's birthday was tolerated.
As can be construed from above, one of the main tenets
of the Wahhabi faith lay in the strict adherence of the
Quranic precepts. Wine, narcotics, music, use of gold and
silk, and other luxury items were to be forbidden and dis-
dained. Further, all true Bedouins were to contest all men,
Moslem and non-Moslem alike until they acknolwedged that there
is no God but Allah and followed the Quranic precepts strictly,
especially the five pillars of faith.
Finally, the Wahhabi faith stressed the evils of
innovation, the necessity for punishment of wrong dress, the
importance os sinner and complete devotion to Allah and the
requirement to follow and remain loyal to those leaders who
accept and rule through the Sharia. They were taught that
good works, especially death in a jihad would bring pardon
from Allah and ensure an afterlife in paradise.
With these principles ibn Saud and the Wahhabi ulema




1) create and establish a legal (Sharia based)
form of taxation,
2) build a legal system corresponding to the Sharia
as the Wahhabi ' s interpreted it,
3) provide the proper religious education for
townsmen and Bedouin alike,
4) develop religious controls to ensure complete
conversion of all to the true faith,
5) and legitimize the pre-eminence of the king
( umara ) over the ulema through directing the
jihad, presiding over prayer, and being
responsible for all religious obligations.
The Wahhabi movement with its precepts, resurrected
as it was by ibn Saud, legitimized his rule, unified the
society and provided the fervor necessary to complete the
conquest and consolidate his gains in the peninsula. The
Wahhabi faith and the development of the Ikhwan provided the
perfect solution to the primordial challenges before him
and his people.
8 . Revolt of the Ikhwan
By 1925, with the Ikhwan leading the way and Wahhabi
inspired townsmen doing much of the fighting, ibn Saud had
conquered al-Aksa, Asir and finally the Hijaj provinces.
With the fall of Hijaj , then under the self -proclaimed caliph
5 6
Husayn, ibn Saud felt that his fighting years were over.
The Ikhwan did not. The Brethren's desire to kill or convert
the unfaithful was still unsatisfied. There were always more
infidels to conquer. Once started, there was simply no way
of stopping the Brethren. They were "certain to crash as a
train or a car without brakes." Yet they had to be stopped
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for there was no one left to fight without encountering the
wealth and mechanized arms of the British. All the small
shiekhdoms on its periphery as well as Trans-Jordan and Iraq
had British treaties, alliances and forces stationed to
protect them.
The Ikhwan, however, long chafing under the moderation
and modernization of ibn Saud threw caution to the wind and
attacked Iraq in 1927. Thus after a period of mistrust and
resentment toward the king, the Ikhwan started their revolt.
The revolt had its roots well before their invasion
of Iraq. The massacres at Taif and in Jordan in 1921 had
59
shocked ibn Saud who was quick to reprimand them. Further
ibn Saud at this time had embarked on a cautious program of
modernizing the state. Though giving due deference to
Wahhabism, the Ikhwan viewed this modernization with its
fiforeign inventions and contacts as evil and sinful. The
first automobile to enter the fanatical town of Hauta, for
instance, was burned publicly with its driver almost sharing
6
1
its fate. The king's contacts with the British and acquies-
cense to the foreigners international laws were further irk-
some to the Ikhwan. All of these sources of discontent led
ultimately to the Brethren under Faisal al-Duwaish of the
Mutair tribe and Sultan ibn Bijad of the Ataiba to take
matters into their own hands and start raiding Iraq and Kuwait.
Their complaints were well known through a previous
conference of Ikhwan leaders in 1926. In that conference
they promised to continue the jihad against infidels and
62
censured ibn Saud on seven points. They were:
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1) for not having punished the Egyptians for
murdering some Ikhwan who were preventing the
Mahmal (a holy covering for the Kabal ) and its
military band from entering Mecca, °^
2) sending his son, Faisal to London to curry favor
with the British,
3) introducing the telegraph, telephone and automo-
bile into the land of Islam,
4) levying custom taxes on the Moslems in Nejd,
5) granting grazing rights to Jordan and Iraq on
Wahhabi land,
6) prohibiting commerce with Kuwait (if they weren't
Moslems they should be killed or converted, if
they were, then trade should be lawful)
,
7) tolerating the dissenters of al-Aksa and al-Qatif.
He should force them to become Moslems or kill
them. 64
The ulema during this time frame were also perturbed
by ibn Saud's actions but were more disturbed by the fanatical
Ikhwan. In issuing a famous fatwa in 1927, they underscored
their concerns by:
1) taking a neutral position on the question of
the telegraph,
2) wanting to prevent the entrance of the Mahmal
into the Hijaj,
3) wanting the Shiites converted or exiled,
4) wishing to prevent Shiites from grazing in
Moslem territory,
5) requesting the Imam to return illegal taxes while
also stating that this was not an issue of
sufficient groudns to destroy Moslem unity, and
6) decreeing that it was , the Imam's responsibility
alone to declare a jihad not sheikhs. 65
Ibn Saud called a conference in April 1927 in Riyadh
to consult with the leaders. Many of his innovations were
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passed in review; the religious and tribal leaders gave their
support of all the main issues raised, especially his policy
of peace and friendship with all their neighbors. Thus armed
with this consultation and endorsement, he could face the
Ikhwan.
After more raids into Iraq and into Kuwait and after
diplomatic protests from the British, ibn Saud held another
conference in 1928. Al-Duwaish and ibn Bijad refused to attend,
Ibn Saud offerred to resign his post but since his power and
prestige could not be replaced, it was naturally refused.
Receiving again their endoresement , the king, with a clear
conscience, set out to purge the Brethren.
Organizing levies from the towns, the war was brought
to its conclusion in two years. Once again the ethic of the
towns and the ethic of the people of the desert became an
6 fi
issue. For the Ikhwan this was more than a jihad for the
Wahhabi faith, it was war against the hated lifestyle and
politics that came to be associated with the town. Once
again, the townsmen bore the brunt of the battle with the
still basically unreliable tribal levies in the wings.
The final battle at Sibila was to mark an end of an epoch as
well, for the battle was waged with motorcars and radios
against camels and swords. Further:
Saudi Arabia had virtually assumed its final
shape as the result of constant war upon the
infidel; and henceforth the infidel would be
a valued ally in the common cause of progress.
Hitherto the killing of infidels in the way
of God had been regarded as the supreme virtue;
but Faisal al-Duwaish had been taught at Sibila
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that that virtue must not be practiced without
the permission of higher authority; and
henceforth its practice would be strictly
forbidden. 68
The rebellion had showed that clan loyalties were
still very strong for the men fought and died as their Shiekhs
had ordered. Ibn Saud realizing the revolt for what it was,
that is, the essence of ancient primordial politics, ended
it quickly with characteristic military efficiency and human-
tarianism, "It was to be the last time that the ethos of
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the desert would challenge the religious ethic of the towns."
Once so prominent in the creation of the new regime,
the Ikhwan were now shattered and sank into oblivion. Brilliantly
conceived, useful in conquests, the Ikhwan had become a jugger-
naut out of control. The modernization and progress so des-
perately needed by the state was then at stake. So it was
ironic that in the end, the very force used to unify the
country, threatened it with disentegration. Philby said it
better by writing:
Ibn Saud's creation of the Ikhwan movement
in 1912 was a stroke of genius; only equalled
by his courageous liquidation of the organi-
zation eighteen years later, when it could be
nothing but an obstacle to the consolidation
of a position which he had built up so patiently
and laboriously. The Frankenstein of his
own creation would surely have dstroyed him,
if he had not taken the initiative of
destroying it himself. ^0
9. Conclusions
With the defeat of the Ikhwan, serious internal
resistance to the regime of ibn Saud ended. Other than the
easily quelled rebellion of ibn Rafida, internal dissatisfaction
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did not rise again till 1958 with the reign of Saud. Still,
ibn Saud and his heirs had to reconcile Wahhabism with their
plans for modernization and later the immense wealth derived
from oil. It would not be an easy task.
Though modernization and the exploitation of oil
would bring profound changes to Saudi Arabia, neither of them
could compare to the impact of Wahhabism. Through al-Wahhab
and his" first convert king, Mohammad abn Saud, the peninsula
had been brought out of the religious 'dark age' and politi-
cally revived. Based on purely religious motives, the two
men had created a nation unique in the Arab world. However,
due to internal and unique primordial conflicts, their dream
came to an end only to be resurrected by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud
in 1901.
The impact of ibn Saud on the formation of the modern
state, was beyond great; he was the state. Deeply religious
yet politically astute, he created and molded a state where
non had existed or had lasted for so long.
Through his grand design, the society and state "had
been established on the bedrock of consultation between
71
classes," and in particular between the king and the ulema.
Many Bedouins had been permanently settled and brought into
the community. Legal anarchy and the violent code of the
people had been corralled. Finally and most importantly,
Islam in its purist form had been reestablished throughout
the land. For the first time, religious instruction and rule
had been introduced to the towns and the nomadic people.
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Having handled internal and external conflict without the
loss of unity or power, the Wahhabi Movement had and would
continue to mold the society and state well beyond the death
of its greatest of leaders, ibn Saud.
C. SAUDI ARABIA TODAY
1. Introduction
With the creation of the Wahhabi society and the
creation of the new state in 193 2, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud
faced the enormous problem of creating a modern nation state.
With the crushing defeat of the Wahhabi rebels in 1929, ibn
Saud shifted from the strictly religious direction of his
politics to a more secular one. Recognizing that the nations
future security depended on modernization and growth, he
single-handedly thrust his nation into the twentieth century.
How he and his successors were able to do so, despite the
difficulties, will be discussed below. Accordingly, the various
elements which make up Saudi Arabian society and government
will be identified and their political religious power analyzed,
as well as their means of political expression. Finally, the
modern sources of conflict will be reviewed and then analyzed.
With this information, the paper will conclude by forecasting
Saudi Arabia's near future; a future which in the end does
not look promising for the royal family.
2. The Political-Social Forces
a. The House of Saud
To understand the present and future of Saudi Arabia
one must. not only look to the king and royal family as the
source for directions and power but to the ulema , the tribal
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Bedouin, the rising middle class and the military as well.
All define and shape the political, social and economic
structure of the society. Each group provides a significant
influence that cannot be ignored by either the analyst or
the ruling elite, the House of Saud. Nevertheless, the
authority and source of power in the nation lies with the
king and his royal family. Ibn Saud had created through his
dominant personality, religious and military acumen, and
purposeful acts, a socio-political structure that remains
72
vibrantly alive today. Difference in method of rule exists
today but for the most part they remain intact.
In the early period of the state, ibn Saud ruled
his country as if it were his personal household. His
reign was absolute but because he modeled his conduct after
that of the Prophet Mohammad, the Quran and the Traditions,
he governed much like a constitutional monarch. In matters
concerning religion he consulted the ulema, specifically from
the Al-al-Shaikh clan. In other matters he held a daily
' majlis ' where his family, tribal chiefs and notables had
74their sway. Ibn Saud's rule was further cemented through the
use of marital alliances which ensured not a huge royal family
derived from over three hundred wives but the loyalty of
tribal chiefs as well. * Thus ibn Saud placed a vested inter-
est in all families for the regimes stability and created
7 6political legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
The primary method of rule, at least in the formative
years, embodied ibn Saud's personal decision making. Faced
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with a poor country and lacking an adequate administration,
he relied on the money garnered from the pilgrimages, the
remaining Ottoman bureaucrats in the Hijaj and his own politi-
cal maturity. These, however, were not enough as a modern
state could not be ruled by Bedouin raised and Unitarian
motivated king who saw the land as his personal estate.
Ironically, the one factor that ensured that Saudi
Arabia was to remain one nation would be his drive for and
acceptance of modernity. This drive allowed for the first
oil and mineral exploration to be conducted between 1931 and
1933 by an American named Twitchell and its production in
771936-38 by Aramco ensured that the state would survive.
Besides supplying the needed funds for the state, "the
oil revenues of Saudi Arabia have in a sense liberated it
7 8from the necessity to choose between tradition and modernity."
The missing ingredient for the success of the regime - money -
came flowing in the millions of dollars. Considering the
country's fiscal problems, the money was welcome yet it
79bequeathed lbn Saud with still more problems In the first
8
year, the king received ten million dollars. In later
years, it would geometrically rise.
Ironically, the very item so necessary for construction
of a modern state, corrupted it. Being ignorant and naive,
the funds were unwisely spent resulting in spiralling infla-
8 1
tion; "anarchy of money grabbing" and corruption. Foolish
extravagances and expensive vices became the norm and a source
of bad publicity for the House of Saud.
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Many of the princes entirely misunderstood
the west, they saw and craved its luxury, but
never saw its foundation of morality and taste.
To some degree, the west misunderstood the
princes; it saw a brood of playboys, but
never saw the sternly moral world they came
from. 82
The political structure then was incapable and incom-
petent in the early years to handle the wealth and moderniza-
tion process. Indeed, ibn Saud's government failed to pro-
vide for the needed medical programs, schools, sanitation
services and infrastructure, so necessary for an emerging
8 3
state. At his death in 1953, ibn Saud had left a unified
but incompletely prepared society as well as a legacy of
corruption and government inefficiency. Prior to his death,
however, he created what was to be a political tradition to
ensure the regimes stability still further - the Saudi princi-
ple of succession. Since the principle of primogeniture was
not universally accepted, he insisted on selecting his
successor, his eldest surviving son, Saud, and forced all to
84
oaths of loyalty to uphold his rule. Thus by a simple
act, he prevented the future disintegration of the Saudi
dynasty which had plagued it previously. The principle of
succession incorporated previous traditions besides this oath
process. The ulema, tribal leaders and the royal family all
' influence the succession and can dethrone the king if need
be (such as Saud in 1964) . The succession also "would be
determined not by seniority but by ability in leadership,





Though his choice as successor proved to be a poor
one, the system left behind him proved enduring and capable.
The royal family armed with numbers, unity, prestige, politi-
cal legitimacy and Quranic principles were able to depose
Saud; albeit with difficulty, and replace him with a more
8 6
competent ruler, Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. If any
questions remained concerning the stability of the Saudi
state they were quickly dispelled with the quick and efficient
87handling of Faisal's assassination.
It was with Faisal's reign that the royal family's
power and prestige expanded. Not only had they proved
responsible in handling internal government problems, they
had embarked upon a successful drive for modernization and
efficient government. Cutting down waste and corruption,
Faisal innaugurated the Ten Point Program to ensure the state
8 8
would progress yet maintain its cultural values.
Today, the royal family's strength has grown far
beyond the expectations of ibn Saud. In fact, the kingly
powers exercised previously have been considerably curtailed.
For a variety of reasons, King Khalid exercises less power
and influence than his predecessors and the trend will likely
continue. The demise of the autocratic rule of the king
came about gradually. Foremost among the reasons was the
j
creation of ministries to handle the ever increasing compli-
cations of a modern state. Starting even with ibn Saud, the




Finance (1933) , Defense and Aviation (1944) , the Interior
(1951), Agriculture, Communication and Education (1953),
Commerce and Industry, Health (1954), Information, Labor and
89
Social Affairs (1960's) and finally, Justice (1970). By
1975, even more ministries were created. They were:
Ministries of; Higher Education, Industry and Electricity,
Commerce, Municipal and Racial Affairs, Planning, Posts,
Telegraphs and Telecommunications, and Public Works and
90 ...Housing. The ministries, at first staffed by foreigners,
were manned mostly by princes of the royal family and later
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some educated laymen. This placed the princes in positions
of significant influence and greatly curtailed the powers of
the king. Tied to this, another element attributing do the
rise of the royal family's power was education. Though not
holding any degrees, they were better educated and politically
92
experienced. Consequently, they demanded a greater voice
and active participation in the government. Further, their
numbers and propensity to form coalitions provided added
strength and necessitated that they not only be heard but
heeded. Finally, due to their royal ties, they have amassed
great wealth through business deals and royal annuities while
the king, though wealthy too, cannot use the coffers of the
state for personal use as in ibn Saud's time. Thus the king
cannot buy loyalties as had been traditionally done before
but rather must use argument and consultation more than ever.
Finally, with the death of ibn Saud, no personality has risen
that can match the power, prestige, legitimacy and epic
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background of the great king. As a result each succeeding
king must live under his shadow and prove his worth and
capabilities and subsequently depend on certain power groupings
and the support of all the five thousand or more princes.
Consequently, the requirement of consultation remains not
only bound by cultural tradition embodied in the majlis but
political reality as well.
It would be erroneous to conclude that each prince
holds equal and commensurate powers. In fact, only a favored
few hold the reigns of government and actively plot its future
course. Foremost among them are what is commonly called
the "Sudairi Seven", one of whom is Crown Prince Fahd. Because
ibn Saud's mother was a Sudairi, all of his descendents have
and will continue to have important connections with the
93family and government. By 1976, four of the seven Sudairi
sons were ministers or vice ministers, while the others
held other important posts, with the last, Abdul Rahman,
94
acting privately as the financial advisor of the family.
Another influential group, the Al-al-Shaikh family,
holds not only political power but great religious influence.
As direct descendents of Wahhab and ibn Saud, they wield
considerable prestige along with the ulema and act as the
traditional guardians of the Islamic orthodoxy of plitical
decisions, also along with the ulema. Under Faisal, however
95their influence declined. Only under Khalid have they seemed
to regain their power and influence. At present one member
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heads the Ministry of Justice and another, the Ministry of
Higher Education, both areas of traditional control.
Through these two prominent families as well as
members from the Jiliwi and Thunayyan families, there is room
for all to share in decision making and direct clashes among
them restrained. Due to the nature of the decision making
process, issues revolve more around personalities than par-
ties or ideological ideas. ' Family ties remain important
but not so important if they threaten to destroy the overall
unity and power of the House of Saud.
Together, they duly support the king under oath
providing the basis for him to rule as head of state, sheikh
of sheikhs, supreme religious leader and commander in chief
of the armed forces,
b. The Ulema
As could be seen in the previous chapter concerning
the Wahhabiyya Movement, Saudi Arabia owes its national iden-
tity to the fundamentalist version of Islam as espoused by
Mohhamad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Traditional influence, well
before al-Wahhab, also prevailed. In early Islam, "the problems
on the affairs of the Moslem community were to be brought
before God and Mohammad." Their judgement must be obeyed.
"Herein lay the basis for the establishment of Moslem theocracy.'
Hence the descendents of al-Wahhab and ibn Saud continue today
to share religious and political hegemony, as the patrilineal
descendents of the 'reformer* dominate the top religious and




Saudi Arabia cannot be overestimated as the faith pervades
all aspects of public and private life. The constitution
of the state, though not written is said to be the Quran.
The legal system relies on the Sharia and the educational
98
system remains predominantly religious. ' All acts of govern-
ment and all social activities are under their close scrutiny
and subject to their injunctions and fatwas. Thus the ulema,
along with the royal family, hold a central and powerful
99
role in the state's affairs.
In recent years, their influence has been on the
wane due in part to the ruling elites actions and powers as
well as the eroding effects of wealth and modernization upon
the society. Nevertheless the ulema perceive their role in
society and government as being very active. As guardians of
Islamic orthodoxy, they have a voice in all things, including
the succession of kings. These powers of legitimizing
authority continue to be important as could be seen in the
, succession of Faisal.
Since the mosque remains one of the most impor-
tant channels for communication, the ulema can generate support
or trouble for the government policies. Their influence lies
not only with internal domestic policies but in foreign affairs
as well. The creation of Israel, the occupation of Moslem
land, the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty has moved them to apply
force on the ruling elite to oppose them. Further as the
center of Islam, the keeper of the holy cities, it has an
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international role through various conferences and councils,
most of which are based out of Saudi Arabia.
As mentioned before, the role of the ulema has
somewhat diminished in Saudi society. It should be noted that
even in ibn Saud's time, at the height of their power, some
of their more fanatical activities were not tolerated. Ibn
Saud, though always mindful to consult them on religious
and some political problems, would not let them stand in the
102
way of progress or the welfare of the state. It was over
their objections that he and his successors introduced the
automobile, modern telecommunications and other Western
technology. Later, the ulema' s hold over the educational
system was diminished with the dispatch of Saudi students to
Egypt in the 1940' s to receive a secular education and cul-
minated with the establishment of a more secular curriculum
104in the state's schools. Thus more secular teachers and
subjects started to infiltrate the country's schools. Through
|
these developments and gradually eroding influence of moderni-
zation and Western educated elite, the ulema have slowly lost
the great influence of the Wahhabi period.
Today, the ulema maintain a voice in government and
society through their two most prominent groups, the Al-al-
Shaikh in the upper class and the mollahs of the lower class.
Their organization, dominated by the Al-al-Shaikh family in




With the death of the Mufti in 1970, no other
al-Shaikh has been designated one and consequently, the al-
Shaikh lack a central and higher authority. Consequently, no
great personality stands out and today, the ulema are ranked
in importance only according to their geographical position.
As George Lipsky states, "the ulema of ar-Riyadh occupy a
position superior to that of the ulema in the provincial
capitals and larger towns." It is generally the lower
class mollahs who are the most conservative and contentious
of forces in Saudi Arabia while the upper class mollahs have
been coerced or open to manipulation by the Saudi kings.
Both groups carry great weight and they could constitute a
conservative force which the government must always reckon
with.
An implication of the pervasive force of the ulema
exists in the fact that the government retains such offices
as Collector of Zakat and Chief of the Committee for the
Encouragement of Good and the Suppression of Evil. Though
the infamous Committee does not break into homes as it had
done previously, it remains active, in particular, during
i n fi
the month of Ramadam.
c . The Bedouin
The next most traditional element in the Saudi
society are the Bedouin. Saudi Arabians use the term ' al-
badu' (Bedouins) to indicate the nomadic Arab tribes whose
pastoral existence bases itself on the raising of camels,
sheep and goats. Among the tribes, some count themselves of
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noble descent and even when poor enjoy high prestige as
members of the desert aristocracy.
Unlike Villagers, Bedouin live an erratic
life - on the move, dreading where and when to
move next, and concerned with daily care of
animals and family needs. There is a continuous
sense of insecurity in a physically hostile
world. To meet the demands imposed on them,
they must be tough, self-disciplined, and
aggressive, characteristics reflected in
traditions of independence, hostility to
compromise and a strong system of values. 107
Their lifestyle has become symbolic of basic
108
Arab values. Even while working in the oil fields they
maintain their rigid codes of honor, revenge, hospitality
. . 109
and hostility, loyalty and resistance to change. To many
townsmen, as explained before, the term Bedouin has long
been an expression of contempt yet at the same time, a badge
of honor, one of which ibn Saud carried with great pride.
"The bedouin of Saudi Arabia are the spring from which other
groups in the population have revitalized themselves periodi-
cally through centuries."
There are four main groupings of Bedouin; the
Badia, Arabdar, Hukra and Hadbar. The Badia remain at the
top of the social scale with the Sharif tribes the most
aristocratic and the Arabdar, the semi-nomads next in line.
They are considered of lower caste because of their association
with the towns, which is thought to be soft and decadent.
The Hakra are shepherds who look after the sheep of the
important tribes and city dwellers and are 'inferior' because
of their restricted movements caused by the sheep. Finally,
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the Hadbar lie at the bottom of the Bedouin world. They are
the people who live in permanent dwellings and therefore are
despised by the true Bedouin.
Leadership in Bedouin society lies in the hands
of the Sheikh of each tribe and ultimately each of the one
hundred or more tribes provides a voice in the government.
They, like the ulema, must be heard and their loyalty sought
by the king. At first resistent to the central authority
of Riyadh, they have through succeeding years succumbed to
it. Though the problems they traditionally cause for any
ruler have been discussed previously, it is worth noting that
they have been far from erased
.
Under Saud, their loyalty had to be bought and
consequently they helped drain the treasury. Their power and
influence however were dramatically pointed out when efforts
were made to curtail the despotism of Saud in 1958, 1962 and
in 1964. Saud was able to maintain power by touring the
country, buying off sheikhs and drumming up support for his
rule. Only when Faisal stopped his funds and preempted his
112
visxts with his followers was Saud finally ousted.
The importance of the Bedouin and tribal support
cannot be overstated especially in the modern age. They have
resisted the central rule of Riyadh even under ibn Saud.
Although the House of Saud undertook some
major changes in the administrative frame-
work for the governance of the tribes and its
vast new possession, for instance, organiza-
tion of the Kingdom or its territorial basis,
and despite the fact that the acceptance of
the spiritual authority of ibn Saud made the
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majority of the population aware of vaquely
belonging to some larger community, it remains
wholly inappropriate to suggest that a modern
political loyalty had emerged or developed
despite the Western predilection for associating
territorial bases of governances with
"nationalism. "113
Riyadh then does not fully control most of the
society of Bedouins either in a territorial or qualitative
sense. There are no territorial limitations upon the effec-
tiveness of the central authority based upon the ability of
tribal rulers to resist this authority and the qualitative
limitations based upon the consultative rights of the leaders
114
of major tribes and confederations. This independence
can be clearly seen in the maj lis whereupon the tribal
sheikhs are treated with deference and respect.
The role and influence of the Bedouin tribes then
lay in its numbers (over 100 tribes) , their familial lineage
and ties, their traditional independence, and historical
background of self-contained loyalties.
The tribe remains a basically autonomous
political entity which demands loyalty from
its members; indeed, it is widely recognized
by both the government and tribe alike that
governmental laws and regulations which are
applicable in villages, towns and cities
are not necessarily relevant nor applicable
to the tribes. 115
Nevertheless they are restrained by institutional checks of
the society and government; i.e., the tribal council, the
subordinate position of the sheikh to the higher shiekh of
the main tribe and by custom. Further, the central government
holds the reigns on money and the military, both of which offer
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powerful deterrents to tribal turbulence. Still more, the
Bedouin have a vested interest in the stability of the tra-
ditional ruling elite as more secular, modernizing forces
stand as an alternative and opposition to it. Their vested
interest and support is clearly illustrated by the development
and pre-eminent position of the National Guard, which is
made wholly from Bedouin recruits,
d. The Military
The present military system like all things in
Saudi Arabia bears the indelible stamp of ibn Saud . As
previously mentioned, his army was made chiefly from the more
reliable levies of townsmen with the Bedouin nomads, supple-
menting the force. The Wahhabi Ikhwan forces, proving extremely
successful in the early years, had by 1930 dissolved. In his
wars, with the tribes, ibn Saud used modern motorized trans-
port and communications equipment including high powered
radio stations. He established, finally, a small regular
army and air force and thus was able to easily quell any
116
tribal rebellions such as the Harb tribe revolt near Mecca.
The military forces were further divided into two distinct
arms: the regular army and the White Army (a national and
royal guard unit) . The regular army had been considered un-
reliable but necessary. The White Army, existing today as
the National Guard, possessed greater political power as a
unit and acted as an effective counter to any defections by
tribes or the regular army. Both armies have grown considerably
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in recent years with the National Guard seemingly receiving
priority treatment.
Four mechanized infantry battalions and one
artillery battalion of the Saudi National Guard,
politically the most sensitive and the fastest
growing branch of the Saudi forces, were trained
by a private American company. "
'
Significantly, since its early organization, the
armies have received very little attention of the government,
except of course until recently. Whenever possible, police
units and personal guards of tribal shiekhs were used to
handle internal disorders, such as the Aramco strikes of 1953
118
and 1956. Further, the military came under scrutiny and
were much feared by some members of the ruling elite especially
during the deposition crises of Saud in 1962-1964. At that
time the National Guard had levelled its guns toward Riyadh
119in support of Saud and decided in his favor, several problems.
Not until they had been sent to the far corners of the country
was Saud finally ousted.
It was with the civil war in Yemen, immediately
after/ that the army distinguished itself though it was not
directly involved in the conflict. More important was the
military aid given by the Soviet Union to the radical forces
in Aden and Egypt. To counterbalance this, Faisal's first
decisions as king was to modernize the military through the
services of the United States and United Kingdom. He reorganized
the entire military organization and named two of his brothers
to leadership posts in the area of the Nation Guard and Internal
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Security. Through the aid, the military was significantly
upgraded in training and arms, so much so, that they were
deployed in the 1967 and 1973 wars in Syria and Jordan.
Since then, they maintained a sizeable presence in Lebanon
120
as a security force which was withdrawn in the spring of
1979.
With Prince Sultan as Defense Minister, Prince
Nayif as Interior Minister, Prince Turki ( al-Faisal) as
Director of Intelligence and another Prince Turki as Deputy
Defense Minister, the Sudairi family holds a firm grip on the
forces. The only exception to this is the National Guard under
Prince Abdullah. This alone" demonstrates the counterbalancing
effect of the Guard not only as a threat to a military
insurgency but a royal one as well.
From its inception, the mission of the armed
force was a conventional one of safeguarding the integrity
of the nation's boundaries and protecting it from invasion.
In times of severe disorder they will assist public security
forces for the restoration of stability. The National Guard
likewise will assist the armed forces in times of national
emergency, but their primary mission remains to maintain
internal security. Today, the nation is witnessing a tre-
mendous expansion of the armed forces facilities. Total out-
|
lays rose astronomically from S.R. 262 million in 1959 to
S.R. 1,711 million in 1973-74 and it has gone far higher
121
since then. Though the Defense Ministry's share of outlays
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has decreased, this has been made up by outlays to the Interior
Ministry (which deals with the nation's administrative organs
as well as internal security) which has increased thirteen
122
fold. Since 1976 spending has increased with $6.7 billion
earmarked for defense. Over eighty percent of the defense
spending is, however, spent on infrastructure; building naval
and air bases and military cities. Once military city at
al-Kharj is expected to cost ten billion dollars alone and
123house 100,000 people. Saudi expenditures today are more
than Iran in the same time frame and if expenditures are
compared to population, it is spending six times more per
head than Iran.
This influx of military equipment has stirred wide
debate in the United States in light of what has happened to
125
Iran and the Saudi" s own capability to accept them. At
present the Saudi state suffers severe drawbacks to the
modernization of its armed forces. First and foremost is the
quality of the manpower. The population is largely illiterate
and due to the sophistication of the hardware some 10,000
U.S. advisors, one for every six Saudi soldiers is required.
"According to one estimate it would take at least seven years
12 6
until the Saudi ' s could operate their equipment effectively."
Saudi' s also suffer from lack of numbers as the population
is small and the country huge. Further, there is a drain in
the highly qualified who seek their wealth and fortunes in the
ever expanding economy. Finally, having no home based military
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industry as yet, the country remains highly dependent upon
foreign powers for equipment, weapons and training.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia continues to be faced
with numerous border disputes, external threats from revolu-
tionary regimes and a reality that revolutions against royal
governments have occurred in many countries of the region.
Saudi leaders feel, especially with the fall of the Iranian
monarch that it has no choice but to expand and modernize the
military. Despite several incidents of infidelity and revolt
(1969) , the military forces will remain and grow as a bulwark
of the traditional elite. At present the regime does not
feel threatened by its military. The National Guard, the
perquisites , training and equipment of the regular forces
have been constantly updated, thus providing no grounds for
127
complaint along those lines.
e. The Middle Class
The one societal group in Saudi Arabia that can be
attributed as being non-traditional is that of the rising
middle class. A relatively new phenomena, the middle class
has roots in the towns and cities of early Arabia, in particu-
lar Mecca and Medina. Their social position however was
always denigrated by the more aristocratic Bedouin tribes
since their lifestyle and lineage was always held in suspect.
Traditionally, this class were the merchants and traders who
frequnetly were of mixed stock and of ambivalent religious
inclinations. Still they showed the basic societal qualities
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of the Bedouin and were protected by ibn Saud from the
Wahhabi fanatics. The protection was sorely needed as could
be seen by the fanatical attacks on their property, and persons
128
in Taif, Mecca and Medina in the early 1900' s. Further,
ibn Saud himself had to break with his own religious convic-
tions in order that the merchants in Hijaj could continue with
. . . 129its commercial activities. Still the class represented
the lowest in the social ladder. They were middle class in
wealth and name only not power.
The lower levels of town society range from
merchants, artisans, traders of moderate means
and the lower echelons of government workers
down through small shopkeepers, workmen, slaves,
prostitutes, beggars and those of ignoble
birth. 130
Until World War II then was there a respectable and sizeable
middle class. Only one or two score of commercial families
achieved any respect.
Because of the large influx of wealth due to the
exploitation of oil and the profligate spending of the royal
family, a comparitively large number of wealthy merchants and
numerous government officials arose to a level commensurate
132
with Western ideas of a middle class. As a result of the
economic revolution brought on by Aramco, a growing middle
class was burgeoned with educated and experienced foreign
Arab nationals. As the nation slowly took control over the
industry an extensive program was initiated for the training
of skilled and semi-skilled workers. The Arab Industrial
Development Department (AIDD) was also established and financial
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resources by Aramco to train indigenous personnel to serve
133
as contractors and businessmen. This development spilled
over in other sectors of the society creating still a larger
group of middle class. Many of them acquired land and had
begun to send their sons to foreign schools. When these
returned, they had acquired an education and Western background
that rivalled and most times surpassed that of the royal
family. This second generation capitalized on the opportuni-
ties prevalent in the society and became even more wealthy.
Today merchants, contractors, businessmen and skilled workers
may be found in increasing numbers throughout Saudi Arabia and
"all indications are that, as industrialism and business
expand, the growing middle group will become more politically
134
conscious and powerful in promoting its own interest."
The middle calss today then, consists of the
professionals, government workers and small businessmen, both
modern and traditional. Although the middle class is larger
than the upper class both are small in relation to the popula-
tion as a whole. Yet the emergence of the new social order
has significantly affected many elements of the population.
As modern secular knowledge has gained ground,
traditional religious knowledge has lost exclu-
sive authority; the main competitors of the
new middle class for power and authority are
not the upper class but members of the tradi-
tional middle class, especially graduates of
the religious school system. Although family
ties remain very important, the new demand
for special knowledge and the new opportunities
for amassing wealth have opened some careers to
talent as well as connections. 13 5
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A classic case of this phenomenon is the rise to
power of Oil Minister, Sheikh Zaki al-Yamani and Hishain
Nazir, Minister of Cultural Planning Organization, and
Ghazi al-Gossaibi, Minister of Industry and Electricity. All
13 6
are commoners holding extremely important governmental posts.
It is significant however to point out that the
beneficial effects of the oil boom and bountiful funds has
not filtered out to all levels of society. In particular, the
Bedouin have not reaped the richest advantages of economic
development. Because they generally receive little education,
have few skills and hold a traditional disdain for cities and
manual labor, they remain distant of the opportunities
available to them. This will have dire consequences in future
years as the rudimentary social stratification of old continues
to break down in favor of economic ties and tribal or family.
As the new middle class comes to prominence with the govern-
ment, it is likely that the influence of the Bedouin will
137deteriorate even further.
At present, there is plenty of room for growth and
expansion of the middle class but in the near future limits
undoubtedly will be faced. The days of 'go-go' growth are
numbered and opportunities will decrease for fast and big
money. Nevertheless, the society has created a new class,
a class with no real precedence and experience (concerning
power and influence) . Their affect on the Saudi Arabian





As a final note to this section on the political
structure os Saudi Arabia, something must be mentioned con-
cerning the means for political expression. Since political
consciousness has begun to emerge in the Saudi society, the
traditional institutions and patterns of behavior have come
under close scrutiny, pressure and sometimes attack. In
previous times internal struggles for power were symptoms of
tribal society and regional partisanship. With ibn Saud, the
Wahhab movement and the benefits of oil wealth, these divisions
were stifled though not eliminated. Once the resistance was
overcome no new opposition expressed either in tribes, politi-
139
cal parties and legislatures appeared. Such institutions
as legislatures and parties do not exist even today and no
form of political expression is available to the population
140
other than through the maj lis .
There are presently only six principal groups that
have a voice in government and constitute the necessary con-
sensus required by the king. They are the royal family,
principal tribal leaders, the Council of Ministers, the
Consultative Council, the ulema, and the armed forces. Left
out are the middle class, government workers, industrial
workers, farmers, and townsmen, in essence, the vast majority
of the people. All political power rests with the king and
political influence is based on affiliation with kings' office
and those around him.
166

At present, there is no constitution other than the
ambiguous references to the Quran. General elections and
legislatures are only figments of the Arabian imagination.
Each of the four monarch's of Saudi Arabia have pledged to
formulate a constitution during his reign but the prevailing
attitude is that it is not needed. Hence, the very nature
and duties of the central authority and the extent of its
powers have not been formalized. The typical response of the
ruling elite can be summarized through the words of Crown
Prince Fahd. Opposing the introduction of Western style
democracy, he said it would not bring the country's most
qualified - the young Saudis educated abroad, into positions
of leadership. In his words, "We invested heavily in educating
these young men and now we want to collect the dividend on
our investments. But if we were to have elections, these
141young men would not be elected.
"
Despite the lack of an explicitly stated and organized
modern government, the monarchial regime has successfully
led the country for close to fifty years utilizing traditional
methods. Surprisingly no popular discontent has emerged as
yet. Several attempts have been made to change the structure
but these attempts originated with members of the ruling elite
themselves. One attempt worth mentioning came from within the
royal family. In 1965, Prince Khalid ibn Mussad attempted
a coup but was foiled by loyalist forces. Significantly the
attempt was made to stop the modernizing process and
167

reintroduce puritan Islamic principles according to the
142beliefs of the radical Moslem Brotherhood based in Egypt.
The stability of the regime despite outside and internal
pressures may be attributed to several elements. First, the
immense wealth flowing into the country and the tremendous
expansion has literally bought time for the ruling elite as
it currently satisfies the growing pains of the new nation.
The complex symbiotic relationships and alliances between the
ruling dynasty and rural and urban elites have added to sta-
bility. The presence of the National Guard and excellent
intelligence service provides strength to the rulers and
143deterrence to would-be revolutionaries. These alone,
however do not fully explain the regimes strength.
Perhaps the most important element providing for its
durability has been the fact that the regime has successfully
been the innovator for change, modernization and reform.
It is important to note that the Saudi family,
as a collectivity concerned with the state, has
demonstrated on a number of occasions since the
death of ibn Saud that it responds to domestic
pressures of various kinds and not solely to those
provided by the religious notables.-'- 44
When threatened by the corruption of Saud the elite
responded and removed him. When contested by the forces for
change, the royal family responded with Faisal's Ten Point
Program. When opposed by the religious factions it promoted
implementation of government policies to preserve the culture
and religious well-being of the people and the ulema. Thus,
they have been successful in coopting the major rallying
168

points of would-be revolutionaries, whether they were tra-
ditional or modernist forces. Whether they can continue to
represent the people in such a responsible way and whether they
can adequately control the events around them will be the
subject of the next section.
4 . Sources of Conflict
A myriad of social problems already alluded to, face
modern Saudi Arabia and many have long concluded that the
massive modernization process and its by products will destroy
the society as well as the ruling elite. Though many elements
present yesterday and today apply pressure on the social
fabric of the people, they have as yet not rent it. Indeed,
there have been many positive moves made by the government and
inherent in the traditional system that have smoothed the
rough road travelled by the society in its journey to the
twentieth century. First, however, the negative forces pre-
sent today will be reviewed and later they will be balanced
with the positive influences.
The disruption of the Saudi social system did not
occur with the exploration and exploitation of oil. It came
about through the rise of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. As pre-
viously pointed out he and the Wahhabi movement dramatically
changed the social system which had lasted for centuries. The
changes aloready documented, were far reaching and helped
establish the basis of a modern state. These changes did not
come easily as over a century of warfare can attest. Further,
these changes are far from complete as the divisive elements
169

found in ibn Saud's time and held in check by him, remain
very much alive today.
Regional and tribal loyalties and factionalism exist
145today much to the detriment of many Saudi Arabians. In
an analysis of the top bureaucrats in Saudi Arabia, it was
found that the highest positions in government went to people
of the same socio-economic and regional background. Inferior
146positions went to people of mixed backgrounds.
This phenomena may become an important factor in
future political instability in that top bureaucrats control
all the governments revenues and services and use their posi-
tion to provide for their particular region, tribe or family.
Specifically, the people of the Nejd control the most impor-
tant posts and are the more numerous. Consequently, in a
study of three basic social services provided by the govern-
ment: health, education and social security, the Nejd com-
prises the vast bulk of the facilities with appalling dis-
147
crepancies found in the Asu and al-Ahsa provinces. This
inequality of services is further exacerbated by another
phenomena. Due to the fact that most top bureaucrats are
from the major cities in particular Riyadh, they provide a
gross amount of interest, funds, and facilities as compared
to the villages and towns which need the services the most.
As a result, there are great disparities in services and
opportunities for the Bedouin, villages, towns, and peoples
of certain provinces. The unification dreams of ibn Saud is
far from a reality as the growing bureaucracy and government
promote the very factionalism he wished to remove.
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While this regional and tribal parochialism exists
today a seemingly contradictory phenomena is also present.
Tribal cohesiveness is reportedly falling apart due in large
part to government efforts. Tribal sheikhs no longer receive
subsidies from the government but instead their areas receive
economic projects. This has the overall effect of denigrating
the previously high position of the sheikh and weakens his
hold over his tribe. Consequently, one of the major demands
in the traditional consultation process, the tribal shiekh,
no longer holds the power and influence he once had. This
ultimately has created discontent among the shiekhs toward
the ruling elite. Add to this the fact that the government
bureaucracy is staffed by members of rival families and men
of questionable ancestry, besides those who show distinct
favoritism to other areas and one see the seeds of a future
conflict.
Another of ibn Saud ' s measures, the elevation of
Wahhabi Islam has been battered down by the effects of oil
wealth and sometimes by ibn Saud himself. Though stressing
conservatism, ibn Saud opened the way for modern Western
technology over the objections of the ulema. The king weakened
their role in society by overturning their objectives punishing
and/or coercing them and by supporting the weaker ulema who
| followed his whims. Ibn Saud further undercut their influence
by secularizing the educational system, long the realm of
their control over the population. Their voice in government
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affairs has been drastically reduced as can be seen by the
posts they hold within it. Though nominally in control of
the Justice and Educational Ministries they are constantly
being undercut by the imposition of men into the bureaucracy
who hold secular, modernist educations. Yet they are still
evidently heard and have recently recouped the valuable
positions of the Ministry of Justice taken from them in 1970
by Faisal. However, the overall consensus is that they have
lost considerable ground by the growth of Westernized, secu-
larized educated Saudi' s, now assuming more and more impor-
tant governmental posts and influence.
Finally, due to the government's efforts to introduce
modernization to the society, the ulema have had to make
many concessions to their Wahhabi doctrine. It appears that
any and every concession it makes, a corresponding loss of
power results. With modernization and differing lifestyles
becoming more a reality, more concessions will have to be
made accelerating their loss of power. This will not come
easy to an ulema with a history of Wahhabi power.
The rise of the middle class and a group of Western
secular educated elite surely has and will continue to have
profound effects upon the traditional system. The new middle
class having first gained access to higher levels of govern-
ment in the 19 60 's are increasing in numbers and influence.
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They are quietly gaining by positions as elaborated previously.
Of the five ministerial posts given by King Saud in 1960, two
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were to commoners and four of those were educated in the
secular and Nasserist atmosphere of Cairo. In fact most of
todays top bureaucratic leaders have received their education
abroad in Lebanon and Cairo and have certainly picked up
Western ideas concerning democracy and secularization.
Today, increasingly, more and more young Saudis have renewed
their education in the United States and other democratic
Western states as well.
In the past decade only six royal family members have
kept six of the fourteen ministerial posts. The six however,
are the key controlling agencies of the government but even
they are increasingly being staffed by non royal, western
educated personnel.
Saudis lacking a modern education still succeed in
their society because of traditional factors such as family
ties and connections but even these benefits are slowly eroding
as competency in the field becomes paramount. .This particu-
lar phenomena does not bode well for the traditional elites
in the society anyway. Already young educated individuals
are chafing and sometimes in conflict under the leadership
of men ill trained for their jobs but well placed by their
family ties. The situation will either result in the young
retiring from their jobs and entering the more lucrative business
field or if choosing to stay, cause growing resentment and
the continuation of governmental inefficiency and corruption.
One thing is for sure though, those men lacking modern educa-
tion still feel they deserve the jobs and if denied, which
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will slowly happen, will provide more seeds for future
conflict.
Commensurate with this growth of a Western educated
elite and middle class is the drive by many of them to speed
up the process of modernization. Undoubtedly the ruling
elite feels this pressure but their present policies embodied
in the new five year plan places greater importance on pre-
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serving the cultural integrity of the nation. Though
also stressing massive modernization goals, much of them had
been altered or scrapped in fear that they were too big, too
fast. The regime, a constant modernizer, still has consis-
tently braked and slowed down the process. This is however
not enough for the conservative forces such as the ulema,
some princes (Abdullah) and bedouin conservatives or too
much for the new elites such as found in the new middle class.
The ruling elite thus finds itself trying to please all the
people all of the time while pleasing very few. The battle
between the traditional forces and those for more moderni-
zation and relaxation of societal rules and barriers is a
very real one and continues to divide the nation. Valid ques-
tions concerning the pace of modernization and the changes
wrought abound. Many "wonder if the massive buildup is really
progress at all or at least the kind of progress the Saudi r s
need .
"
Can such a young man learn to know London and
Geneva better than the Saudi towns of Tebuk
and Qizan without becoming a hybrid too? And what
will this mixture produce?!^
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One Saudi remarked that the pace of modernization had to go
on regardless of its cost:
We have no choice but to try and build a
viable economic base before our natural
resources are depleted. The government plan pro-
vides for the creation of the base. What we
are hoping for is that the fabric of our
nation, our spiritual and moral values, will
survive. It is our intention that it will. 155
On the same plane of thought, how will the society
handle the new class of women they are creating? Having opened
up the schools to women (though still segregated) , the Saudi
regime has created an explosive issue of women's rights.
15 6
At present, they are still veiled, and denied opportunities.
Transformation of the country and society cannot avoid such a
large segment of society indefinitely.
The forces of traditionalism reinforced by the ulema
are the biggest obstacles to progress for women and till now
women have been tolerant of their inferior role for a variety
157
of reasons. Yet new lifestyles and perceptions of Western,
modernized behavior have already affected women's self-image.
With each succeeding generation, the women become more inde-
pendent and undergo value changes. In a recent survey these
158
changes were evident in their value priorities. Where
a families reputation was held high for members of three
generations of women, those born after World War II (3rd
generation) held individual achievement as high priority for
the individual and piety, descent and wealth as a low pri-
159
ority. Further, it was found that thexr role in the society
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was expanding yet still unnecessarily stifling. One can only
guess how long they will remain subservient and quiet as a
whole in a society recognized by them and others as backwards
and restrictive.
Many other elements exist pointing to present and
future social and ultimately, political ferment. As men-
tioned before the bureaucracy has been corrupted by regional
and familial tendencies. The corruption in government goes
much further than that however. The attitude of the public
servants has proven to be selfish and extremely corruptible.
Of a poll taken of hundreds of top bureaucrats most perceived
their interest, mostly financial, as having the highest
priority even if it is known that their actions would harm the
public. More disquieting is the fact that while only 52%
of the older section of the group answered affirmatively, over
83% of the younger group, most still in America answered the
161
same way. Corruption and self interest have thus become
an accepted norm and the effects on the future efficiency and
stability of the regime will be disastrous. But it does not
end there, further problems exist for the government in other
areas.
Top ministries have shown a propensity for having very
little time for passing problems as much of their effort goes
toward socializing and small problems. There is little dele-
gation of authority and consequently many works are both
16 2
needed or receive inadequate treatment. " The effects in
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government grand schemes can be seen by the gross waste of
163
resources and roughshod treatment of the society's culture.
Another problem is overstaf fing. Young aspiring educated men
are returning to find little opportunities or jobs requiring
164
their skills. At present, this doesn't appear to be a
serious problem due to an expanding economy but surely it
will turn cancerous unless new opportunities arise, especially
if the economy slows down.
Lest one thinks that the corruption and organizational
problems exist only at the top levels of government, it has
been shown that at lower levels, in local governments it
165
is worse.
The overall effect of this phenomenon can be seen in
the housing shortage, which is exacerbated by 6% urban growth,
the spiralling inflation, land speculation and government
u I 66waste.
There is an ever widening gap between the 'haves' and
'have nots' as the urban educated elite, in particular from
16 7
the cities of the Nejd grow more rich and powerful.
With the above information, one can point out that
if trouble comes, it may well come from the deprived popula-
tions of al-Aksa and Asir if not from the urban centers who
may experience deprivations of a different sort, an end to
the boom, lack of jobs, inflation and denied expectations.
Another major negative aspect found in the society
is the large alien population consisting of Yemenis, Pales-




well over one million. The threat to the stability of the
regime from this foreign element is many and varied. First,
the importation of expatriot labor fulfills the need for
manual and service oriented labor. This does little to
encourage Saudi Arabia's own population to overcome its aver-
sion to such needed labor and become a productive element in
society. Second, the importation of labor threatens to make
the Saudi' s a minority or at least ethnographically and demo-
graphically weak. Third, the mass influx of these people
brings with it the importation of foreign customs, ideals and
in particular, ideology. This may in turn introduce radical
politics to a population long insulated from foreigners and
create an untenable position for a regime trying to prevent
unsavory elements and politics from entering the state. This
leads us to the fourth problem, that is, the political unrelia-
bility of the foreigners. Their presence in vital services
could prove harmful to the state if international politics
take a sudden turn and their home countries become hostile
or worse, enemies. Their presence then restricts freedom of
maneuver in foreign policies and in worse cases, an unde-
sirable element within the society. The Palestinians stand
169
out in such a case. The fifth problem lies within the
field of law. One grievance in the Iranian revolution of
1979 was the immunity of foreigners to national laws. For-
eigners have so far, especially Americans, maneuvered around
the laws of the state. At present, violators are either
178

brought to the governor of the province and handled separately




A sixth problem generally relates to the American
presence. In previous times because of the oil production,
the American presence was small in numbers but large in impact.
As an example, even in the isolated town of Dharan the dis-
parities between the rich American lifestyle and the poor
171
country beside it were blatantly evident. American influ-
ence in all affairs was and is today all pervasive. The
claim of cultural imperialism can be made today due to this
previous influence and especially now since the American presence
has risen dramatically (filling management and leadership
roles not manual labor). In 1976, Americans numbered about
1,600. Today that number has risen to above 10,000 just in
military advisors alone and is expected to increase to well
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over 30,000 in the near future. One should note that though
the numbers are small they occupy key positions in government,
military and business. Further, just about everything is
conducted after American institutions have studied problems
and provide American solutions to them, thus engendering a
greater American influence than the numbers indicate. Further,
the negative impact of such numbers and influence is already
!
well documented in the Iranian revolution of 197 9 and simi-




Perhaps more important however is the fact that
American military advisers are not only numerous (one for
every six Saudi' s) but their presence is required to maintain
the recently bought sophisticated equipment. In times of
national emergency can they be expected to support the coun-
try's military if it is not in the interest of the United States?
There are still more negative aspects to be found in
Saudi society. One can be seen in the military. As previously
noted, the military has made several attempted coups. Fore-
most among them stands the attempt made in September 196 9 which
173
resulted in the arrests of over 300 men. Though many of
the arrested were later released and allowed to reenter the
service, the attempt nevertheless indicates a discontent within
the armed forces and a tendency to force change in the govern-
ment, in this case, for a republican government. Other plots
were found in March 1970 and in October 1974, a number of
National Guard officers were arrested on suspicion of plotting
174
against the regime. In 197 4 executions of several men were
reported including two military men in an attempt on King
175
Faisal's life. Still more, defections of military per-
sonnel were also noted in 1979 when a garrison commander and
thirty seven men refused to obey government orders to quell
a labor strike in Dharan. Not only did they mutiny, they
^1 A 4- T 176fled to Iraq.
All of these incidents point out that the military is
not as reliable as commonly held nor are the checks and
balances provided by the National Guard foolproof. The fact
180

that they were unsuccessful belies the point that the mili-
tary arm, growing in numbers and equipment have been and can
be in the future, a source of internal stability. Given the
fact that there are few if non-existent channels for voicing
discontent and the traditional role that military's have
throughout the Middle East for revolt and modernizing reform,




Another element to be identified pointing to the
instability of the regime can be seen in the regime itself.
There is already several precedences for revolt within the
confines of the royal family. One case is that of the aborted
178
coup attempt of Prince Khalid ibn Mussaid in 1965. This
attempt reflected an armed rebellion against those forces
within the royal family seeking modernization and reform.
Supported by the Moslem Brotherhood, Prince Khalid had
attempted to turn back, the clock in the cause of Islamic
179traditionalist forces. In the other extreme, there is the
attempt, then defection
r
of Prince Talal in 1962. Advocating
the establishment of a democratic and constitutional form of
government, he and a band of his supporters to the cause of
Arab nationalism were forced to flee to Egypt. Again this
reveals not only royal attempts to change the government but
the totally divergent political outlooks of some of its mem-
. 180bers.
Since that time, the royal family has shown remarkable
resiliency and compromise on important issues. With the
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murder of King Faisal in April 197 5, they again showed
maturity and responsibility in electing King Khalid quickly
181
and efficiently. However, the murder itself dramatically
points out the inherent weakness of the regime. The first
is that no king is safe from assassination and new leaders
can be imposed by virtue of his death. Secondly, the blood
feud and family ties are still strong enough in the House
of Saud to motivate murderous vengence even over a lengthy
182
time period. Third, the selection process, the succession
of a new king, though smooth last time, promises to be more
hazardous the next. The problems of succession remains a
peculiar problem in Saudi Arabia given the family rivalries
of the House of Saud and the critical crossroads that the
country finds itself in; both politically vis-a-vis the United
18 3States and the Arab World and economically. The anomalous
practice of placing two powerful figures in the position of
leadership, King and Crown Prince, may prove to be destabilizing
1 ^u c , 84in the future.
To conclude that the royal family remains a unified
bloc of one voice would be erroneous. The cases of Prince
Talal and Prince Mohammad in the 1960 's should disprove that.
Further, there exists sufficient indicators that there are
"divisions, rivalry, dissension and jealousy motivated by
political or personal differences that could precipitate a
IOC
power struggle within the ruling group." " Resentment and




Abdul Aziz faction and the pre-eminent "Sudairi Seven."
Problems arise not only from family jealousies but also due
to government policies and politics. For example, a leadership
18 7feud has become evident concerning the Saudi' s foreign policy.
It is currently believed that Prince Fahd has fallen to dis-
favor because of his opposition to an economic and political
boycott of Egypt following the latter 's peace initiative with
18 8
Israel. ' Opposition to Fahd and other certain members of
the elite emanates also from their pro-United States stand
which is seen by many as detrimental to the cause of Islamic
unity and confrontation with Israel.
Finally, a simmering feud not yet evident but perhaps
more debilatating to the regime lies with the group of young
princes a full generation behind the present leaders. The
succession system as it stands today will not allow these
young men to rise in power due to the relatively young ages
of the present leaders. Yet these Euro/American educated
young princes will not likely give countenance to a system
which not only doesn't allow for a greater voice, post in
government or succession but is perceived as politically and
socially backward. Significantly, these men "have more in
common in terms of their expectations for the future of the
Kingdom with members of the intelligentsia than with their
18 9
peers and elders in the ruling house." Since Prince Talal's
campaign for a democratic constitutional government failed
in the early 1960's for lack of an echo in Saudi society, his
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call embodied in these new leaders surely will promote their
push for power if it comes for such a change.
Internal dissent from other sources have thus far
been muted. There have been several elements that indicate
that it is alive though. Certainly this fear of internal and
external threats is evident within the Saudi regime. Recently,
Prince Najif, the Interior Minister, urged officials in all
Islamic countries to draw up legislation on the local and
190
regional level to combat subversive ideas. Crown Prince
Fahd commented on the problem of "internal divisions" and
191
the role of the National Guard to combat them. Both have
good reason to be concerned; for there exists groups outside
and within the country seeking social and political change.
One such group, the Saudi Council for Solidarity and Peace evi-
dently based in Iraq continues to stir ferment in the society.
In a recently published document they attacked the Saudi
regime for alleged abuses and problems in the domestic sphere.
They also voiced bitter condemnation of the Saudi foreign
policy, arms purchases, Petroleum policy, and the "so-called
192free economy.
"
In essence the group blasts Saudi dependence on the
United States presence and arms, its government extravagance
and corruption and failure to use the oil weapon. These points
are not without merit and obviously strike responsive chords
in the ears of many young Saudi 1 s.
Another group capable of provoking domestic conflict
is the sizeable Shiite population located in the Eastern
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province- Long discriminated against because of their faith
and tribal background, a strong case can be made that this
193
group may erupt. Exacerbating this situation is the pre-
sent call for Islamic radicalism as embodied by the Ayatollah
Khomeini and the Iranian revolution. Whether Khomeini has
any sway with the Saudi Shiites has yet to be proven. Never-
theless, the Saudi' s should be disturbed by the radicalism and
its rejection of the institution of the monarchy, its hos-
tility to the West and Western oriented regimes. The call
194
may be heard by Sunni s and Shiites alike. The Shiites
regardless of their ties to Khomeini could find Khomeini's
call attractive.
In conversations with high officials, Professor Abbas
Amirie found that they were indeed aware of the Shiite
threat, real or imagined, and indicated their concern by
their efforts to locate and closely monitor their Shiite
195population in Saudi Arabia.
For a variety of reasons then, the Saudi regime's
stability today and in the near future should be questioned.
Due to the plethora of factors, its legitimacy and power can
and will be subject to attack from forces within the country.
In summary, the following items support this thesis: the
continuing and disparaging gap between the rich and poor, the
bureaucratic inefficiency, waste and corruption, the dis-
crimination by the government of certain peoples, provinces
and villages, the increasingly large influx of foreigners,
increasing dependence and dominance of Americans, the continued
185

presence of regional and tribal factionalism, the denigration
of the roles of the ulema and tribal sheikhs, the rise of a
middle class and intelligentsia, the feuds within the monarchy,
the conflict within the monarchy and society in regards to
the pace of modernization, the culturally destructive effects
of modernization itself, the massive rearmament and ques-
tionalbe political reliability of the military, the rise of
a disenfranchised generation of Saudi princes, the predicted
instability of the succession process and the presence of
internal and external dissent and radicalism. All combine
to paint a dismal picture for the future of Saudi Arabia.
The basic conflicts inherent in a backward society
gushing to the twentieth century are all evident and are best
summarized by Richard Snager, who wrote of a scene near an
oil facility in Saudi Arabia:
Sometimes in the gathering twiliight he, an
Aramco worker and his son, sit with other
fellow workers on the concrete porch in front
of the barracks. They look across the green
shrubs and flowers beginning to take hold at
the entrance to their building and over the
roof of the million-aiyal Arab hospital.
Beyond the well oiled road which runs to the
airport, a prominatory of Jebel Dhahaan sticks
out toward the Persian Gulf. Under the rim-
rock are a series of caves inhavited by bedouin
who have not yet taken the plunge into the
twentieth century. Their long haired figures
stand out in sharp silhouette against the
evening fires. There is no water up there,
little food, no regular pay, no medical
attention, no school, and little chance to
buy even the necessities of bedouin life.
The worker and his son are only across the
road, to be sure, but they have journeyed
into a new era.-*-96
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5. Sources of Stability
Though there are many negative elements evident within
Saudi Arabia, many writers allude to an assortment of counter-
balancing positive traits. Among them, Manfred W. Wenner
advances the thesis that the Saudi regime will remain stable
for the following five reasons. 1) There is no clear rela-
tionship between dependence on foreign labor and expertise
and political instability, 2) the continued rapid growth and
economic growth rate of the country has resulted in an ex-
panding bureaucratic apparatus which is able to absorb the
newly graduated Saudis, 3) there exists next to no opportuni-
ties for public discussion of change in the existing social
and political framework, 4) the overwhelming position of the
population disaffected by the "claustrophobic atmosphere of
the country" can seek their pleasure outside of the country,
and 5) the overwhelming majority of the population supports
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the present arrangements.
Wenner also points out that the military because
"perquisites, training and equipment of the regular forces have
been continually updated, consequently providing no grounds
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for complaint along these lines." Plus the army would be
required to handle the large area and the population scattered
in it, both of which it is physically incapable of doing.
Upon reviewing the above characteristics one can
immediately recognize the close parallels to what was said
of Iran and other countries a few years ago. The Iranian
revolution and the negative aspects recounted previously in
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this paper seem to discount them. Yet they are salient points
and sufficient differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia's
socieities exist to support them.
There are, however, more supportive arguments for
Saudi Arabia's stability. First and foremost, is the notion
that many of the Saudi Arabian ills can be eliminated by the
action of the Saudi royal family. As in previous instances
the Saudi royal family can make changes and thus coopt any
serious attempts for change by reformists outside of the
circles, be it ulema, military or middle class. For instance,
in order to undercut the movement for representative government
the royal family could establish piecemeal, certain government
reforms. One such effort could be the establishment of a
constitution written in a way which confirms the present
political situation. Along the same vein, the time honored
ma j lis might be expanded in such a way that a member of the
House of Saud if not the king would be more accessible to the
population. Thus a Bedouin form of representation would coopt
efforts for democracy along western lines. The point is,
however, that the royal family has previously responded to
social pressures and could do so again. Similarly the point
can be made that what is , is more important than what could be
and thus, only the royal regime itself can determine its own
political stability, before others do it for them.
According to James Bill and Richard Stooky, their
stability is also limited to their solidarity. Obviously,
the intra-family feuds and jealousies weaken the regime. Thus
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far in three succeeding succession crises, they were able to
overcome their differences and behave in a responsible fashion.
The question must be asked, despite their track record, if
they will be able to continue to do so in the future. History
is resplendent with similar cases of royal families surviving
for only limited times only to fall to intra-family and harem
intrique. Till now, the personal integrity and political
maturity of the kings and ruling elite has been a matter of
record but if the findings of al-Awaji concerning Western
secular educated bureaucrats can be inferred to the Saudi
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regime, then this record appears to be short lived.
For the present, the House of Saud has several factors
working for its benefit. The military, especially the National
Guard stand out as a bulwork for its defense. Organized as
it is with a peculiar Bedouin makeup, training and loyalty,
it stands as a potent counter to any military coup or insur-
gency. In Fahd's words the men of the National Guard as
"dedicated soldiers," "full of vigor and confidence and belief
in their religion, king and nation.
By having the military and internal security forces
under direct rule by the royal family, their reliability in
times of internal crises becomes more assured. There is also
the added security of dividing this rule between the more
important factions within the House of Saud. While the Abdul
Aziz group under Abdullah controls the National Guard, the
Sudairi group maintains the regular and special internal
security forces. One such group, the intelligence service
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once under the Interior Department, now separate, also acts
as an effective counter to insurgency and political dissent.
In response to the possible nefarious actions of foreigners
living in the country, Prince Nayif has required that all must
now carry identification papers proving their lawful presence
in the country. This decree significantly also requires
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Saudi citizens to carry identification cards as well. In
such a way, his department can more easily control and iden-
tify any "undesirables," foreign or domestic.
Another attempt to curtail the problem of foreign
nationals is a current law forbidding them control of small
business in the country. The idea is to filter more money
down to Saudi citizens, and keep control of the nations
economy. Most Saudi' s lend their "name" to an enterprise and
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thus are able to reap some of the profits. Also forexgn
contractors are now required to provide the necessary housing
facilities for all personnel imported for labor. They also
require the foreign contractors to limit the number of depen-
!
dents following the workers into the country. The law has
thus aided in the housing shortage problem and diluted the
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overall presence of the workers and families.
The threat of outside intervention, however, cannot
be adequately handled by the still small army and intelli-
gence service. The Saudi regime, ever cognizant of this threat
from the radical regimes in Yemen, Iraq, and other nations
including the Soviet Union, has initiated several programs
to forestall this threat. With Soviet backed Yemen, it has
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recently contained its military adventures without outside
help through diplomacy and military might. In regards to
radical regimes and perhaps in response to its own weakness,
it has allied itself with them in confrontation with Israel
and boycotting Egypt. Also, the Saudi ' s have used to a great
extent subsidies "aid" and payments to many Arab regimes
around them in an effort to "buy off" any political ambitions
they may entertain in Saudi Arabia. This method of political
protection continues today, even to the Palestinian Liberation
Movement. Their previous activities of caution, moderation
and support of the United States efforts in the Middle East
have been modified in response to the political realities of
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the region, especially after the fall of Iran.
Not content to let diplomacy secure its borders or
depend on the United State's security, the Saudi government
has taken steps to modernize and expand its armed forces up
to the point where it now is the single most important goal
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of the Saudi government. Of $32 billion allocated to the
1978 budget, close to $10 billion or 30.2% of its provided for
Defense. The end result of all this effort provides for
the present and near future security of the nation and hence
the regime.
Aside from the positive aspects found in the royal
family, the National Guard, military and intelligence service
there are more fundamental characteristics of Saudi society
that ensure its survivability in the near future. As
Manfred W. Wenner alluded to in his work in the Survival of
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The Traditional Elites , the Saudis in general support the
present political system. The rural and tribal population
remains committed to the ideals of Wahhabi Islam despite the
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strains of modernization. Wahhabi Islam is deeply ingrained
into the majority of the population and consequently the
traditional value system continues to have immediate signi-
ficance and impact. One, then, cannot overestimate the internal
solidarity provided by this Wahhabi religion which makes the
Saudi ' s unique in the Islamic world nor its basic precepts
of unqualified support of the king.
One should also add to this support based on religious
and political experience, the feeling that most Saudi 's hold
in regard to the uniqueness of their government. It is per-
ceived as a purely Saudi invention untainted by Western inter-
vention and process. It is uniquely Arab, Islamic and con-
servative with no parallel in the region. Consequently, most
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Saudi 's are proud of their past and present achievements.
This becomes more apparent when one notes the fact that prac-
tically all Saudi' s abroad return home, an enviable fact that
209few countries can claim. Equally surprising is the high
proportion of young Saudi ' s who do accept all the restrictions
of their society. Though easily adopting American lifestyles,
they are prepared for the most part to abandon them on their
return to Saudi Arabia.
Concerning the impact of rapid modernization projects
and government corruption, the Saudi ' s have implemented a
series of actions designed to mitigate them. The extensive
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effort employed by the government in construction of the
second Five Year Plan will hopefully systematize and priori-
tize project's in such a way as to minimize gross waste,
avoid 'white elephants' and maintain the cultural integrity
211
of the nation. One such instance was the cancellation of
212the $7 billion deal led by Phillips electronics firm. To
control corruption a decree was set down regulating the rela-
213tionship between foreign contractors and Saudi agents.
Armed with these positive factors and irregardless
of the problems faced by the economic development and com-
mensurate social change, the Saudi government will continue
with its present policies. The ruling elite appears confi-
dent that their cultural identity and their rule will survive,
This attitude is best summed up in the words of Ghazi al-
Gusaibi, Minister of Industry of Saudi Arabia, who said:
The foreign press used to complain that the
Saudi people were sleeping, that they never
moved and they were living in the 13th or 14th
century. Now all of a sudden the press is
complaining that we are moving too fast,
that we are spending too much money. They say
we are changing our own traditions, destroying
our own society. I really don't know what
we are expected to do. 'Look what they are
doing to their way of life. The government
is so greedy. It keeps all the money and
the people suffer.' But when we spend it,
they say, 'Look at the inflation. They are
crazy. They are spending every penny they
have.' So really, I am glad that we are not
dying to please you, because if we were, we
would get nowhere. 2l4
6. Conclusions
After reviewing the negative and positive aspects of
the present Saudi society, one cannot help but conclude that
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the regimes time is limited, that a radical transformation
of the government will come, either violently or peacefully.
Its future security appears assured for only a limited time
as the inexorable forces of change, already found apparent
in its society, continue to build momentum.
The monarchial system, good or bad, cannot assist
these changes. It must radically change the present ruling
system, the pace of modernization, and its governmental ineffi-
ciencies as well as better prepare the society for the ongoing
changes. Unless it joins or relinquishes part of or totally
the command of government to the rising new elites underneath
them, it will surely be wrestled away violently.
Herein lies the key to their past and future success,
the ability to delegate responsibility to capable commoners
important positions within the government has proven to be
beneficial for the crown and the nation. Commensurately
,
their ability to self-instigate social reforms has proven
salubrious for the society and will prove to be politically
expedient in the future
.
The experience of Iran, and more importantly, to many
other Arab royal families, however, should point out that
military strength, lipservice to democratic ideals, maintenance
of exclusive and autocratic rule and swift modernization of
a backward society are not enough to ensure internal stability
for a royal family.
There are at present more than enough divisive factors
present within the society to produce in the near future a
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radical change in the government and society. Certainly the
time for their eruption is limited. In sum, these are the
forces for increased modernization against the forces of
conservatism, forces for democratic change and forces for
continuance of royal power, age-old conflicts between the
people of the desert and of the towns, of religious conserva-
tism and secularization, and the forces of the rich against
the forces of the poor. Added to. this are governmental waste
and corruption, societal and cultural dislocation, rising
new elites, in particular the middle class and disenfranchised
young princes, inflation, housing shortages, increased
numbers of foreign laborers and influence, hostile enemies on
its borders, and feuds and rivalries within the royal family
itself.
It appears that the forces of history and its commen-
surate societal evolution are against the grand experiment of
the royal family. Trying to outmaneuver the pitfalls and
obstacles that have previously plagued all other societies
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and governments in the region and world will prove futile.
What then will be the future of Saudi Arabia? Since
the ulema in Saudi Arabia lack a distinguished figure and
organization to lead them, the prospect of a Khomeini style
of Islamic Fundamentalist revolution appears unlikely. Be-
sides the many and varied differences between Iran and Saudi
Arabia (socially and politically) there is a great divergence
in the Sunni and Shiite faiths. Where the Shiite faith is
secretive by nature, historically at odds with any government,
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fanatical and martyr oriented, and possessing a strong
organizational and leadership base, the Sunni Wahhabi faith
though fanatical is more associated with governments, lacks
organization and leaders, and totally coopted by and intimately
bound to the Saudi regime. Differences exist, but the power
is lacking for the ulema in Saudi Arabia.
Where then could the opposition arise from? The
middle class? The younger generation of princes? Or the
military? It is the opinion of this writer that a social/
political revolution or radical transformation of the present
ruling system will come from a variety of sources, all working
and fighting for change. Though not in agreement on what kind
of change should be wrought, the middle class, the dislo-
cated populations, the poor, the discontented elements of
the tribal Bedouin society, the ulema and religious conserva-
tives and the military, will all rise and force a change on
the existing form of government. The motivating force for
this change would come not from the deprivations that some in
the society experience but rather from the frustrations derived
from denied aspirations and opportunities. The denied oppor-
tunities for rule for the western educated young princes,
the denied aspirations of the middle class for a stronger voice
in government, the denied opportunities of the poor, of women,
of the Bedouins, and the minorities for a share in the wealth
of the state, for better employment and for the denied aspira-
tions of some for a more conservative society and others, for
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a more modern and less restrictive society; all will combine
and ferment
.
What is needed for an explosive change, for all these
groups to struggle for change is an "X" factor, a spark.
This "X" factor could be an assassination of top leaders, an
international incident, a drastic change in direction of
government policies, or a significant act of repression on
the people, be it religious, political or economic. More
than likely, it could come from the assassination of Crown
Prince Fahd or both the king and the crown prince. This par-
ticular event could provoke a serious intra-family feud among
the top ruling members of the House of Saud and set in motion
a jockeying of constituents, a power play and a revolution.
Whatever the scenario, and no matter who wins the
struggle, a dramatic social revolution and transformation
is in the making. Whether it is a violent struggle or a






At the onset of this thesis, it was postulated that Islam
had and is currently playing a significant if not dominant
role in the political life of the Middle East. Further, the
supposition that Islamic fundamentalism as an extreme politi-
cal movement had and does determine the internal stability
of the region's governments also was proposed. Both views,
as could be seen in the three case studies concerning Egypt,
Iran and Saudi Arabia have adequately demonstrated the validity
of these assumptions.
It was further hypothesized that Islamic fundamentalist
movements have many socio-political phenomena in common that
could be identified and applied by analysts to not only fully
understand their birth and influence today, but in another time
and area in the Middle East as well. The case studies, especially
Saudi Arabia have proven to be ideal examples for understanding the
fundamentalist movement's dynamics as well as providing the
optimum conditions for their possible resurgence.
Given the validity of the above assumptions and the pre-
vious analysis of modern Saudi Arabia, the thesis that Saudi
Arabia will undergo a radical transformation in regards to
its domestic and international policies due to the pressures
presented by Islamic fundamentalism appears sound. As a result,
a review of the data studied and proven as well as its ramifi-
cations is presented here as a conclusion.
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This thesis has shown that Moslem fundamentalist move-
ments have many socio-political phenomena in common. These
similarities in turn were used to provide a profile of condi-
tions necessary for a future fundamentalist movement to succeed
in other Moslem countries. In this case, Saudi Arabia has at
present all the conditions outline in this work as well as
some other unique ones and as such, will likely suffer from
Islamic reactionary pressures. Some analysts may point out,
however, that Saudi Arabia because of a unique history and
government, will not undergo any drastic transformations in
the near future. These arguments have already been presented
in Chapter IV of this thesis and have been found to be lacking.
It remains the thesis of this work that too many similarities
exist in Saudi Arabia today which have helped formulate
fundamentalist movements in the past. As such a review of
these conditions is offerred below.
The Moslem fundamentalist revolts in Egypt, Iran and
Saudi Arabia showed a remarkable similarity to each other in
regards to their roots, ideology and solutions for the social-
economic-political malaise found in their countries. First,
both Egypt's and Iran's Islamic reaction were shown to be
a religious response to the political impact of the West.
_ In Egypt's case, the Moslem Brotherhood arose as a response
to British colonialism. In Iran's case, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and the United States provided the causes for
many Islamic revolts. The Saudi Wahhabi movement in turn,
almost collapsed due to internal revolts against King Abdul
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Aziz ibn Saud's attempts to introduce Western technology and
government administration. Today, Saudi Arabia faces the
critical problem of a large American and foreign nationals
presence. It is this presence which has and will create a
pretext for dissension and instability and opens the doors
for a fundamentalist movement in the future.
Secondly, the creation of the state of Israel provided a
cause celebre and renewed vitality to the movements, in par-
ticular for the Moslem Brotherhood and the Iranian revolution.
Though Israel was not a factor for the Wahhabi movement, it
remains a potentially destructive issue internally and inter-
nationally today. Saudi Arabia can no longer remain politically
inactive in the Arab opposition to the Israeli occupation of
Palestine. Already, a discernible hardening of Saudi Arabia's
position vis-a-vis Israel and a reluctance to support the
United States peace initiatives in the region has been docu-
mented but may prove to be inadequate in the eyes of the
faithful and Saudi Arabia's neighbors. Hence, Israel's
existence will provide further incentives for the development
of a fundamentalist movement and most likely will be one of
the major issues which will affect the stability of the regime
in the future
.
Third, the influx of Western technology and culture was
shown to be a deciding factor in the formation of fundamen-
talist reaction. First in Egypt and later in Iran the Western
influence was attacked vociferously and later violently by the
200

more traditional elements of their society on both nationali-
istic and religious grounds. Even in Saudi Arabia, King
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud found it difficult to stifle the rebellious
Ikhwan who fought against the introduction of foreign technology,
Today, the invasion of Western, in particular American, tech-
nology and culture has created a radically changed society in
Saudi Arabia which in turn has heightened the nationalistic
fears and fervor of its people. It is a change that fore-
bodes a Saudi and hence Islamic cultural backlash in the near
future.
Fourthly, the rising secularization of Arab governments
and societies had created resentment among the more traditional
and religious segments of society in all three states studied.
This resentment clearly emerged through the activities of the
religious and traditional classes who found their age old
power and ties with the people weakening. This was particu-
larly true of the Iranian ulema and Bazaaris who chafed under
the imposition of secular schools, judicial system and banking
laws. Significantly, Egypt's response came through the
society's lay circles (i.e., Hasan al-Banna) and not the
ulema. In the study on Saudi Arabia, it was shown that the
most likely leaders of a revolt would be secular as well.
It should be noted then, that religious, extremist activity
is not the sole domain of the ulema. In fact, in many cases,
the ulema has been shown to be entirely coopted by the central
government and lacking the qualities, skills and pre-eminence
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to lead such a revolt. Revolts, with or without the ulema
nevertheless arose and one of the root causes for revolt was
the secularization of society.
A fifth factor responsible for creating a fundamentalist
reaction proved to be the alienation of Moslem intellectuals
and certain traditional classes in the three societies. This
factor proved to be a relatively modern phenomenon as the
Moslem Brotherhood and the Wahhabi reaction filled its ranks
with rural, less educated people and not an intellectual elite
However, as each nation modernized and created a class of
intellectuals, large numbers of them emerged as supporters if
not exponents of the fundamentalist cause. This was shown
as significant as one would normally associate the intellec-
tual elite as being more as modernizers and less as Islamic
fundamentalists. However, as could be seen in the Moslem
Brotherhood and the Iranian revolution in the late 1960 's
and 1970' s, increasing numbers joined the fundamentalist
camp.
How can one explain this contradictory and ironical
phenomenon? In both cases of Egyptian and Iranian intellec-
tuals it appears that intense nationalism and a hatred for
the perceived corruptions of modern Western society (commer-
cialism, crime, prostitution, loss of national identity and
culture) were some of their reasons for accepting the funda-
mentalist movements. As the experience of Iran and later in
the 1960's, Egypt, the intellectual elite and professional
middle class joined the religious movements because the
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reactionaries were the only real and active opposition to
the corrupt, modernizing regimes. In any event, as a new
intellectual elite and professional middle class grows in
Saudi Arabia, tensions undoubtedly will rise between them
and the government and any opposition movement, even an Islamic
reactionary one will appear to be a brighter prospect than an
autocratic, monarchial regime.
Perhaps the most important element for the successful
emergence of a fundamentalist movement was found to be the
discontent of the people resulting from a nation's deteriorating
economic situation. Both Egypt and Iran's movements bene-
fitted directly from the economic dislocation found in
the rural, urban and highly traditional populace. As the
gap widened between the "haves" and the "have nots," as the
economy suffered more and more inflation, housing shortages
and related economic problems, many people looked to the
opposition movements for relief, in particular, the Islamic
fundamentalists. In both Egypt and Iran, the fundamentalists
achieved their greatest power and members during periods of
economic failure and their lowest support during times of
prosperity. Saudi Arabia does not have a serious problem
now but as the inflationary, housing, and food problems
mount and the present boom in the economy slows down or collapses,
one can foresee many of the deprived (whether in aspirations





As for the seventh factor required for the growth and
success of the fundamentalist movement, it was found necessary
that the nation have a population inculcated with traditional
Islamic education and upbringing. In all cases, this proved
to be a critical element as those segments of the population
which maintained a strict Islamic background were very sus-
ceptible to the religiously veiled calls for political activism,
This explains why in all countries, the religious elements
were able to exploit their hold over the faithful by claiming
to be their defenders as well as guardians of the Islamic
faith. Their use of the mosque as a rally center and locus
of dissent as well as their religiously couched goals always
struck a responsive chord among the traditional elements of
the society and provided added legitimacy to their programs.
The traditional Islamic education and upbringing of the
people was exploited in another manner too. Due to their
Islamic background and history, many of the populace faced
a severe crisis of alienation in their own communities as the
modernization process brought many unique and foreign social-
political changes. Further, these changes were perceived by
many to be denigrating or destroying centuries held Islamic
values. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the writings
and speeches of dissident Iranians mentioned in Chapter III
of this thesis. Saudi Arabia, as pointed out in Chapter IV
of this work, faces a similar crisis perhaps even greater than
that faced by Egypt or Iran. Having only recently emerged in
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the modern world, the Saudi population must face greater
degrees of change and in a shorter time span due to the massive
development plans of the ruling elite intiated in the 1970 's.
These rapid changes, already acknowledged by the Saudi elite
as debilitating but necessary, cannot help but create an
alienation problem and hence growing resentment toward the
perceived cultural imperialism of the West.
Finally, all the fundamentalist movements were similar
in their simplistic, religiously inspired solutions to the
complex social and political problems in their countries.
All sought a return to the Quran and its laws, an invigora-
tion of the Islamic faith and culture and the denial of Western
secularism, imperialism and culture. All the leaders of the
Moslem Brotherhood, Iranian Revolution and the Wahhabi revolts
avoided potentially divisive issues and instead preferred to
espouse simple or obscure goals and tenets. The faithful
at the grass roots level eagerly accepted these calls for
their simplicity and the belief that they would quickly resolve
their social, economic and political plight.
There were some exceptions to this emphasis on simplicity.
Only the Moslem Brotherhood was capable of providing sophis-
ticated principles as well as activities. Their efforts and
success in building an ideology, schools, business ventures
and communes remained unique among the fundamentalist move-
ments. Still they preferred to avoid controversial subjects
such as the rights of women, business laws and the acceptable
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level of modernization. It is interesting to note also
that whenever they proceeded to develop their socialist
ideals they fell into disunity and lost much of their support
from its members and potential recruits. Hence, the Moslem
Brotherhood failure has proven that if a fundamentalist move-
ment hopes to be successful, it must rely on simplistic,
obscure goals and solutions at the onset for if any attempt
is made to refine their ideology, their support will surely
suffer. Because Ayatollah Khomeini kept his programs simple
and avoided potentially divisive subjects, the Iranian revo-
lution was able to garner the support of mutually exclusive
political groups and hence insured its success. If a movement
were to appear in Saudi Arabia, then, it must do the same
thing if it too wishes success.
Though other phenomena were discernible in the three
case studies, these eight factors remain the most common.
As such, an analyst can apply them to other country studies
and determine whether an Islamic fundamentalist movement is
feasible and has a chance for development an success. In
the case of Saudi Arabia, all eight indicators were found
relevant and in some ways have greater impact than in other
movements. These eight factors which already have shown to
be enough to ferment a fundamentalist revolt are joined by
several other unique factors which make Saudi Arabia even
more susceptible to fundamentalism.
Note that Saudi Arabia remains unqiue in the Middle East
in that it has already had a successful fundamentalist movement,
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one which in fact created the modern state. It is further
differentiated from other Arab countries in that it was ranked
among the most underdeveloped nations in the region earlier
this century and is now because of its oil wealth, attempting
to leap from the fifteenth century to a twenty-first century
lifestyle. Considering its unqiue role as the birthplace of
Islam, and as protector of its two most holy cites (Mecca
and Medina) as well as its unique Bedouin population and
government, the country is more than well suited for an Islamic
fundamentalist revolt.
In the course of analysis of fundamentalist movements a
few other similarities arose among the three cases which may
be added to the eight indicators above and may have an impact
on any further fundamentalist movements. Most striking among
all the movements was tne necessity of a charismatic and
eloquent leader. Hasan al-Banna, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
al-Wahhab and King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud all represent perfectly
such a leader. The necessity for such a leader became all
too apparent upon review of the Moslem Brotherhood's ill
fortune under the less able management of Hasan al-Hudaybi.
Lacking the skills, eloquence and charisma of al-Banna, the
Moslem Brotherhood fell easily into internal disputes and
jealousies which severely undercut their strength.
The use of violence to achieve their goals was also common
among all the cases studied. In each case, however, it varied
in style and intensity. For instance, the Ikhwan of Saudi
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Arabia were feared for their fanatic violence and their
armies represented the use of force on a grand and organized
scale. Conversely, the Rovers and secret terrorist cells
of the Brethren illustrated more modern and smaller terrorist
forms of violent activity in fundamentalist movements.
Similarly, the Iranian fundamentalists used isolated terrorist
activity to a certain extent but during the revolution, its
leaders employed massive demonstrations and riots to bring
themselves into power. All of the groups, however, effectively
played upon the notion of martyrdom in order to enthuse their
followers and inspire fanatacism.
Commensurate with this propensity for violent activity
was the common lack of control over their perpetrators. This
lack of control created the needed pretext for Nasser's
crushing repression of the Brethren in the 1950 's. In Iran,
Ayatollah Khomeini has yet to effectively control his revo-
lutionary Komitehs and guerrillas and quite possibly this
will result in his own downfall as well. Even King ibn Saud
had to launch a full scale offensive against the rebellious
Ikwan in order to preserve his throne and the new nation '
s
integrity.
Finally, in all cases the ruling elites were attacked by
the fundamentalists because of their inadequate leadership,
corruption and/or repression. The failure of the ruling
elite was best exemplified by both Egypt's and Iran's leader's
political corruption and economic mistakes. In Saudi Arabia,
in the early period, the need for a religiously inspired and
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nation unifying ruling elite was apparent as the country
was stricken with factionalism.
In sum, then, the above similarities all contributed
to the growth and vitality of the movements albeit, in a
negative fashion. Each item, if added to the previous check-
list of indicators should provide a sound basis for the
analysis of Islamic fundamentalism.
It should be noted, however, that though many similari-
ties exist among the various movements, just as many dissimi-
lar phenomena were documented as well.
First, a history of colonial subjugation was readily
apparent in the case of Egypt which experienced British
imperialism and in Iran which fell under the influence of
Great Britain, Russia, and to a lesser extent, the United
States. Saudi Arabia does not share this experience of exploi-
tation in its cruder forms by Western powers. It did feel the
yoke of Ottoman (Turkish) rule but since the early twentieth
century it has been relatively free of the derisive effects
of colonial rule. The effect of this experience upon the
Saudi population has been significant. King ibn Saud actually
had to nurture and build the concept of nationalism in his
people and up until recently the nation has not reflected the
intense nationalism like that of Egypt or Iran. The massive
presence of Americans and foreigners, however, may promote the
rise of nationalism, the level of which Saudi Arabia has never
experienced. Further, there was shown to be a growing resentment
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toward what is perceived as "cultural imperialism" by Western
nations and this may act as an even greater catalyst for
xenophobic activities, activities which would undoubtedly
benefit any Islamic fundamentalist movement.
Another dissimilarity between the states in study could
be seen in the relative stage of development that each nation
found itself when afflicted by the various movements. Both
Egypt and Iran were much more developed economically, socially
and politically than Saudi Arabia when the movements struck.
Iran, in particular, had become the most modernized state in
the region before it fell to the revolutionaries. Saudi Arabia,
on the other hand, had what was best described as a medieval
society during the Wahhabi revolt. This seemingly contradic-
tory phenomenon, does not disturb the thesis concerning
Saudi Arabia's future as one might expect, for it proves
that an Islamic fundamentalist revolt can occur during any
stage of a nation's development, especially during a nation's
efforts to modernize itself.
As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia has had the distinction
of only recently emerging as a modern state. As a result of
this development, historians and Saudi ' s alike, know that the
creation of the modern state with all its social, political
and economic strains it presents, makes fertile grounds for
revolutionary activity. Indeed, it is the expressed hope of
the Saudi ruling elite that they can avoid or overcome those
strains and not repeat the mistakes of its neighboring regimes.
It appears, however, in reviewing this thesis' analysis of
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modern Saudi Arabia, that they cannot escape the inexorable
forces of the social pressures and survive as it wishes to.
A third dissimilarity between the nations lay in the
relative wealth of each state. Egypt was and still continues
to be a resource poor state and lacks the enormous wealth of
Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Iran, though having oil revenues,
was found to be financially weak at the time of its revolution.
Saudi Arabia on the other hand, has more money than it can
literally spend and hence financial difficulties appear out
of the question for the near future. This wealth presents
Saudi Arabia, then, with an effective tool which can deny
some of the social-economic problems that fundamentalist
movements prey on. It can also be, however, a two-edged
sword since it can lead to misappropriation and waste of
funds and resources as it did in the 1950 's and 1960 's.
A fourth dissimilarity can be found in the organizational
structures and ideological platforms which existed in each
movement. The Moslem Brotherhood in this case proved to be
the most highly organized and detailed in structure resulting
in a closely controlled and coordinated membership. They
created and actively pursued a detailed plan of social,
economic and political activities such as the construction
of schools, mosques, business ventures, and social welfare
programs and party politics. The Wahhabi ' s of Saudi Arabia
were seen as organized as well but to a lesser extent than
the Brethren. At first, a loosely tied army of fanatics, they
soon developed the Lkhwan with their carefully planned
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cantonments. The Iranian revolutionaries on the other hand
appeared less organized compared to the other movements.
Other than the central figurehead of Khomeini and the ulema/
Bazaari leadership, there was never an organization or plat-
form comparable to the Brethren or the Wahhabi's. Signifi-
cantly, they were still successful in their revolt and may
reflect the hypothesis that the simpler the program the
easier it is to lead the revolt.
Finally, the leadership of each movement showed dis-
parities as well. While the Brethren were led by secular
leaders and even opposed at times by the ulema, the Iranian
revolutionary leadership proved to be strictly religious,
ulema led. Striking a balance between the two movements, the
Wahhabi movement contained both lay and religious leaders in
the personage of al-Wahhab and later King Abdul Aziz ibn
Saud who acted as both religious leader and politician.
Consequently, the leadership of fundamentalist movements
can come from a variety of sources. In fact, any analysis
of the fundamentalist movements' future should include the
distinct possibility that the leadership will be secular in
personage as many lay revolutionaries will be sure to exploit
the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism not for religious
reasons but for their own covert secular ones.
The above mentioned dissimilarities, then, should be
recognized and noted by the reader in order to fully comprehend
the fundamentalist movements of the past, present and future.
They point out that each revolt was unique in themselves
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and that any future one will surely be colored differ-
ently.
With this in mind, the reader should avoid looking for
a repetition of the Brethren, Iranian and especially the
Wahhabi movements activities in other Moslem states, in par-
ticular Saudi Arabia. Instead one should foresee a rather
different movement; a movement which encompasses at one time
many of the phenomena outlined above and at the same time
reflects the unique history, society and problems found in
that state. This will certainly be the case for Saudi Arabia.
There is one final area alluded to throughout this thesis
which requires review and further study; the Western miscon-
ceptions of Islam. No study of Middle Eastern politics will
ever be complete without a complete understanding of the many
facets of the Islamic faith. In fact, the recurring unwilling-
ness to recognize the very nature of Islam, its pervasiveness
in all elements of Middle Eastern life and its central role
in the regulation and formation of the society has been the
greatest weakness of Western analysts and policy makers. It
remains the root cause for many of the West's political mis-
takes in the past and if ignored, for many mistakes in the
future
.
Consequently, to fully appreciate and accurately estimate
the political impact of Islam and its fundamentalist move-
ments, further research and education is required by Western
analysts and decision makers. Until the West can recognize





Eastern domestic and international affairs, until the Western
mind can conceive that men will fight and die in great num-
bers for religious causes and until we acknowledge that
there is no division between Church and State in Islam, all
policy decisions and intelligence estimates will remain error
prone and meaningless.
The ramifications of these misconceptions for the United
States' economic and political well being are many and obvious.
The Moslem Brotherhood, the Iranian Revolution and the Wahhabi
experience are not the only examples of militant Islam. Today,
there are many religiously based and inspired movements in
various Islamic countries. There are: The Organization of
Algerian Ulema, the Tijaniyya Brotherhood, the National
Salvation Party in Turkey, and the Basmuchi Movement in Soviet
Central Asia, to name only a few. Can the United States afford
to ignore these movements as it did in Iran?
Further, as was previously noted, the regimes of various
Moslem states are becoming more, not less, selfconsciously
Islamic both in the respect they accord their own religion
and their treatment of others. Already Pakistan has reorgan-
ized its laws to reflect the Quranic teachings. Afghanistan
is presently undergoing a religious civil war because of the
central governments' secular and pro-communist policies. Syria
too, has serious internal problems due to a resurgence of the




In sum, nationalist movements throughout the region are
becoming more popular, less nationalistic and more religiously
oriented. Does the United States recognize this fact and
formulate its policies accordingly? At the present, the
answer appears negative, for the turmoil in Iran, the ani-
mosity of the last Arab League Conference, the bitter division
created by the latest Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the
growing disenchantment of the Persian Gulf states (notably
Saudi Arabia) , the continuing conflict in Yemen and the
extremism of many Arab states have all been exacerbated by
United States' actions or more often than not, by its lack
of it.
As this appears to be the case, the United States faces
grave political problems in the Middle East, especially in
Egyptian and Saudi Arabian affairs. The recent growth of the
Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt may undermine the current peace
initiatives between Israel and Egypt. More important however,
is the questionable future stability of Saudi Arabia, currently
the linchpin of American foreign policy in the region. If
this thesis proves correct and Saudi Arabia falls to the pres-
sures of rising Islamic militancy, the United States will not
only suffer the loss of an important strategic ally but may
face a grave economic crisis in the possible loss or reduction
of that country's oil exports.
Obviously, then, the United States can no longer ignore
the political impact of Islam or its fundamentalist movements
if it wishes to retain its strategic position and power in the
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Middle East. Further the United States' intelligence
community must recognize this fact as well and refrain from using
the criterion of economic advancement as a reflection of
political stability and computer analysis as a determinant
of past and potential human behaviors. If this thesis has
proven anything, it is that the intelligence community must
study and understand the complex mass of religious, tribal
and other societal influences before an adequate prognosis
of a nation's political future can be ascertained. Hopefully,
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